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AN ANALYSIS OF THE MANDATORY ADMISSION CRITERION WITHIN 
YOUTH JUSTICE DIVERSIONARY PROCESSES 
 
 Karen Cushing  
ABSTRACT  
 
‘to require old heads upon young shoulders is inconsistent with the 
law’s compassion to human infirmity’ (Lord Diplock in Director of 
Public Prosecutions v Camplin Appellant [1978] AC 717)’ 
For young people in England and Wales who offend, diversion from formal 
proceedings has historically been a principle constituent of youth justice 
policy and practice, and presently accounts for over a third of all outcomes 
for detected youth offending (Youth Justice Board for England and Wales, 
2015).   
Although attitudes concerning diversion have often oscillated between 
favour and criticism, and there has rarely been a period of sustained 
consensus or constancy of processes (Bernard, 1992; Goldson, 2010), 
eligibility for an out of court disposal has traditionally been dependent on an 
admission of some form being made by a young person.  
This thesis seeks to place the evolution of diversionary measures for young 
people who commit low level offences or engage in nuisance behaviours 
into a contextual and historical context, and explore why an admission has 
  Cushing, K., 2016, Abstract 
iii 
 
become, in the absence of any discernible political, academic or 
professional considerations, a central tenet of diversionary policies in 
England and Wales.  
Potential barriers which may prevent some young people making an 
admission and unnecessarily losing eligibility for an out of court disposal are 
considered, as well as the nature and standard of admission expected from 
young people, and the circumstances in which admissions are usually 
sought from them. This thesis also explores whether the mandatory 
admission criterion is compatible with other statutory and international 
obligations to consider the welfare of a young person when determining a 
suitable disposal, and whether it sufficiently distinguishes between young 
people unwilling to make an admission and those who may feel unable to. 
The thesis seeks to identify the gaps in current academic and professional 
knowledge concerning whether some young people may unnecessarily 
forfeit eligibility for a diversionary outcome for the sole reason that they do 
not make an admission. The research undertaken with relevant 
professionals’ endeavours to fill these gaps by exploring the practical 
application of the admission criterion, as well considering any suitable 
alternatives within the existing statutory regime.
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
ABC  Acceptable Behaviour Contract 
ACPO  Association of Chief Police Officers 
ASBO  Anti-Social Behaviour Order 
BME  Black and Minority Ethnic 
BAEME Black and Asian Minority Ethnic 
CDA  Crime and Disorder Act 1998 
CPS  Crown Prosecution Service 
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DBO  Drinking Banning Order 
EHRC  Equality and Human Rights Commission  
FGC  Family Group Conference 
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LBJ  Local Justice Board 
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PACE  Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
PND  Penalty Notice for Disorder 
YCC  Youth Conditional Caution 
YJB  Youth Justice Board 
YRD  Youth Restorative Disposal
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
‘It is not unusual for young people to get in trouble with the police. The 
majority of those that do will only have informal or transient contact, but 
a significant minority will go on to acquire a criminal record at some 
point in their adolescence’ (Newburn, 2003:187) 
1.1 Why this area of study? 
Many young people transgress the law, and in recognition of this 
diversionary processes are a central tenet of youth justice practice and 
procedures (Ministry of Justice and Youth Justice Board, 2015; Bateman, 
2015). This thesis is an exploration of the mandatory admission criterion as 
a pre-requisite for diversion from formal prosecution in the Youth Court in 
England and Wales. 
A failure to make an admission can be an immediate barrier to eligibility for 
an out of court disposal. This is especially salient for very young people who 
have committed a low level offence who do not make an admission when 
there is no discernible advantage in prosecuting them, and their welfare is 
best served by keeping them out of the Youth Court and minimising formal 
system contact. There has however been a remarkable absence of interest 
concerning how an admission came to be a key principle of diversionary 
policy, whether it is a necessary pre-requisite and the standard of admission 
required is reasonable, and whether it disproportionately impedes 
diversionary processes. 
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As a consequence of previous experience as a police station Duty Solicitor, 
and current employment as a specialist Senior Crown Prosecutor involved 
in charging decisions and prosecutions of young people aged between 10 
and 17 years in the Youth Court, this author identified that young people 
were routinely appearing at the Youth Court who had not made an 
admission or satisfactory admission, and but for that sole reason would 
have been offered some type of formal recordable out of court disposal.  
This cohort fell outside of those young people who had not made an 
admission as they wished to deny any alleged wrongdoing and maintain 
their innocence throughout all processes, or alternatively they knew they 
were guilty of an offence but exercised their right to silence with the 
intention of putting the prosecution to proof. These were instead young 
people who had no or few antecedents and had committed a low level 
offence, and were charged and put before the Youth Court for the sole 
reason that they had not made an admission. Post-charge these young 
people often came to regret their failure to make an admission and routinely 
sought another opportunity to do so in order to gain eligibility for an out of 
court disposal. 
The likely success of requests for another police interview to make an 
admission and secure a diversionary outcome was dependent on highly 
discretionary and unregulated decision making processes, and were often 
unsuccessful, resulting in many young people accruing a formal criminal 
conviction. Despite this, there was a paucity of academic, professional or 
judicial interest in this area, and an identifiable knowledge gap.  
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These anecdotal views were subsequently corroborated by primary 
research undertaken with other relevant professionals (Chapters 3.3 -3.7 
and Chapters 7.0 -7.18). 
Chapters 7.1 and 7.2 further examines what existing knowledge there is 
concerning the admission criterion and why this area has been neglected by 
academics and professionals. 
Although this thesis seeks to explore features of diversionary processes 
which prevent young people making an admission and gaining eligibility for 
an out of court disposal, it recognises that an admission should only be 
made by a young person if there is, or is likely to be, sufficient evidence for 
a realistic prospect of conviction. In the absence of such evidence it is 
reasonable and proper to either deny any wrongdoing or to exercise a right 
to silence, and this course of action can sometimes result in the best 
outcome for a young person. 
This thesis distinguishes however between those young people who 
knowingly or wilfully do not make an admission in the knowledge that it shall 
preclude a diversionary outcome - such as those who intend to deny an 
offence, raise a defence or put the prosecution to proof by exercising their 
right to silence - and those young people who do not make an admission or 
fail to make a satisfactory admission when there is no discernible advantage 
to them, and no apparent reason why they took this course of action, and 
which is subsequently regretted.  
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The original analysis of existing literature and other secondary data 
(Chapters Four and Five) seeks to place the development of the admission 
criterion within an historical context, explore why it has become a central 
tenet within diversionary practices, examine whether the existing criterion is 
necessary, whether it is too onerous, whether the circumstances in which an 
admission is usually sought are reasonable, and whether any alternative 
regimes or amendments to existing practices may reduce the likelihood of a 
failure to make an admission. 
The primary research undertaken with relevant professionals directly 
involved in processes where admissions are sought from young people who 
offend – police officers, police civilian interviewers and legal representatives 
(defence solicitors and accredited police station representatives) – sought to 
answer the same research questions (Chapters 3.4 – 3.6 and Chapter 
Seven) 
1.2 Chapter Summary 
Chapter Two considers the nebulous concept of what diversion means in 
the wider field of youth justice, and how the formalisation and expansion of 
diversionary practices has primarily displaced the use of non-recordable 
informal measures. Although the admission criterion has become a central 
tenet of statutory diversionary regimes, and this thesis seeks to identify 
improvements in the existing diversionary regime so that a greater number 
of eligible young people do not unnecessarily lose this disposal, this chapter 
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recognises that some diversionary measures often still results in other 
formal system contact. 
Chapter Three sets out the key research questions and research design, 
which involved a multi-method approach, and included original analysis and 
review of secondary ‘white’ and ‘grey’ material, analysis of case law, and 
research with stakeholders engaged at the forefront of diversionary 
practices, namely police officers, civilian interviewers (civilian police 
employees who are increasingly tasked with interviewing suspects in 
custody) and defence legal representatives.  
The research was intended to answer three key questions: 
I. Is the admission criterion an unnecessary barrier for young 
people who have committed a low level offence gaining eligibility 
for a diversionary disposal? 
II. If so, why are some young people not admitting an offence when 
it is often in their best interests to do so? 
III. Are there alternative criterion or amendments to existing practices 
which may better facilitate young people gaining access to 
diversionary outcomes? 
Chapter Four examines and contextualises the historical, political and social 
variances concerning diversionary disposals for young people who offend, 
and how the practice of an informal police admonishment, which was initially 
wholly reliant on the unfettered discretion of a police constable, developed 
throughout the twentieth and early twenty-first century into a rigidly 
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prescriptive statutory practice, where a young person is ordinarily expected 
to make a clear and reliable admission to all elements of the offence, often 
during one police interview and whilst detained in custody.  
The admission criterion is further considered within the context of 
diversionary measures which have operated since the late nineteenth 
century, and have ranged from an admonishment, informal police caution, 
formal police caution, caution plus, reprimand, Final Warning, Penalty 
Notice for Disorder (PND), Fixed Penalty Notice (FPN), Acceptable 
Behaviour Contract (ABC), Drinking Banning Order (DBO), Youth 
Restorative Disposal (YRD), Youth Caution, Youth Conditional Caution 
(YCC) and Community Resolution, as well as a myriad of alternative 
diversionary disposals operating within separate regional schemes.  
Within this chapter this thesis explores the historical tensions between the 
police and magistracy to retain authority for determining outcomes for young 
people who offend, the extraordinary variances in regional diversionary 
practices, and initiatives which ostensibly sought to de-criminalise or 
support young people but which in fact widened the net of young people 
drawn into the criminal justice system. This thesis seeks to highlight the 
absence of any consideration of the necessity for the admission criterion 
throughout these cycles of diversionary policies, despite it usually being a 
key element of these procedures. 
Chapter Four also seeks to contextualise how attitudes and policies 
concerning the diversion of young people who offend have oscillated at 
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times between radical benevolence and rigid punitiveness, and how these 
influences may have affected the nature and standard of admission 
required. Contemporary diversionary processes are further also examined 
within this context. 
Chapter Five considers the development of international and domestic 
human rights within domestic youth justice practices, and whether the 
mandatory admission criterion is compatible with other welfare centred 
statutory considerations concerning young people who offend. 
Chapter Six seeks to identify when, why, and how an admission became a 
key pillar of diversionary policy in England and Wales. It also explores what 
the current criterion is, what opportunities there are to make an admission, 
and in what circumstances. The processes of arrest, detention in custody, a 
formal police interview, pre-interview disclosure, likely knowledge of 
diversionary processes, and the role of key participants such as police and 
civilian interviewers, Appropriate Adults and defence legal representatives 
within these processes are further examined. 
This chapter also examines the complexities of what constitutes a clear and 
reliable admission, and the fact that young people are expected to 
understand often complex legal issues when providing an account to the 
police. A number of cases where these complexities have resulted in 
arguably the unnecessary prosecution of a young person are considered, 
and the existing rigorous criterion is contrasted with the less demanding 
admission criterion adult offenders are currently subjected to.  
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Chapter Six further explores the amplified admission criterion in the 
controversial Crime and Disorder Act 1998, and why the present statutory 
regime, the Legal Aid Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 
(LASPO), adopted this rigorous criterion despite the then Conservative-led 
Coalition Government’s intention to simplify out of court procedures and 
increase discretion within decision making processes. This chapter also 
considers the anomalies in the existing statutory regimes concerning 
admissions, notably the radically different requirement under the Youth 
Conditional Cautioning protocol that an admission does not have to be 
immediate and a young person does not have to admit all elements of the 
offence. 
The mandatory admission criterion is further considered in this chapter as 
potentially in conflict with other statutory obligations to ensure that the 
welfare of a young person is a primary consideration within diversionary 
processes, and whether it is especially disadvantageous for young BME 
people who are arguably less likely than white youths to willingly engage 
with the police. Other factors which may be of relevance when an admission 
is not made are further examined, including young people’s often conflictual 
relationship with the police and other authority figures, wider cultural factors, 
and the fact that they are statistically more likely to have offended with at 
least one other of a similar age, and thus have a greater fear of inculpating 
another if they make an admission. 
Chapter Six also considers the standard of admission for a diversionary 
outcome in other jurisdictions, and whether these may be more suitable 
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alternatives to the existing statutory criterion. It also examines the standard 
of admission required in alternative restorative processes, especially in 
Northern Ireland where Youth Conferencing takes place, and was recently 
recommended by some commentators as a suitable model for England and 
Wales. 
Chapter Six also considers the practical benefits of the admission criterion 
for decision makers, and whether some form of admission of wrongdoing 
may in fact enhance young people’s autonomy and citizenship, and is an 
important ‘temporal aspect of responsibility’ within criminal justice 
processes. 
Chapter Seven sets out a thematic analysis of the views of relevant 
stakeholders within the context of the research questions. This chapter also 
considers whether the mandatory admission criterion is a necessary, 
proportionate or reasonable pre-requisite for young people who commit low 
level offences to secure an out of court disposal. Suggested alternatives to 
existing practices which may better enable the diversion of young people 
who offend from formal processes wherever possible are considered. 
1.3 Terminology 
The power and impact of justice language is routinely influenced by ‘moral 
entrepreneurs’ (Coyle 2013:xiii), and the language used to define young 
people who fall within the criminal justice system has at times construed 
children in a castigatory manner (Jones, 2010:345) in order to sanction 
punitive policies.  
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There is no legal definition in England and Wales of the term ‘youth’ and 
terminology for children and adolescents who fall within the criminal youth 
justice system has historically varied from descriptions of ’children’, 
‘juveniles’, ‘young offenders’ and more recently ‘young people who offend’.  
At present the youth justice system is defined as a system of criminal justice 
in so far as it relates to children and young people (section 42(1) Crime and 
Disorder Act 1998) and there are several statutory definitions of young 
people, including ‘children’ (those aged 10-13 years - s.107(1) Children and 
Young Persons Act 1933); ‘young people’ (those who have attained the age 
of 14 years and are under the age of 18 years - s.101(1) Children and 
Young Persons Act 1933); ‘juveniles’ (those aged 10-17 years in the context 
of detention at a police station and bail hearings - s.37(15) Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Code C paragraph 1.5); ‘juveniles’ (those aged 
10 – 17 years for the purposes of the Youth Court – s.29 Magistrates Court 
Act 1980); and ‘child’ as anyone under the age of 18 years (s.105(1) 
Children Act 1989 and section 65(1) Children Act  2004). Article 1 of the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the child also defines a child as 
any human being under the age of 18 years.  
Wherever possible this thesis refers to young people aged 10-17 years 
within the youth justice system as ‘young people who offend’, which reflects 
both current vernacular and an arguably less negative label than some 
earlier definitions.  
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2.0 CHAPTER TWO: DIVERSION AND ADMISSIONS 
 ‘The path to hell is paved with good intentions’ (Bullington, et al, 1978:71) 
2.1 Introduction 
This thesis seeks to place the evolution of the police caution and other out 
of court disposals into an historical context, and explore why an admission 
has become a central tenet of diversionary policies in England and Wales. It 
also seeks to explore the views and knowledge base of relevant 
professionals - police, civilian interviewers and legal representatives – 
concerning their understanding of how the admission criterion currently 
operates within diversionary processes, and their own practices concerning 
admissions within diversionary processes. The conventional notion of 
‘diversion’ requires however a wide construction and should be treated with 
some circumspection (Koffman and Dingwall, 2007). 
2.2 Definitions of Diversion 
There is no definitive definition of what the diversion of a young person who 
offends from entering the formal court system is, or what they are to be 
diverted to, and notions of diversion have oscillated between the desirability 
of no intervention of any type, to informal and non-recordable diversion, 
diversion away from the Youth Court but towards a formal and recordable 
interventionist system, and diversion from prohibited behaviours (Goldson, 
2000; Newburn and Souhami, 2005).  
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Despite the weight policy makers have placed on the probative value of 
diversion within youth justice practices and procedures: 
‘Considering how ubiquitous the concept is in the youth justice 
sphere, the lack of a cogent definition of ‘diversion’…is remarkable’ 
(Kelly, 2014:125). 
Diversion has alternately been categorised or classified as: 
‘The channelling of cases to non-court institutions, in instances where 
these cases would ordinarily have received an adjudicatory (or fact 
finding hearing) by the court’ (Nejelski, 1976:393); 
‘a flagpole around which radicals and reformers can still hang their 
colours, can push forward initiatives and innovations at the margins 
of the juvenile justice arena’ (Pratt, 1986:230); 
‘the idea of a system of different responses’ (Dingwall and Harding, 
1998:2); 
‘a convenient shorthand for a wide range of decisions designed to 
divert people from crime, from court and from custody’ (Goldson, 
2008:147); 
and 
‘The process of keeping offenders and other problem populations 
away from the institutional arrangements of criminal justice or 
welfare’ (Lee, 2013:102). 
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Recently, the use of the term ‘diversion’ has fallen out of favour, and there is 
increasing use of the alternative ‘out of court’ disposal (Ministry of Justice, 
2010a; Youth Justice Board for England and Wales, 2014). This thesis uses 
both terms interchangeably at times, intending to describe those processes 
where a young person is not charged and put before the Youth Court, and is 
instead offered some type of formal or informal alternative which may or 
may not involve another form of system contact. 
2.3 Diversion and formal system contact 
Though offering a mechanism for avoiding prosecution, formal diversion 
results in a recordable criminal sanction and subsequent criminal record, 
which may not necessarily be immediately expunged (Rehabilitation of 
Offenders Act 1974 (Exceptions) Order 1975). Formal diversion from the 
Youth Court thus frequently falls short of diversion from the criminal justice 
process in its entirety (Goldson, 2000) and many of the outcomes this thesis 
refers to as ‘diversionary disposals’ are arguably in fact sanctions and not 
truly diversionary at all -  this distinction is acknowledged in this thesis.  
The formalisation and expansion of diversionary practices has on occasion 
displaced the use of non-recordable informal measures, and paradoxically 
resulted in the net-widening (discussed further at paragraphs 4.6, 4.8. 4.14, 
4.20-4.22.2 and 5.3) and escalation of young people into the criminal justice 
system (Austin, et al, 1981; Cohen, 1985; Reid, 1997; McMahon, 1990; 
Dingwall and Harding, 1998; Goldson, 2000; Bateman, 2002; Ministry of 
Justice, 2010a).  
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It is also seen by some as a highly interventionist process, which produces 
or consolidates delinquent identities (Goldson, 2000:43) fosters desistance 
amongst young people as a consequence of negative or adversarial police 
contact (McAra and McVie, 2007) and: 
‘compromises the right of defendants to be presumed innocent, 
relieves the prosecution of the burden of proving guilt, and may bring 
intolerable pressure to bear upon those eager to escape the police 
station or fearful of the prospect of prosecution to admit an offence 
they may not have committed (Ashworth and Zedner, 2008:25; see 
also Dingwall and Gillespie, 2007). 
Diversionary measures are also primarily sub-judicial processes operated in 
the main by the police, affording them vast discretionary power as both 
interviewer and adjudicator in determining and administrating out of court 
disposals (Hinds, 2007; Wells, 2007; Independent Commission on Youth 
Crime and Anti-Social Behaviour, 2010). Such measures accordingly have 
the potential to jeopardise established principles of procedural fairness 
(Eliarts and Dumortier, 2003; Dingwall and Gillespie, 2007; Reiner and 
Newburn, 2007; Padfield, et al, 2012; Scheuerman and Keith, 2015; Barnes, 
et al, 2015).   
Formal diversionary measures which result in a recordable sanction are also 
on occasion imposed to primarily facilitate welfare orientated intervention, 
such as assistance with housing, education, skills, health, drug use, and 
adverse peer influence. These measures arguably fall within Platt’s (1969) 
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critique of the ‘child-savers’, whose nineteenth century initiatives to 
benevolently manage troublesome youth inadvertently gave rise to the 
adverse notion of the juvenile delinquent and concomitant criminalisation 
through the establishment of special judicial and correctional institutions. 
Goldson argues against formal system contact wherever possible, even by 
way of diversionary measures or targeted early intervention, and suggests 
that: 
‘There is substantial evidence to suggest that early intervention via 
youth justice systems is counter-productive when measured in terms 
of crime prevention and community safety and, as such, it fails the 
public interest…Empirical evidence reveals that early intervention via 
youth justice systems can expose children and young people to the 
prospect of unnecessary harm and impose iatrogenic effects’ 
(Goldson, 2013a:2, see also Gatti, et al, 2009). 
2.4 Rehabilitation of diversion? 
Conversely, Newburn argues it is timely to rehabilitate the notion of 
diversion from the one-sided debate of the 1990s (Newburn, 2011). 
Although system contact is considered by some as inherently criminogenic 
(McAra and McVie, 2005, 2007), diversion by way of a formal recordable 
diversionary disposal outside of the Youth Court has also been considered: 
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‘cost effective, proportionate and works in the sense that young 
people who are cautioned are less likely to be reconvicted than those 
who are prosecuted’ (Evans, 2008:147). 
Notwithstanding a formal diversionary disposal still involves some system 
contact and an official antecedent record, there is other research which 
suggests diversion can have a positive effect on recidivism (Wilson and 
Hoge, 2012). There are also other practical benefits when a young person is 
diverted away from the Youth Court, as they avoid the ordeal of being 
formally charged, are spared the stresses of the Youth Court, and are not 
subjected to a recordable conviction or the rigours of any sentence 
imposed.  
Although the limitations and deficiencies of diversion by way of a formal 
recordable disposal are acknowledged, as well as divergent research 
concerning the efficacy of informal restorative diversionary measures 
(Lynch, 2012), whilst formal diversion remains - and is likely to remain - a 
core tenet of diversionary practices in England and Wales, this thesis seeks 
to draw attention to fundamental limitations in the current regime, namely 
the mandatory admission criterion.  
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3.0 CHAPTER THREE: THE RESEARCH DESIGN  
3.1 Key Research Questions 
I. Is the admission criterion an unnecessary barrier for young 
people who have committed a low level offence gaining eligibility 
for a diversionary disposal? 
II. If so, why are some young people not admitting an offence when 
it is often in their best interests to do so? 
III. Are there are alternative criterion or amendments to existing 
practices which may better facilitate young people gaining access 
to diversionary outcomes? 
Diversionary processes in the field of youth justice have attracted 
considerable political and academic interest, and consequently a body of 
substantial published material is available. Despite however the central 
importance of the admission criterion to these processes, there is seemingly 
an absence of identifiable literature or data concerning how it operates 
within these processes.   
This thesis seeks to re-position the admission criterion into mainstream 
youth justice academic discourse and examine the history of both 
diversionary processes for young people who offend, and the concomitant 
development of the admission criterion as a gateway or barrier to an out of 
court disposal. It traces the trends and rationales as to how the police 
caution developed from a highly discretionary and informal practice to a 
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more formal and rigid process, and seeks to identify when and why and 
admission became a mandatory pre-requisite for a formal out of court 
disposal.  
It also seeks to identify whether young people are unnecessarily forfeiting 
eligibility for an out of court disposal for the sole reason that they do not 
make an admission, and if so, for what reasons.  It additionally seeks to 
explore whether the mandatory admission criterion for young people who 
commit a low level offence is a necessary, proportionate and reasonable 
pre-condition, and whether any alternative criterion or amendments to 
existing practices may better facilitate young people gaining access to 
diversionary outcomes.  
3.2 Methodology 
There is never only one ideal research method (Nelken, 2007), and given 
the nature of the research questions and the absence of other research 
which has examined the admission criterion within diversionary processes, 
in order to fully understand the admission criterion and its centrality within 
diversionary processes it was necessary to consider the historical, social 
and biographical aspects of both the development of out of court disposals 
as well as the development of diversionary criterion for eligibility - or to 
explore diversion and admissions through the ‘sociological imagination’ 
(Wright Mills, 2000).  
Criminology is a genuinely interdisciplinary research field’ (Meuser and 
Löschper, 2002:26), and a multi-method approach was necessary to both 
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broaden the depth of research but also complement and integrate the 
research findings (Marshall and Rossman, 1999). Research undertaken 
includes a literature review, an original analysis of secondary sources, the 
examination of primary legislation and policy documents to identify how the 
admission criterion developed and what its current status is within 
diversionary practices, and the identification of what, if any, data there is 
relating to whether the admission criterion may prevent some young people 
unnecessarily losing the opportunity to receive a diversionary disposal.  
In addition, framework analysis was used to facilitate and interpret the 
findings from two data and information strategies - a questionnaire and 
follow-up interview. These two strategies were devised in order to best 
achieve data rich responses from key participants in diversionary 
processes. Given that the police interview is for many young people the only 
venue and opportunity to make an admission and gain eligibility for an out of 
court disposal, police officers and legal representatives were identified as 
key participants. For practical and professional/ethical reasons it was not 
feasible to interview young people themselves (as discussed below at 
paragraph 3.8).  
The nature of these mixed research methods falls outside of any strict 
definition of either quantitative or qualitative data, and draws on elements of 
both research processes. The questionnaire and interviews were primarily, 
but not exclusively, a quantitative research method intended to generate 
‘facts’, however it also sought to uncover patterns, behaviours, opinions and 
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other defined variables. As such, it in part also comprises qualitative 
research, which ordinarily seeks to explore trends, thoughts and opinions 
(Bachman and Schutt, 2014).  Quantitative and qualitative research 
methods are also arguably both poles on a multi-dimensional research 
continuum (Bazeley, 2009) and any attempt to wholly distinguish them is 
both artificial and unhelpful to the researcher (Hagan, 2014).  
This research was also influenced by reflective-action research as a primary 
theoretical base, as it intended, through the participation of practitioners in 
diversionary youth justice procedures, to invite them via the questionnaire 
and follow-up interviews to assess and examine the mandatory admission 
criterion within existing processes and: 
‘arrive at recommendations for good practice that will tackle a 
problem or enhance the performance of the organisation and 
individuals through changes to the rules and procedures within which 
they operate’ (Denscombe, 2002: 2; see also Coghlin and Brannick, 
2010). 
This research falls outside however of true action research, as the key 
participants – police officers and legal defence solicitors - were outside of 
this researcher’s own profession, and any findings were unlikely to affect 
any change within the participant’s own practices. 
The multi-method research further sought to identify what was distinctive in 
the practice and discourse of these key participants - those findings were 
then triangulated with the original analysis of primary and secondary 
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sources and the literature review in order to contextualise the admission 
criterion within ‘a history of the present’, and illuminate and understand the 
rationales and dynamics of how it operates within the sphere of youth justice 
(Garland, 2001: 1-26). Triangulation is also a useful means of integrating 
multiple forms of evidence which can often engender more meaningful 
research findings (Jick, 1979). 
3.3 Literature review and original analysis of secondary sources  
This thesis considered not only ‘white’ literature such as academic 
publications, reported case law, international human rights treaties, 
conventions and rules, and Youth Justice Board policy and statistical 
publications, but also sought out where available ‘grey’ literature, or: 
‘manifold document types produced on all levels of government, 
academics, business and industry in print and electronic formats that 
are protected by intellectual property rights, of sufficient quality to be 
collected and preserved by library holdings or institutional 
repositories, but not controlled by commercial publishers i.e., where 
publishing is not the primary activity of the producing body’ (Schöpfel, 
2013:12). 
Grey literature examined within this thesis included Home Office Circulars, 
Government Research Reports, Royal Commission Reports, Police Enquiry 
Reports, Association of Chief Constables (ACPO) Guidelines, regional 
police policy documents, non-reported case law and other doctoral theses’. 
The Bodleian Library at the University of Oxford held much of this material 
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and kindly granted unrestricted access. When this material was not 
available at the Bodleian Library, it was sourced alternatively between the 
National Archives and the British Library.  
This material was sourced both by physical review of hard copy publications 
in the criminology, jurisprudence, law and youth justice sections of the 
Bodleian Library, but also using the Oxford University Solo/OxLip search 
engine, the Westlaw and EBSCO databases and the University of 
Bedfordshire DISCOVER catalogue. Other search engines included Google 
Scholar and the Crown Prosecution Service intranet legal-resource, with the 
most frequent search terms used including ‘youth diversion’, ‘youth caution’, 
‘youth admissions’, ‘police caution’, ‘informal caution’ ‘reprimand and Final 
Warning’ and ‘youth conditional caution’. ‘Juvenile’ was substituted for 
‘youth’ during the searches in order to access earlier and international 
material. The term ‘police caution’ proved the most challenging search term, 
as in addition to an informal or formal sanction/disposal ‘police caution’ also 
describes the mandatory explanation of a person’s rights the police must 
make after an arrest, unless impractical to do so. 
These search terms were also entered into the electronic search engines of 
a number of journals, including Youth Justice: An International Journal, The 
British Journal of Criminology, The Howard Journal of Criminal Justice, The 
Criminal Law Review, Contemporary Issues in Criminology, Criminology 
and Criminal Justice, European Journal of Criminology and the Journal of 
Mixed Methods Research. 
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3.4 Identifying research participants 
This research was intended to examine how the admission criterion affects 
young people who have offended, and the most potentially probative line of 
enquiry was to interview those young people who had been accused of 
committing a low level offence and who were prima facie eligible for a 
diversionary disposal, but were charged and put before the Youth Court for 
the sole reason that they did not make a satisfactory admission. For 
practical and ethical reasons (as discussed at paragraph 3.8) it was not 
possible to undertake that research. 
The qualitative researcher is however encouraged to: 
‘look through a wide lens searching for patterns of interrelationship 
between previously unspecified sets of concepts’ (Brannen, 1995:4),  
and as the most significant element of diversionary processes is arguably a 
young person’s police interview - as this is usually the only opportunity 
available to make an admission - access was sought to police officers and 
civilian interviewers involved in the interview process, as well as defence 
solicitors and accredited police station legal representatives who advise and 
represent young people in police interviews. 
One regional Police Force Authority was approached with a request for 
direct access to police officers of all ranks and civilian interviewers, by way 
of face to face interview and completion of a semi-structured, self-
administered survey. Consent was granted after an Assistant Chief 
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Constable accepted, after considering a draft article prepared by this 
researcher summarising the literature review and key research questions, 
that there was a need for further research. That draft article was 
subsequently accepted for publication prior to submission of this thesis 
(Cushing, 2014).  
The only pre-conditions imposed by this Police Force Authority were that 
their identity and that of any police officer or civilian interviewer who 
participated in any aspect of the research were not disclosed, and that the 
interviews were not tape recorded. This request was subsequently approved 
by the University of Bedfordshire Ethics Committee. 
This regional Police Force Authority encompassed multiple counties, and for 
practical and resource reasons the research was confined to one particular 
county within this Police Force Authority. This county was selected as it was 
relatively representative of most other police regions, being sufficiently large 
and diverse, and due to previous professional relationships this author was 
able to efficiently secure participant consent for this research. The county 
had between 2012-2013 a population in excess of 600,000, the numbers of 
young people aged between 10-17 years who came to the attention of the 
police as a consequence of alleged offending was commensurate with 
national averages, and there were similarly no distinct variances in the use 
of diversion or prosecution outside of the national average (Office for 
National Statistics, 2013; Youth Justice Board, 2013).  
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There were however significant variations in the ethnic and socio-economic 
composition of this county.  More than 20% of the city population identified 
itself as BAME (Black, Asian or another Minority Ethnic), however within 
rural areas this fell to between 3% and 7%. Similarly, 20% of local 
authorities within and near to the city region were categorised as amongst 
the most deprived nationally, whereas 10% of rural areas were 
characterised as the most affluent (Office for National Statistics, 2013). 
Given these significant variables, access for the purposes of the 
questionnaire and follow-up interviews with police officers and civilian case 
interviewers was granted to the main city police station and one rural police 
station. It later became apparent however that the majority of police officers 
and civilian interviewers had been located at both police stations at some 
stage, and young people in custody were routinely transferred from the city 
police station to the rural police station on the occasions when the city cells 
were full, or they were taken directly there after arrest for the same reason.  
Consequently, despite the considerable differentials within the city and rural 
areas concerning ethnicity and deprivation, and other research which has 
identified divergent practices between city and rural/semi-rural police areas, 
it was not possible to examine whether there were any identifiable divergent 
practices between the city and rural police stations concerning the 
admission criterion and the diversion of young people who committed low 
level offences. There were however a number of identifiable opportunities 
for other research which were likely to contribute to greater knowledge in 
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this under-researched field of youth justice, as discussed further in this 
chapter. 
3.5 Questionnaire and interviews – police officers and civilian interviewers 
The questionnaire was developed in order to elicit from police 
officers/civilian interviews their standard of knowledge and attitude 
concerning: 
i. the statutory admission criterion; 
ii. diversionary processes; 
iii. features of the admission criterion during the diversionary process 
which may facilitate or hinder admissions; 
iv. any amendments to the current regime which may best assist 
young people who offend to secure eligibility for an out of court 
disposal. 
The content of the questionnaire was derived from a combination of this 
researcher’s own professional experience, the initial findings from the 
literature review, collaboration with the thesis supervisor and also 
suggestions from other professionals during the peer review process. A 
draft police questionnaire and explanatory letter explaining its purpose was 
peer reviewed by a supervisor and another researcher at the University of 
Bedfordshire to ensure adherence to best practice guidelines (Fowler, 
1995). It was then piloted on two police officers who were selected through 
an existing professional connection. Both officers had more than 15 years’ 
experience and held the rank of Sergeant. This resulted in a number of 
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revisions, primarily concerning less use of legalese in some questions, and 
condensing the number of questions from 50 to no more than 30, after 
feedback that participants would be more willing to participate if the 
questionnaire was shorter.  
A mixture of open and closed questions were used to gather both 
quantitative and qualitative data – quantitative data primarily concerning the 
experience of each participant in diversionary processes and interviewing 
young people as suspects. Qualitative data sought included their attitudes 
and methods concerning these processes, their relationship with other 
participants, and their views on the admission criterion within diversionary 
practices. 
The Assistant Chief Constable who consented to this research - as well as 
the final draft of the questionnaire and the explanatory letter attached to 
each questionnaire - further advised that there was on average a response 
rate of less than 20% within his/her force for voluntary paper questionnaires 
of this type, and an even lower response for online surveys.  
In order to achieve a higher response rate, the Assistant Chief Constable 
consented to the request that Case Directors at the two police stations - 
police officers who hold charging responsibilities and quality check all 
prosecution files before they are sent to the CPS - would make direct 
requests to police officers and civilian interviewers to complete the 
questionnaire, and the only selection process would that the candidate had 
previous experience of interviewing a young person. Case Directors were 
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identified as the most suitable conduit to identify potential respondents, as 
through the nature of their role also had contact with the greatest number of 
possible candidates. The University of Bedfordshire Ethics Committee 
subsequently approved the explanatory letter (Appendix 1), questionnaire 
(Appendix 3) and these research methods. 
This approach resulted in 52 requests and 32 responses – an overall return 
rate of 61% which was considerably higher than typical responses to 
surveys of this nature (Hagan, 2014). Three responses however were only 
partially completed and therefore excluded from analysis on the grounds 
that partial responses may adversely affect the overall thematic analysis of 
responses and data calculations. Of the completed responses 21 were from 
respondents primarily located at the city police station, and 8 from officers 
usually based at the rural police station. 4 responses were from civilian 
interviewers, 17 responses were from police officers with less than 5 years’ 
experience and 17 responses were from police officers with more than 5 
years’ experience (Appendix 7). 
Arrangements were made for officers to complete the questionnaire in a 
room next to the Case Directors’ office. It was subsequently disclosed by a 
Case Director that some officers (estimated between 6 and 8) completed 
the questionnaire together at the same time, and it is thus not known 
whether they discussed the questionnaire prior to completion, and if so 
whether their answers may have been influenced by any discussions 
amongst them.  The Case Directors advised that upon completion of the 
questionnaire participants posted them into a secure box file which was later 
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forwarded to this researcher via the DX postal system. Upon receipt all 
questionnaire responses (and the notes from the follow-up interviews) were 
stored in a secure cabinet in this researcher’s office. 
The Case Directors were further designated by the Assistant Chief 
Constable to identify candidates for a follow-up interview, with the only 
selection criterion that they had experience of interviewing young people as 
suspects.  22 police officers, 6 civilian interviewers and 5 officers of the rank 
of Sergeant or above agreed to participate in an interview (Appendix 7). 
This was lower than the response rate for the questionnaires, and the Case 
Directors advised that the police officers who did decline to participate all 
did so only due to other work commitments. 
The interview questions sought to add descriptive and thematic data to the 
primarily quantitative data obtained from the questionnaire. The content of 
the interview questions was derived from a combination of this researcher’s 
own professional experience, the initial findings from the literature review, 
initial findings from the questionnaires, collaboration with the thesis 
supervisor and also suggestions from other professionals during the peer 
review process. The interview schedule contained 30 questions (Appendix 
5). 
Interviews took place over five days during a four week period at the city 
police station, as there were operational matters which prohibited access 
during the research period to the rural police station. 26 of the interviewees 
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also had experience working at the rural police station however. Of the 22 
police officers, 12 had less than five years’ experience.  
Each interview took place in a closed room opposite the Case Directors’ 
office, where privacy and confidentiality were maintained. Of the 33 
interviewees, 14 had previously met this researcher either at court or 
previously at the police station for a separate professional matter, and 
another 9 indicated that this researcher may have previously dealt with one 
of their cases. The quality of the answers in these interviews must thus be 
considered in this context, as interviewee’s may conceivably have been less 
likely to express certain views which fell outside of their own organisation’s 
policies and code of conduct, and may have been more candid if 
interviewed by an independent researcher at a location outside of the police 
station. 
Each interview lasted for approximately 25 minutes. The only personal 
details retained from each interviewee were whether they were a civilian 
interviewer or police officer, length of service, rank, and experience 
interviewing young people as suspects. Handwritten notes were made of all 
responses and each response was identified with the following alpha-
numeric codes beginning with: 
i. JPO: junior police officer with less than 5 years’ experience; 
ii. EPO: experienced police officer with more than 5 years’ experience; 
iii. CI: civilian interviewer. 
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As civilian interviewers were a recent initiative none had more than 5 years’ 
experience at that time, and it was not necessary to distinguish their 
experience in the same manner as police officers. 
Further details concerning the categories of respondents are contained 
within Paragraph 7.5 and Appendix 7 of this thesis. 
3.6 Questionnaire and interviews – defence solicitors/legal representatives 
A separate questionnaire was devised for defence solicitors and accredited 
police station legal representatives (non-qualified solicitors who represent 
suspects in custody), which although intended to answer the same research 
questions being sought of police officers and civilian interviewers, was 
necessary in order to reflect their separate role from the police, as well as 
their distinct experiences. The author of this thesis was able to use existing 
professional contacts with criminal defence solicitors and accredited legal 
representatives to assist with the drafting, peer review and completion of the 
questionnaire. A draft questionnaire was piloted on one local solicitor, who 
made minor suggestions for revision, primarily concerning the re-drafting of 
some leading questions to open questions.  
The peer reviewer also advised that many legal representatives would be 
unlikely to participate in this research due to a number of factors, including 
the considerable work pressures most were experiencing at that time, the 
additional anxiety many felt concerning proposed changes to legal aid 
funding arrangements - which if implemented would reduce the number of 
local firms by more than three quarters - as well as the fact that this 
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researcher was at that time a CPS employee and may intentionally or 
inadvertently negatively stereo-type defence legal representatives.  
In anticipation of a low response rate and in order to gain as much 
information from local solicitors and accredited legal representatives as 
possible, the legal representative questionnaire was significantly larger than 
the police questionnaire and contained 50 questions, as opposed to the 
police version which contained 30 questions. Although this length may have 
potentially dissuaded some respondents from completing it, the benefits of a 
longer questionnaire were initially considered to outweigh this. This variance 
did however subsequently cause difficulties during the Survey Monkey 
collation stage, and additional coding and thematic analysis of the 
responses was undertaken manually using an Excel spreadsheet in order to 
code and analyse the responses. 
In order to examine the relationship between police and legal 
representatives during diversionary processes, and restrict the research to 
practices in one county, legal representative’s unknown to this author who 
practiced in another area were not pursued. Although existent professional 
relationships afforded expeditious access to this cohort, it also potentially 
undermined the integrity of some responses, as there was the possibility 
that some of these professionals would be reluctant to admit to a lack of 
procedural or technical knowledge given the professional embarrassment 
this may cause them. The University of Bedfordshire Ethics Committee 
subsequently approved the explanatory letter (Appendix 2) questionnaire 
(Appendix 4) and the follow-up interview questions and arrangements.  
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Requests were made both in person and in writing to individual solicitors 
practicing within the same region as the Police Force Region. 31 
questionnaires were personally handed to legal representatives over the 
course of three months, another 50 questionnaires were left in the 
advocates’ room at one Magistrates Court with an explanatory letter, and 
another 30 were sent to 6 local law firms who employed accredited police 
station representatives. Attached to each questionnaire was an explanatory 
letter and pre-paid envelope with the return address of a PO Box which was 
hired for this purpose and all responses were returned anonymously. 
Of the 111 questionnaires sent out only 23 were returned, with 11 returned 
personally and the remaining 12 sent via the postal box. Of these 
responses, 20 were from solicitors and 3 from accredited legal 
representatives. This was a return rate of only 26%, and would likely have 
been even lower but for the existence of professional relationships with 
some respondents and the opportunity to chase responses, which facilitated 
the return of some questionnaires. All of the returned responses were 
complete. The 3 accredited police station representatives who answered the 
questionnaire all had more than 5 years’ experience, 3 responses were from 
qualified solicitors with less than 5 years’ experience and 15 responses 
were from qualified solicitors with more than five years’ experience 
(Appendix 7).  
Personal requests were made to 22 local defence solicitors and three 
accredited legal representatives for participation in an interview. All were 
identified from personal knowledge that they had experience representing 
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young people. 14 solicitors subsequently consented to an interview, which 
took place over a 6-week period at a local Youth Court either during a 
recess or at the end of the court sitting. All had more than 5 years’ 
experience (Appendix 7). Two of the interviewees disclosed they had not 
completed the questionnaire and this was not a follow-up interview. No 
accredited police station representatives agreed to participate. The solicitors 
who participated came from 6 of the 10 local firms which undertook publicly 
funded police station representation within the county.  
The content of the interview questions was derived from a combination of 
this researcher’s own professional experience, the initial findings from the 
literature review and questionnaires, collaboration with the thesis supervisor 
and also suggestions from other professionals during the peer review 
process. Although the legal advisor questionnaire had been considerably 
larger than the police questionnaire, given the time pressures on 
interviewees and also the practical benefits of corresponding police and 
legal advisor questions, the legal advisor interview questions were 
contained to 30 questions - the same number as the police interview 
questions. 
Each interview took place in a private room at the local Magistrates Court. 
Given the police had refused consent for the tape recording of interviews, 
no request was made to tape record these interviews either, as this disparity 
may have undermined the participants’ confidence in the independence and 
integrity of the research. One interview was subsequently excluded from 
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analysis as the interviewee later indicated that he/she no longer wished to 
participate in this research due to a professional conflict. 
Each interview lasted approximately 40 minutes – significantly longer than 
the police interviews. The legal representatives were all generous with their 
time given their work pressures, and expressed a genuine interest in the 
research questions. The only personal details retained were the number of 
years the interviewees had represented young people at the police station, 
and how often. All interviewees requested anonymity and no information 
identifying their name or the firm they practiced at were recorded. 
Handwritten notes were made of all responses and each response was 
identified with alpha-numeric codes beginning with: 
i. JS: junior solicitor with less than 5 years’ experience; 
ii. ES: experienced solicitor with more than 5 years’ experience; 
3.7 Data analysis 
Analysis of the research data findings was undertaken through the 
characteristics of framework analysis - an analytical approach using a set of 
codes organised into categories through charting and indexing (Ritchie and 
Spencer, 1994). This facilitated summarising and reducing the data in a way 
which supported the research questions, identified explanatory clusters of 
information and a comprehensive and transparent analysis (Gale, et al, 
2013). 
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The questionnaire responses were initially collated using the ‘Survey 
Monkey’ tool, which automatically populated the answers to the closed 
questions into percentiles and graphs. This was the primary tool used for 
charting and indexing the closed question responses, so that a spreadsheet 
matrix could be developed. Some questions invited respondents to go 
beyond the closed questions and answer ‘other’ if they had an additional 
response, and write down their full response, and at that stage Survey 
Monkey simply collated these as ‘other answers’. 
Responses from the questionnaires were then coded and recorded in a 
Word document and the data extrapolated from this coding subsequently 
entered into an Excel spreadsheet. Coding was initially attempted using 
CAQDAS software, however given the number of open ended questions in 
the questionnaire, the variance of the interview responses, and the fact that 
the numbering and drafting between the police and legal representative 
questionnaires differed (despite making the same enquiries) it was more 
efficient to code these other responses manually using Word and Excel. 
Coding of the answers to the open questions in the questionnaire was 
undertaken by identifying any response either considered to be important or 
relevant, or was a response to an ‘other’ question, and these responses 
were given labels, or ‘interrogating data categories’ (Gale, et al, 2013:117). 
They were then integrated with the Survey Monkey findings into the Excel 
spreadsheet, and the statistical and thematic research findings extracted 
from this spreadsheet. This resulted in identifiable trends concerning the 
research questions.  
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For example, in Question 6 of the police questionnaire respondents were 
asked to comment on whether they felt able to comply with competing and 
sometimes contradictory pre-interview disclosure guidelines, and invited to 
comment further should they wish. Two respondents added written 
comments – one respondent added: 
‘every case is different and sometimes I can, and sometimes I can’t. 
It often depends on who the brief [legal representative] is’ (JPO4), 
and another: 
‘sometimes – depends on who the DP [detained person] is, who their 
solicitor is and what type of case it is’ (JPO6). 
These responses were both coded as ‘sometimes’ added to the Excel 
spreadsheet, which included ‘facts of the offence’, ‘dependent on young 
person’s circumstances’ and ‘dependent on legal advisor’. A similar 
question was also asked in the police (question 19) and legal representative 
interviews (question 19) and those responses also similarly labelled and 
added to these sub-columns.  
Likewise, question 1 of the police questionnaire asked respondents to 
number from 1 to 12 the suggested reasons why a young person does not 
make an admission. Answer 12 however asked for any ‘other’ reason, and 
these ‘other’ reasons were also coded separately as they could not be 
automatically populated by Survey Monkey. There were two further reasons 
offered by the respondents: ‘playing the system’ and ‘waiting to see if they 
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can get off with the offence by saying nothing’ - these were both coded as 
‘strategic’. During the interview phase one other reason was also offered, 
namely that Asian girls were less likely to make an admission possibly due 
to fears that offending may contravene notions of honour. This was coded 
as ‘cultural’ and sub-coded again as ‘Asian girls – honour’. 
Coding of the interview responses was also undertaken by identifying any 
response either considered to be important or relevant and these responses 
given labels, or ‘interrogating data categories’. For example, question 30 of 
both the police and legal advisor interviews asked participants if they had 
any ‘views on any changes to current practices that may improve 
opportunities for young people to make an admission?’ This same question 
had also been asked at question 30 in the police questionnaire and question 
50 in the legal advisor questionnaire. 
All of the responses were initially coded as either ‘yes’, ‘no’, ‘maybe’, and 
‘not sure’. The participants were also asked in the questionnaire interviews 
to explain their response, and thematic data was extrapolated from these 
responses into the Word document and then coded and entered into 
separate police/defence columns in the Excel spreadsheet. For example, 
thematic data from the ‘yes’ responses were identified and coded as ‘return 
decision making to the Custody Sergeant’, ‘get more experienced officers to 
undertake interviews’, ‘improve pre-interview disclosure’ and ‘improve pre-
interview explanatory guidelines’.  
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Thematic analysis of responses to the police and legal representative 
questionnaire and interviews were entered as codes into the Excel 
spreadsheet which already incorporated the Survey Monkey data, and 
graphs were then produced to adduce some (but not all) of the research 
findings [Figure 1, Chapter 7.5; Figure 2, Chapter 7.12]. Graphs were not 
used however to reflect all of the research findings as they would not have 
adequately reflected the complexity of the data and thematic findings, and 
they have instead been explained in written form throughout Chapter Seven. 
Analysis of the answers to the open questions in the questionnaire and 
interviews required an element of subjective interpretation, and there were 
risks of errors or omissions in the coding and thematic analysis of the 
responses. Efforts were made to neutralise and counterbalance this through 
the framework analysis research method, which encourages coding, 
charting and indexing, rather than intuitive analysis. This method cannot 
however guarantee that subjective interpretation has not influenced data 
analysis, despite the best efforts of this researcher. 
During interviews with police and civilian interviewers it also became 
apparent that some responses were not strictly in response to the research 
question which solely concerned young people who offend, and answers 
were sometimes reflective of what happens to adult suspects as well. This 
was especially common when interviewees were asked at question 20 of 
the interview schedule about why some young people answer ‘no comment’ 
in their police interviews. Although this was identified during the interviews 
and efforts made to confine the answers to the research question, it is 
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conceivable that some of the questionnaire and interview answers are not 
exclusively in response to young people who offend, and this may have 
adversely affected the findings. 
3.8 Ethical considerations  
This thesis was subject to approval and scrutiny from the University of 
Bedfordshire Ethics Committee, as well to the approval of third party 
professional bodies, namely the relevant Police Force Authority and Crown 
Prosecution Service.  Ethical challenges included ensuring the informed 
consent of all participants was obtained, maintaining confidentiality, and 
managing any potential breaches of confidentiality in the event of certain 
disclosures. 
All participants were provided with a written disclosure document setting out 
the purpose of the research and that their responses would be anonymised 
within the research findings (Appendix 1 and 2). It also explained however 
that as a consequence of the duality of the professional and academic role 
of this researcher, this anonymity did not extend to disclosure of any 
‘significant’ breach of ethical or procedural obligations, which may be 
referred either a senior police officer or The Law Society for England and 
Wales. ‘Significant’ was defined as sufficiently great or important to 
be worthy of attention (Oxford Dictionary definition).  
Participants were asked to sign and return the disclosure document with the 
questionnaire responses as an assurance they accepted this pre-condition, 
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or sign and return it before they participated in an interview. Throughout the 
research there were no significant disclosures however. 
Regrettably, it was not possible to approach or interview any young people 
who came within this cohort, as this was outside of the professional 
boundaries imposed on this author, who as a prosecutor was prohibited 
from direct communication with young people within the criminal justice 
system outside of any reasonable communication concerning alleged 
offending, procedural matters or issue of law. There was also the additional 
complexity that any future offending by a young person after an interview 
with this author which resulted in a prosecution, may later result in 
professional embarrassment.  
The improbability that young people would consent to participate in an 
interview with a prosecutor was a further factor in not pursuing this enquiry. 
For similar reasons it was considered impracticable to interview those who 
had acted as an Appropriate Adult. It is hoped however that this thesis 
generates a greater interest in this neglected area, and further research is 
undertaken which can engage directly with young people and examine why 
they do not make an admissions and lose eligibility for a diversionary 
disposal. 
For practical reasons, primarily resources, it was also not possible to 
engage an independent third party to facilitate and conduct interviews with 
young people. 
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3.9 Access to primary data sources 
Analysis of primary documents such as police custody records, interview 
tapes and prosecution witness statements would have similarly adduced 
useful quantitative data concerning whether and why some young people 
are unnecessarily entering the formal criminal justice system as a 
consequence of the admission criterion. This would most likely elicit some 
data concerning the length of their period in custody before interview, the 
time the interview took place, quality of any explanation of diversionary 
procedures given, quality of pre-interview disclosure, the nature and tone of 
the interview, type of questioning, competency of the Appropriate Adult and 
legal advisor, the duration of the interview, the quality of any answers given, 
and whether any of these variables were contributory factors when young 
people did not make an admission (or a satisfactory admission) to the 
police. 
There were insurmountable barriers however to access this material. It is 
the property, at various times in the criminal justice process, of both the 
police and Crown Prosecution Service. A request was made to one Police 
Force Authority, and although they consented to access, the Crown 
Prosecution Service (CPS) was unable to make a decision as to whether 
consent should be granted within the necessary timescales, in part because 
this researcher is an employee of the CPS and subject to the Official 
Secrets Act 1989, and has a statutory duty of confidentiality concerning all 
material dealt with.  
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Additionally, this researcher was likely to have been involved at various 
stages in either the charging process or prosecution at court of some of this 
cohort, and was also likely to have had some previous professional contact 
with the relevant police officers. As such, any analysis or interpretation of 
this primary data may not have been satisfactorily independent.  
3.10 Limitations of the research  
In addition to the ethical barriers concerning obtaining interviews with young 
people and the lack of access to primary data sources, the questionnaires 
and interviews examined the practices, attitudes and knowledge base of a 
very small sample of police officers, civilian interviewers and legal 
representatives from one county within one Police Force Region. Given this, 
the findings are indicative rather than conclusive, especially given the 
established body of research which identifies wide geographical variances 
in police diversionary practices (even within a singular Region), and this is a 
consistent trend in diversionary youth justice (Royal Commission on the 
Police, 1962; Patchett and McClean, 1965; McLintock and Avison, 1968; 
McClintock and Avison, 1968; Somerville, 1969; Steer, 1970; Ditchfield, 
1976; Tutt and Giller, 1983; Laycock and Tarling, 1985; Giller and Tutt, 
1987; Pitts, 1990; Hirst, 1994; Goldson, 2000; Bateman, 2002; Ball, 2004; 
Office of Criminal Justice Reform, 2010). 
The thematic findings from the responses in the questionnaires and 
interviews are an assessment of majority sentiments, and as such only 
speculative rather than definitive. There is also the unintended possibility 
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that as this researcher was known to many of the respondents and 
interviewees as a CPS employee, some may have been reluctant to 
acknowledge any deficiency of knowledge, or admit to a view which was 
outside of their organisation’s public ethos. The circumstances in which the 
police questionnaires were completed and secured was in hindsight 
imperfect, as it became subsequently known that some police officers 
completed them in each other’s presence, and collusion or discussion may 
possibly have influenced their responses.  
The police and civilian interviewers who participated in this research were 
selected in advance by the Case Directors. Although this was considered an 
expeditious method of ensuring a high participation rate, and a verbal 
assurance was provided that the only ground for selection was availability 
and some previous experience interviewing young people, it cannot be 
discounted that the Case Directors judiciously sub-selected potential 
participants, and excluded those whose answers may have embarrassed 
the Police Force Region in some way. 
As a consequence of the practicable limitations of this research there is 
regrettably no examination of gender within the admission criterion, and 
whether the findings from the literature review and this research are equally 
applicable to boys and girls. There has similarly been no consideration of 
socio-economic, educational or mental health factors which may influence 
whether a young person makes an admission or not when it is seemingly in 
their best interests to do so. 
  Cushing, K., 2016, Chapter Three 
45 
 
Although the proper conduct of critical enquiry mandates that: 
‘those concerned with research should be objective and vigilant as 
well as sympathetic’ (Hirschi and Selvin, 1973:273-374), 
there is also the possibility that this researcher’s own professional 
experiences in this field may have unintentionally influenced the nature of 
information sought, the tone of the interviews, and the interpretation of the 
responses. As such, these research findings – from the secondary analysis 
of the literature review, questionnaires and interviews – must thus be 
considered in the context of possible unconscious bias.  
Despite these issues, the potential for bias was recognised from the outset 
and vigilance for objectivity, impartiality, accuracy and the elimination of 
error was continual throughout the research process. The multi-method 
research approach was also always intended to be the subject of 
convergent-discriminant validation – and the findings from each method 
triangulated to ascertain areas of similarity and divergence (Hagan, 
2014:285).  
Although some limitations and imperfections have been identified in the 
methodology: 
‘If a student of research is afraid of making errors in research, then 
he or she should probably do none, because error is omnipresent… 
the question is not whether errors are present, but rather, whether 
reasonable attempts were made to acknowledge and/or eliminate the 
most obvious errors. Only when such errors so grossly compromise 
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the accuracy of the findings and conclusions thereof should one 
attach other research’ (Hagan, 2014:8). 
Given the depth of the literature review and original secondary analysis, the 
primary research undertaken with certain relevant stakeholders, and the fact 
that the findings are not reliant on one approach only, these research 
findings still arguably come within tolerable standards of validity and 
reliability, and contributes value and knowledge to this seemingly ignored 
area of youth justice practice and procedure.
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4.0 CHAPTER FOUR: LITERATURE REVIEW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
THE POLICE CAUTION AND OTHER OUT OF COURT DISPOSALS FOR 
CHILDREN AND YOUNG PEOPLE WHO OFFEND 
De Minimus non curat lex  
‘the law does not concern itself with trifles’ (Law, 2015:183) 
4.1 Introduction 
It has long been enshrined in English law that not every misdemeanour 
must be formally sanctioned within the parameters of the formal criminal 
justice system, and alternative disposals are an accepted and legitimate 
outcome (Sharpe, et al, 1980; Ashworth, 1998; Dingwall and Harding, 
1998). For young people who offend, diversion from formal proceedings has 
historically been a principal constituent of youth justice policy and 
procedure. This practice emerged and developed however without statutory 
authority, has oscillated between favour and criticism, and there has rarely 
been a period of sustained consensus or constancy of processes (Bernard, 
1992).  
Prior to the nineteenth century, enforcement of English criminal law was 
haphazard, without much sense of strategy and dependent on informal and 
amateur policing (Dingwall and Harding, 1998). The absence of official or 
reliable authorities to initiate and undertake criminal proceedings resulted in 
the decision to prosecute devolving primarily to an individual victim, 
ecclesiastical authority or local constable. A resort to a prosecution was one 
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of a number of routes available and non-formal disposals were common 
place, and often: 
‘a natural choice rather than a kind of “diversion”’ (Dingwall and 
Harding, 1998:35), 
often encouraged by the judiciary (Beattie, 1986) and ‘resorted to when 
other means had failed’ (Sharpe, et al, 1980:7). 
4.2 Origins of diversion and the age of criminal responsibility 
Prior to mid-nineteenth century legislative initiatives, there were few legal 
distinctions between the age of an offender, the offence committed and 
mode of trial or punishment (May, 1973: 99) and the liability of children and 
young persons within the criminal law was determined by judges as a matter 
of common law (R v JTB (Appellant) (on appeal from the Court of Appeal 
(Criminal Division) [2009] UKHL 20). English law had developed complex 
distinctions between phases of childhood and adulthood in order to 
determine the liability and culpability of children and young people who 
transgressed the law.  
Blackstone’s seminal eighteenth century ‘Commentaries on the Laws of 
England’ (Blackstone, 1796) distinguished those under the age of twenty-
five years into three stages – infantia, from birth to seven years of age; 
pueritia, from eight to fourteen; and pubertas, from fifteen years and 
upwards. The period of pueritia, or childhood, was again sub-divided into 
two equal parts; from seven to ten and a half was designated as aetis 
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infantiae proxima and from ten and a half to fourteen as aetas pubertati 
proxima.  
During the first stage of infantia and the first half of infantiae proxima young 
people were not punishable for any offence, but were punishable if during 
the second half of infantiae proxima up to pubertas they were found to be 
doli capaces (capable of mischief and able to discern between ‘good and 
evil’), but with mitigation for their age, and ‘not with the utmost rigour of the 
law’. During the last stage of pubertas a young person was held to be as 
culpable as an adult, and subject to the same punishments. 
The outcome for offenders aged less than twenty-one years was determined 
not just by their age, but was also distinguished by the gravity of the 
offence, with the commission of ‘common misdemeanours’ most likely 
resulting in avoidance of a formal sanction for all offenders aged between 
seven and twenty-one years (Kean, 1973). Felonies and capital crimes 
however exposed any person aged from seven years to the same 
processes as adults, as: 
‘the capacity of doing ill, or contradicting guilt, is not so much 
measured by years and days, as by the strength of the delinquent’s 
understanding and judgement. For one lad of eleven years old may 
have as much cunning as another of fourteen…though an infant may 
shall be prima facie adjudged to be doli incapax; yet if it appear to the 
court and jury that he was doli capax, and could discern between 
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good and evil, he may be convicted and suffer death’ (Blackstone, 
1796:13). 
The first statutory distinction between children and adults within the criminal 
law was established in the Juvenile Offenders Act 1847 and the Summary 
Jurisdiction Act 1847, which devolved power from the judiciary to the 
magistracy to try children under the age of fourteen for most indictable 
offences. Offences ranging from petty larceny to felonies could be dealt with 
summarily, and children and young people were kept away from the more 
serious adult criminals at quarter sessions and the assize courts (Ball et al, 
2001). This distinction, although in part intended to benevolently protect 
children and young people from the rigour and stigma of a public trial, as 
well as facilitate proportionate sentencing, established the precedent, which 
endures to the present day, that - unlike adults - young people do not have 
the inalienable right of trial by jury (May,1973:102).  
Subsequently, distinctions between the punishment, sentencing and 
outcomes of adults and children and young people who offended were 
introduced in the Youthful Offenders Act 1854, which established 
Reformatory Schools as a residential alternative for children less than 
sixteen years convicted of an indictable offence, though an initial 14 days’ 
custody was still served. Industrial Schools were subsequently also 
established to house the ‘perishing class’ - children aged between seven 
and fourteen years convicted of ‘vagrancy offences’ (Newburn, 2002:533). 
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4.3 The emergence of police powers and the ‘informal’ police caution 
During the nineteenth century, and principally as a consequence of the 
establishment of organised police forces (Reith, 1938; Robinson and 
Scaglion, 1987), primary responsibility for decisions concerning the 
commencement of criminal proceedings progressively became the 
responsibility of regional police forces. Local authorities retained certain 
remit as prosecuting agencies for offences concerning Weights and 
Measures Acts, Education Acts and Public Health Acts. Notions though of 
what constituted a minor offence, or indeed what constituted criminality 
during this period is complex (Emsley, 1996; Newburn, 2003; Reiner, 2010). 
Certain communities, especially in poor rural areas, operated local justice 
processes arising from perceived inalienable rights superseding statute or 
common law (Christian, 1961), and ‘various communities and social groups 
gave a wide degree of tolerance to other offences which state legislation 
decreed crimes’ (Emsley 1983:115).  
As the role and authority of the newly established police forces progressed, 
inevitably the police established, or arguably acquired by default, both the 
discretionary authority to determine the sanction when a minor, technical or 
trivial offence was committed, and the authority to resolve the matter by 
other means when entry into formal criminal justice processes was 
undesirable, but a positive action was considered necessary to denote 
some form of disapproval (Newburn and Reiner, 2012). This disposal 
developed in a ‘spontaneous manner in different police forces at different 
times’ (Dingwall and Harding, 1998:809) and by the mid-nineteenth century 
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discretionary police decision making in favour of the issuing an informal 
warning as opposed to taking no action or initiating a formal prosecution, 
became colloquially known as a ‘police caution’.  
The practice of an informal police caution had no statutory or common law 
basis, was available to both young people and adults, and initially took the 
form of an informal warning or reprimand with no recordable sanction, made 
by a constable at street level, but could include extremely informal modes of 
policing (Davis, 1989) such as a: 
‘the proverbial clip around the ear’ or ‘flick of a policeman’s rolled 
cape’ (Pearson, 1983:214), a ‘constabular rebuke or cuff’ (Simpson, 
1968:123) or a night in the cells (Emsley 1983).  
There was an absence of regulation or supervision of cautioning processes 
by senior officers or other bureaucratic officials and ‘depended very much 
on the individual policeman’s discretion’ (Emsley, 1983:139). The 
emergence of the police caution embodied the doctrine of ‘constabulary 
independence’; where every police officer, even the ‘rawest recruits’ had a 
right to enforce the law as he saw fit (McConville, et al, 1991:2)  
The police caution did not operate without controversy however, and was 
not initially embraced with unqualified enthusiasm by the police. In 1833 the 
Metropolitan Police Commissioner strongly condemned any decision by a 
constable to warn and not summons to court an offender believed to have 
behaved in a disorderly manner, insisting it was the exclusive function of the 
judiciary to determine the sanction when an offence had been committed, 
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irrespective of gravity, and the issuing of a police caution, either formally or 
informally, exceeded the authority of the constable (Steer, 1970:54).  
Despite the reluctance of the Commissioner to endorse the practice of the 
police caution, by the latter part of the nineteenth century most regional 
police forces had accrued virtual autonomy to determine the initial outcome 
for children and young people who committed low level offences, and 
diversion from formal proceedings by way of a police admonishment was an 
entrenched practice.   
A degree of police discretion was inevitable when police cautions were 
issued, and the law initially took a permissive stance concerning police 
powers by tolerating elastic and vague rules (Bowley, 1975). There is no 
evidence of what criterion was initially necessary for a young person to 
receive an out of court disposal, and whether an admission was a 
necessary pre-requisite (McBarnet, 1978). 
4.4 Increasing criminalisation of youthful behaviour 
Despite the emergent recognition and use of the police caution as a 
diversionary disposal during the nineteenth century, which in part reflected 
increasing benevolence towards young people, there was simultaneously a 
significant escalation in the incarceration of young people and sentence 
tariffs, even for offences and misdemeanours which ostensibly could have 
been dealt with by way of a police caution (McConville, 1981; McConville, 
1985; May, 2009:103).  The 1836 Report of the Inspectors of Prisons 
argued that the Vagrancy Act 1824 and the Malicious Trespass Act 1827, 
  Cushing, K., 2016, Chapter Four 
54 
 
which both criminalised a range of behaviours peculiar to young people, 
resulted in some unfortunate outcomes: 
‘Many offences for which a lad is now sent to gaol were formerly 
disregarded, or not considered of so serious a character as to 
demand imprisonment. By the Vagrant Act alone, hundreds who 
formerly were permitted to remain at large, are committed not for the 
commission of a specific offence, but as “idle and disorderly” or 
“reputed thieves”. The Malicious Trespass Act and other laws 
peculiarly applying to the offences of youth, have also materially 
contributed to the increase of juvenile prisoners….Delinquencies of 
the most trifling description, committed by mere children, and 
formerly thought very lightly of, are now treated as grave offences; 
and the youth who would a few years back on detection have been 
summarily chastised, is sent to gaol and arraigned before a criminal 
tribunal’ (UK Parliament, 1837:7, as cited in Magarey, 1978:18). 
A range of other statutory provisions including the Larceny Act 1827 and 
Metropolitan Police Act 1839 further criminalised behaviour which previously 
would most likely have resulted either no action, informal admonishment or 
a police caution (Jones, 1992). These statutes extended categories of trivial 
behaviour and offending suitable for police intervention, including the flying 
of a kite, playing any game to the annoyance of inhabitations or passengers, 
or making a slide in the snow (Smyth, 2011:154). In addition to criminalising 
previously tolerated behaviour, a further consequence was to extend 
seemingly trivial behaviour within the jurisdiction of not only the police, but 
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also the magistracy. The punitiveness of the magistracy, in contrast to the 
judiciary, further contributed to the notable increase in the both the 
conviction rate of juveniles and the severity of sentences imposed on them 
(Magarey, 1978; Lee, 1961; Milton, 1967).  
For very young people who offended, the increase in their incarceration 
during this period was also a consequence of a ‘lapse’ in application by the 
judiciary and magistracy of the presumption of doli incapax for offenders 
under fourteen years (Magarey, 1978), and they were often presumed to 
have the same capacity for understanding right or wrong and form intent as 
older youths and adults.  Additionally, there was often indistinguishable use 
of punishment and poor relief, with offences such as begging and theft, 
committed by the young and destitute, increasingly dealt with by way of a 
criminal sanction (Carpenter, 1853).  
During this period a constable was also responsible for prosecuting his own 
case in court and personally liable for any costs awarded to a defendant on 
acquittal, and was thus perhaps incentivised to target misdemeanours or 
misbehaviour by children and young people, given they were much less 
likely than an adult to present an able defence or instigate counter charges 
at court (Magarey, 1978: 117).  
4.5 The police caution and the ‘juvenile delinquent’ 
Anxiety and disapproval concerning children and young people who have 
transgressed the law, irrespective of the gravity of otherwise of their 
perceived wrongdoing, are chronicled throughout modern English history 
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(Pearson, 1983; King, 1998). During the same period in the mid-nineteenth 
century when the police caution began to gain official recognition, the notion 
or concept of the ‘adolescent’ and ‘juvenile delinquent’ also emerged 
(Pearson, 1983; Newburn, 2002; Hendrick; 2009) as an identifiable class of 
children and young people who contravened or challenged prevailing laws 
and morals, and were feared as: 
‘a race “sui generis” from the rest of Society, not only in Thoughts, 
Habits and Manners, but even in Appearance; possessing moreover, 
a Language exclusively their own’ (comments of ‘one interviewer’ 
cited in Magarey, 1978:11). 
Juveniles and juvenile delinquency become a ‘major focus of anxiety during 
the nineteenth century’ (King, 1998:1; Cox and Shaw, 2002) and identifiable 
subcultures such as ‘Scuttlers’ and ‘Ikes’ of Manchester, ‘Hottentots’ of 
Liverpool, ‘Peaky Blinders’ of Birmingham and the ‘Hooligans’, ‘Chelsea 
Boys’, ‘Girdle Gang’, ‘Plaid Cap Brigade’, ‘Velvet Cap Gang’, ‘Drury Lane 
Boys’, and ‘Waterloo Road Gang’ of London embodied this newly 
recognised juvenile delinquent (May, 1973: 105; Pearson, 1983:83, Muncie, 
1999:169). 
Theories concerning the emergence of the ‘adolescent’ and ‘juvenile 
delinquent’ and the establishment of the youth justice system have been the 
subject of considerable critiques, some of which question the extent to 
which the innovation of juvenile delinquency was a wholly benevolent 
development (Platt, 1969).  
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Idealists advocate that the enlightened concept of juvenile justice arose 
naturally and organically as life cycles and transitions between them during 
the nineteenth century became more distinct, facilitated during this period by 
the expansion of formal education, urbanisation, changes in family structure 
and an emerging interest in child welfare (Newburn, 2002; Randall, 2011). 
Revisionists however, notably Foucault (1995) and Platt (1969) argue that 
the classification of the juvenile delinquent around this period was the 
misguided and unintended consequence of social welfare reformers who:  
‘helped to create special judicial and correctional institutions for the 
labelling, processing and management of “troublesome youth” …the 
child savers…brought attention to, and in doing so, invented new 
categories of youthful behaviour which had hitherto been 
unappreciated’ (Platt, 1969:3).   
Others similarly argue the ‘labelling’ of children and young people as 
juvenile delinquents during the nineteenth century emerged not from any 
escalation in offending or demonstrable facts concerning the deviance of 
any act committed by a child or young person, but as a consequence of the 
established order constructing deviant behaviour by making rules in the 
service of their own interests and safeguarding their status and prestige 
during a period of considerable social upheaval (Foucault, 1995; Becker, 
1963). 
Socialist theorists argue the classification of juvenile delinquency, which 
gave rise to the concept of ‘penal welfarism’, came primarily from activism 
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between an alliance of feminists, labour movement campaigners and 
children and penal welfare groups (Logan, 2009). May suggests though that 
this classification was almost inevitable, through the fusion of the exertions 
of self-styled ‘moral statisticians’ who initiated the science of criminology 
and drew attention to the young age of many offenders, together with the 
swelling prison population which collectively stimulated efforts at reform, 
and in the process revealed the problem of the juvenile delinquent (May, 
1973: 100-104). Shore however suggests contrarily that the conventional 
criminological and historical chronology of the ‘juvenile delinquent’ should 
be challenged, and the nineteenth century does not necessarily represent 
the watershed in youth justice it is often ascribed (Shore, 2002). 
Though there is an absence of consensus concerning the provenance of the 
‘juvenile delinquent’ during the nineteenth century, this period was 
undoubtedly the naissance of when childhood and adolescence become: 
‘the most intensively governed sector of personal existence’ (Rose, 
1990:121).  
The increasing recognition of the police caution as an accepted practice for 
young people who offended - albeit initially exercised informally and 
ordinarily without sanction or consequence - was arguably impelled by the 
conflicting activism of benevolence and interventionist zeal. 
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4.6 The emergence of the police caution and the origins of ‘net-widening’  
The influence of ‘child-savers’ and welfarists on traditional practices and 
procedures concerning young people who offended, or were considered at 
risk of offending, was significant. These movements, which arose 
consecutively in England and other jurisdictions during the nineteenth 
century, were especially concerned with ‘pre-delinquent offenders – the 
children who occupy the debatable ground between criminality and 
innocence’ (Platt, 1974:188), and advocated early state intervention in the 
lives of these children.  
Consequently, previous youthful behaviour which was either routinely 
ignored or dealt with informally became increasingly the subject of formal 
intervention. The inflationary consequences of the recognition and 
formalisation of the police caution as a diversionary measure for young 
people who offended diminished the practice where: 
‘it was sufficient for inconsequential behaviours to be stored only as 
mental notes or rough jottings in the notebooks of kindly constables’ 
(Pratt, 1986: 212),  
and criminalised childhood and adolescent behaviour previously not 
considered suitable for any action or punishment.  
Though the police caution is conventionally considered a benevolent 
diversionary measure for children and young people who offended, in 
practice its emergence during the nineteenth century and acceptance 
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thereafter in the twentieth century resulted in significant numbers of young 
people entering the criminal justice system for minor or inconsequential 
offences.  
The ‘net widening’ effect of diversionary measures is a recurrent theme in 
the study of youth justice policy and practice, and has been the subject of 
considerable comment (Ditchfield, 1976; Farrington and Bennett, 1981; 
Parliamentary All-Party Penal Affairs Group, 1981; Austin, et al, 1981; 
Cohen, 1985; McMahon, 1990; Goldson, 2000; Bateman, 2002).  
4.7 Nineteenth century acceptance of the police caution  
Despite the emergence during the nineteenth century of the ‘juvenile 
delinquent’ and an increase in the incarceration of young people, often for 
low level offences, by 1853 there was also broad acceptance that a police 
caution could be an appropriate disposal for a young person who committed 
a minor, trivial or technical offence, and was a pragmatic response where 
the likely sanction would be nominal (Steer, 1970; Davis, 1984). The police 
caution was generally perceived as introducing humanity into an often rigid 
and unfair system; affording discretion where legislation had become 
obsolete and rigorous enforcement was undesirable, and was a suitable 
disposal where a prosecution would be oppressive in the circumstances 
(Dingwall and Harding, 1998).  
Despite the increasing use and recognition of the police caution, it did not 
receive unequivocal support, with concerns this ostensibly lenient disposal 
was detrimental to a young person’s character, and: 
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‘There is no indulgence more fatal to a boy than a series of light 
punishments; this familiarised his mind to degradation and left him in 
a path which would lead him step by step to the gravest crimes and 
consequently to the heaviest inflictions known to the law’ (Davenport 
Hill, 1857, quoted in Duckworth, 2002:39).  
The first known record of a police caution issued to an adult was in 1833, 
four years after the establishment of the Metropolitan Police force, though it 
was not until 1853 that any official police policy formally encouraged 
informal warnings to be issued by way of police caution for minor offences 
(Smyth, 2011). The first documented issuing of a police caution for young 
people who committed an offence deemed suitable for a caution (if indeed 
an offence and not merely nuisance behaviour which fell outside of statute 
or common law) was in 1858 and concerned the seemingly trivial 
misdemeanour of: 
‘Complaint having been made of boys running alongside omnibuses 
in the streets turning somersaults, which is encouraged by 
passengers throwing halfpence; boys who are guilty of this practice 
are to be cautioned that, if it be repeated, the law must be enforced 
against them’ (Steer 1970:55). 
The ambit of the ages of the boys referred to is unknown, and the definition 
of ‘boys’ in 1858 would not necessarily be commensurate with modern 
statutory definitions of ‘young offenders’ (Magarey, 1978; May, 1973:98). 
Given however that the criminal age of responsibility in England and Wales 
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at that time was 7 years of age, the lowest in Europe, it is likely the boys 
referred to would fall above the then age of criminal responsibility. It is not 
apparent from this account however whether this caution was an informal or 
formal recordable disposal. 
By the end of the nineteenth century there was increasingly broader support 
for less punitive measures for young people who offended, and greater use 
of discretionary and diversionary police measures, with a prevailing belief 
that young people who offend: 
‘are not the product of any deep-seated criminal propensities: they 
represent a transitory phase of mental and moral development, and 
the desire to commit them quite disappears when maturity is attained. 
If a child is under healthy and normal home surroundings it is usually 
wiser in such circumstances to refrain from convicting and to regard 
the ends of justice satisfied by resorting to admonition alone’ 
(Morrison, 1896:189). 
The absence of reliable records from this period however hinders identifying 
or distinguishing the practice of a formal police caution - where a record was 
retained and which could potentially prohibit the issuing of a further similar 
disposal, and the practice of an informal police caution - a non-recordable 
admonishment or punishment (Emsley, 1983). There is also no record of 
what pre-requisites were necessary for an informal or formal caution to be 
issued, such as the existence of sufficient evidence for a realistic prospect 
of conviction, an admission, remorse, consent to the issuing of a caution, or 
  Cushing, K., 2016, Chapter Four 
63 
 
co-operation with the police. The absence of published or reliable crime 
statistics until 1876 (Gatrell, et al, 1980; Emsley, 1983: Maguire, 1994) and 
the lack of official cautioning statistics until 1954 (Ball, 2004) further 
impedes analysis of the frequency and geography of early police cautioning 
of children and young people who offended or were subjected to police 
sanctions primarily on welfare grounds. 
4.8 Conflicting ideologies of the Juvenile Court and police discretionary 
powers. 
Despite the increasing approval of less punitive measures for young people 
who offended, by the early twentieth century there continued to be an 
absence of consensus regarding the suitability of the police caution for 
young people who offended (Dingwall and Harding, 1998). The 
establishment of the Juvenile Court under The Children Act 1908 reflected, 
in part, increasing concern that police cautioning for all but the most trivial of 
offences was outside of the proper remit of police powers, and was an 
ineffective disposal when intervention was necessary to prevent recidivism 
(Home Office, 1927).  
Increasing advocacy for the necessity of intervention on welfare grounds 
resulted in the: 
‘language of delinquency shift[ing] to a more welfare orientated 
vocabulary, with notions of the “neglected child” in “need of care and 
protection” gaining favour’ (Cox and Shore, 2002:10).  
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The establishment of the Juvenile Court was thus considered to be either a 
consequence of a larger shift towards ‘penal welfarism’ within the criminal 
justice system (Garland, 1985); the result of ‘liberal progressives’ initiatives 
to establish new strategies to deal with children and young people who 
offended (Bailey, 1987); or the natural result of other intellectual and 
ideological currents of the era, notably socialism and feminism (Logan, 
2009). 
The Juvenile Court actively encouraged the police to prosecute children and 
young people, presupposing that the court was best placed to fulfil the dual 
roles of dispensing both justice and welfare, as opposed to the issuing of a 
formal or informal caution by the police. This doctrinal pursuit of an 
interventionist welfarist agenda also encouraged the prosecution of children 
and young people considered ‘in need of care and protection’, with the court 
and the powers available to it regarded as more suitably equipped than the 
police to help children and young people whose offending was perceived as 
inextricably linked to wider welfare considerations.  
There was considerable support for further expansion of the Juvenile 
Court’s jurisdiction so that it had: 
‘control over all children and young persons under 18 who have fallen 
or were likely to fall into delinquency’ (Hall, 1926:266-267), 
and should have powers greater than those of the police, with the authority 
to bring children: 
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‘before the Court without being formally charged at the police station’ 
(Hall, 1926:266-267).  
The practice of routinely diverting children and young people from the 
Juvenile Court by way of a police caution was also strongly condemned by 
the first review undertaken of Juvenile Court. The Molony Committee 
concluded that: 
‘This practice seems to us objectionable, as usurping the functions of 
a tribunal, and we think it is outside the proper duties of the 
police…when it is realized that these courts are specially equipped to 
help rather than punish the young offender we hope that the 
reluctance to bring such children before them will disappear’ (Home 
Office, 1927:22-23). 
The Committee did recommend that the police could turn a ‘blind eye’ to 
young first time offenders, but only when dealing with minor offences and ‘if 
applied with judgement and good sense’ (Home Office, 1927:22). Tensions 
at that time between the conflicting ideals of benevolence and punishment 
in the newly developing sphere of youth justice were evident, as despite 
recognising that not all minor offences needed to be formally dealt with, the 
Committee also approved the corporal punishment of boys, pronouncing 
that: 
‘We believe that there are cases in which whipping is the most 
salutary method of dealing with the offender, but as much depends 
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on the character and home circumstance of the boy concerned’ 
(Home Office, 1927:69) 
In addition to the establishment of the Juvenile Court in England and Wales 
in 1908, the introduction of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 
further converged punishment and welfare of young people under the 
auspices of the Juvenile Court, and was intended to discourage regional 
police forces from developing any specific youth justice diversionary 
regimes. The resultant disapprobation of out of court disposals by way of 
police cautions inevitably resulted in an escalation in the numbers of young 
people who committed low level offences entering the formal criminal justice 
system and accruing an antecedent record. The ‘net-widening’ effect of this 
‘welfarism’ arguably had the effect of ‘drawing into the criminal justice 
system both the deprived and the depraved child’ (Padfield, 2003:30; Pratt, 
1986; Gelsthorpe and Padfield, 2003).  
Despite ostensibly supporting the ideological dictum that a prosecution was 
usually preferable to a police caution for children and young people who 
offended, and legislating to restrict its use, the Home Office conversely 
encouraged initiatives which facilitated diversion and endorsed the 
establishment of juvenile liaison schemes (Home Office, 1951). The majority 
of police forces throughout England and Wales also still continued to 
establish their own diversionary schemes, though with notable variances of 
use. 
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Remarkably, given the conflict between the Molony Committee’s 
disapproval of the use of the police caution for children and young people, 
and its increasing recognition and use, it was the subject of very little official 
interest. It was, for instance, given no consideration in the Report of the 
Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedure 1929 (Steer, 1970:55).  
4.9 The emergence of the ‘formal’ police caution in the twentieth century 
Despite the emergence of the Juvenile Court, the practice of an informal 
police caution continued to be operated by the majority of regional police 
forces, and became increasingly formalised. This however resulted in the 
diminution of informal measures. The formal police caution, unlike an 
informal caution, was usually issued not at street level or immediately after 
an offence, but at a later date at a police station, by a more senior officer, 
and a young person’s parent or guardian was expected to be present. 
Significantly, a record was retained of the caution which formed part of a 
recorded antecedent history, which may at a later stage preclude another 
out of court disposal and was also citable in any subsequent judicial 
hearing.   
The first recorded practice of formal cautioning in Great Britain for young 
people was in 1905, when Glasgow City Police established, without 
statutory authority, a ‘Superintendent’s Court’, and: 
‘Juvenile offenders’ attended with their parents together with a 
representative of a relevant welfare service, a formal caution was 
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issued by a senior officer, and a record was retained of this disposal 
(Steer, 1970:55; Dingwall and Harding, 1998:104).  
Significantly, although there was no official prohibition on the number of 
cautions which could be issued, the issuing of a formal caution could result 
in escalation into the formal criminal justice system if another offence was 
committed, even if of a minor nature and, in isolation, itself suitable for a 
caution. The implementation of the Children Act 1908 however temporarily 
curtailed this practice (Ferguson, 1952), with the Report of the Scottish 
Department Committee on the Treatment of Young Offenders reporting that: 
‘Where minor offences were disposed of by caution before the 
passing of the Children Act 1908, the practice appears to have been 
abandoned owing to the fact that there was no statutory authority for 
it, owing to the provision of children’s courts under the Act (Steer, 
1970:18). 
Regional police forces in England and Wales continued to develop 
cautioning schemes, but with divergent attitudes and policies concerning 
whether it was a legitimate or effective role of the police to both caution 
young people who offended and also seek to address the causes of 
offending. Whilst Merseyside Police formally established its own highly 
interventionist diversionary scheme in 1949, which was a: 
‘a natural development of the preventative work that the police and 
particularly the “village policeman”, had been carrying out for many 
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years with wholehearted approval’ (Home Office, 1960:50; 
Somerville, 1969:475), 
the Metropolitan Police were ideologically opposed to this practice, with the 
Metropolitan Commissioner’s informing The Ingleby Committee that: 
‘Since 1933 the practice of cautioning juvenile offenders was 
probably less in his force…he and his predecessors had taken the 
view that the intention of Parliament, as expressed in the Children 
and Young Persons Act of that year, was to provide in the juvenile 
court system a means of dealing with young offenders in the interests 
of their own welfare and in a way that would prevent them from taking 
to a life of crime. The police would be open to serious criticism if they 
took it upon themselves to withdraw some children from the operation 
of this system to be dealt with in a different way (Home Office, 
1961:51).  
Nevertheless, despite the continued ‘disquiet’ amongst some police forces 
and interested groups, especially the magistracy (Steer, 1970:18) who 
maintained this was ‘contrary to English justice’ (Lee, 1998:23), most 
regional police forces, particularly in the north of England, continued to 
establish their own diversionary schemes for young people who offended, 
and endeavoured to use this measure to target identifiable risk factors likely 
result in further offending. The increasing conjoining of cautioning practices 
with targeted early interventions further formalised the process of the police 
caution for young people.  
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Additionally, the continuing formalisation of the police caution in the 
absence of any statutory or common law endorsement again reflected the 
practical and ideological conflict between the police and judiciary concerning 
which agency was best placed to not only reprimand or punish, but prevent 
the commission of offending.   The Chief Constable of Liverpool City Police, 
who had formalised its cautioning and diversionary practices into the 
Merseyside Juvenile Liaison Scheme in 1949, argued that given the 
limitation of the Juvenile Court, primarily that it was only engaged after 
offending had taken place that police should have primary jurisdiction as: 
‘It is very evident that the real solution (to the problem of juvenile 
delinquency) must be found not so much in improved methods of 
dealing with offenders after conviction, as in the field of prevention of 
the development of offenders’ (Steer, 1970:18). 
Somewhat unusual experimental research projects were also undertaken by 
the police to assist in identifying apposite models of diversion. One such 
project determined which cohort of young people would receive either a 
simple police caution or a caution together with a package of supervision, by 
randomly:  
‘providing the Chief Inspector in charge with a series of sealed 
envelopes in which contained an instruction for caution or 
supervision, prepared by throwing a dice, had been placed’ (Rose 
and Hamilton, 1970:2).  
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Other diversionary schemes sought to identify both the cause of juvenile 
crime and whether a police caution was a suitable disposal through the 
psychological study of each young person, and distinguish those with ‘sub-
normal intelligence’, those with ‘sub-normal emotions’, and those who were 
‘sub-normal in morality and character’ (Burt, 1944). 
4.10 First statistical analysis of the police caution 
The publication of the first statistics on the use of the police caution in 1954 
revealed that despite the reluctance of some police regions to establish 
diversionary liaison schemes, and the magistracy seeking to retain 
jurisdiction even for low level offences, the proportion of ‘juvenile offenders’ 
being issued with a caution throughout the twentieth century consistently 
increased (Steer, 1970). This was despite the age of criminal responsibility 
being raised from eight to 10 years (Children and Young Persons Act 1963) 
and no discernible commensurate rise in youth offending. Significant 
geographical disparities in the cautioning of both adults and young people 
were evident however (McClintock and Avison, 1968), and this emerges as 
a recurrent theme in diversionary practices in England and Wales - and is 
discussed further in this thesis at paragraphs 4.14 and 4.18. 
Steer, in his 1970 study of police cautions, concluded that the increasing 
use of the police caution was in part the consequence of the expansion of 
juvenile liaison schemes leading to cautions being issued more frequently in 
certain regions, but was also simply a reflection of improvements in the 
recording of cautions issued. Steer further found that the rise in the number 
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of cautions issued to young people was also a consequence of the fact that 
the majority of complainants did not want young people prosecuted, and 
these schemes gave complainants greater confidence to report minor 
offences committed by young people to the police, in the belief that a formal 
prosecution would not be initiated. 
Though Steer’s conclusions reflected the prevailing understanding of 
cautioning at that time (Nelken,1976) it is arguably flawed. Another rationale 
is that formal cautioning schemes incentivised the reporting of low level 
offences which ordinarily were unlikely to have been reported to the police, 
as these schemes were more likely to result in some intervention and 
sanction. Informal police cautioning usually involved either no action or 
minimal intervention, and as such complainants may have felt reporting a 
low level offence was not worth the effort in the absence of a formal 
cautioning scheme. 
4.11 The police caution and ‘welfarism’  
The Ingleby Committee, tasked in 1956 with a review of the youth justice 
system, rejected the notion that the judiciary was the most suitable body to 
prevent further offending, and approved the practice of the police caution, 
finding that: 
‘It is generally accepted that the police are not obliged to prosecute 
every offender against the law who comes to their notice even when 
they have a clear case: they may properly exercise discretion in 
deciding whether to bring proceedings or merely to administer a 
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caution…it seems unnecessary and undesirable to bring a child 
before a court if the shock of being found out and the effect of a 
caution from the police are enough to make it unlikely he will offend 
again’ (Home Office, 1960:49). 
The Committee also found that: 
‘Since a conviction may have serious consequences for a young 
person’s career, there is a natural reluctance to prosecute…A caution 
spares offenders the stigma of a court appearance, and may 
preserve whatever deterrent effect is presented by the threat of 
prosecution. A caution may be given in the hope that if a juvenile is 
not immediately treated as a delinquent then there is less chance of 
his behaving like one in the future’ (Home Office, 1960:147). 
The court was however considered a suitable venue where the child was: 
‘one whose delinquency results from more deep-rooted 
causes…often the right form of treatment can be provided only by a 
decision of the court’ (Home Office, 1960:49). 
Thereafter the Home Office increasingly approved the police caution as an 
appropriate disposal for young people who committed low level offences 
(Home Office, 1965; Home Office, 1968) and by 1969 the majority of 
regional police forces had embraced the formal police caution as a 
legitimate diversionary practice within their exclusive jurisdiction, and 
introduced some form of diversionary scheme for young people who 
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offended; though their scope and function varied considerably (McClintock 
and Avison, 1968).  
The north of England continued to develop more progressive models, where 
a police caution was ordinarily coupled with supervision or some form of 
intervention. In London the Metropolitan Police initiated in some boroughs, 
though not all, a Juvenile Bureaux, and in West Ham established a Modified 
Juvenile Liaison Scheme, with both schemes containing specially trained 
officers who decided in consultation with other professionals whether a 
young person should be cautioned or charged (Osborough, 1965; Steer, 
1970.)  The Modified Juvenile Liaison Scheme accepted referrals not only 
from the police as a direct consequence of offending, but also referrals from 
‘parents, schools, shops and various welfare agencies’ when ‘delinquent 
behaviour was of concern’ with the latter accounting for two-thirds of their 
caseload (Taylor, 1971:7). 
The determining factor for suitability for the majority of liaison schemes was 
the level of seriousness of the offence committed, with a constable ordinarily 
distinguishing youthful misbehaviour so trivial as to require no action or 
intervention at all, misconduct requiring an informal warning, or more 
serious behaviour (significantly not necessarily criminal) which would result 
in a formal report to the bureaux with a recommendation as to the 
appropriate disposal (Oliver, 1973; Ritchie and Mack, 1974).  
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4.12 The police caution and 1960s radicalism 
By the mid-1960s youth justice had become increasingly radicalised, with 
some theorists rejecting a retributive and disciplinary response to youth 
offending, and advocating a child-centred, welfarist approach, with either 
radical non-intervention, or the greater use of informal and non-recordable 
measures (Becker; 1963; Lemert, 1967; Schur, 1973; Bottoms, 1974; Morris 
and Giller, 1987; Garland, 1985; Ball, 2004; Pitts, 1988; Gelsthorpe and 
Morris, 1994; Dingwall and Davenport, 1995).  
Welfarist ideologies had been partially reflected in the White Paper ‘The 
Child, the Family and the Young Offender’ (Home Office, 1965), which set 
out provisional proposals to divide youth justice into separate jurisdictions 
for those aged under 16 years and those aged under 21 years, and for the 
latter cohort, to transfer the majority of the Juvenile Court’s powers to local 
authorities by way of children’s committees, family councils and a newly 
created magistrates court sitting as a Family Court. The White Paper made 
no reference at all to the role or otherwise of the police caution for either 
cohort, and sought to diminish the jurisdiction of both the police and 
judiciary concerning young people who offended, and to spare them ‘the 
stigma of criminality’ (Home Office, 1965:5) as: 
‘In the great majority of cases of offenders brought before the juvenile 
courts, the facts are not in dispute. The problem is to decide the 
appropriate treatment, and the court procedures, designed 
essentially for testing evidence, do not provide the best means for 
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directing social enquiries and discussing possibilities with the child’s 
parents and the social services that might be concerned with the 
treatment’ (Home Office, 1965:5). 
Although the: 
‘objectives and broad strategy of these proposals were warmly 
welcomed…as far as possible’ (Home Office,1968:3-5)  
the 1965 White Paper did not result in any significant legislative or 
procedural changes. The subsequent White Paper ‘Children in Trouble’ 
(Home Office, 1968) was similarly radical, and though it retained the 
jurisdiction of the juvenile courts, advocated a double-barrelled test that: 
‘The prosecution of children [aged 10-14 years] will cease, and action 
to deal with offenders and to help their parents has been taken, 
where possible, on a voluntary basis. If a child commits an offence 
and his parents are not providing adequate care, protection or 
guidance, or the offence indicates that he is beyond parental control, 
it will be possible to take him before a juvenile court as in need of 
care, protection or control’ (Home Office, 1968:17). 
The White Paper further proposed that those aged 14 to 17 years should 
only be made subject to criminal proceedings after mandatory consultations 
between police and social service departments, and a multi-agency decision 
that prosecution was a last resort. It made no reference at all to police 
cautioning practices. The resultant legislative initiative, the Children and 
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Young Person Act 1969, sought to establish a youth justice system that 
wherever possible kept young people outside of formal processes, and was: 
‘aimed at developing the child’s treatment according to his response 
and changing needs’ (Tutt and Giller, 1983:587).   
The Act did however approve the use of the police caution, and gave for the 
first time statutory recognition to the practice of the police caution (Bottoms, 
1974). Between the passage of the Act however and its commencement, a 
newly elected Conservative government abandoned the majority of the 
more radical proposals, in preference to an alternate ‘justice’ approach. The 
utility of formal prosecutions and the role of the judiciary were subsequently 
endorsed, diversionary practices were restrained to a model of 
proportionate intervention, and the police caution remained a non-statutory 
but approved practice (Bottoms, 1974). 
The subsequent Home Office guidance still encouraged the police to 
engage with other relevant agencies during the decision making process 
and permitted the diversion of young people who offended from the formal 
justice system, but only when deemed proportionate and appropriate, as: 
‘It is the well-established practice of police forces to caution a 
considerable number of juvenile offenders. The Act [Children and 
Young Persons Act 1969] does nothing to inhibit the continuance of 
this practice: on the contrary, it leaves full scope for the use of the 
caution as one of the variety of available courses of action, other than 
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court proceedings, to be used appropriate’ (Home Office, 1970:10; 
see also Ditchfield, 1976; Gelsthorpe and Morris, 1994). 
4.13 The 1960s and increasing recognition of the police caution and police 
autonomy over children and young people 
By the mid-1960s the majority of police regions had embraced the police 
caution as an inherent and legitimate police function. The development of 
formal diversionary schemes by most police regions was arguably however, 
at least in part, not a reflection of benevolence or enthusiasm for a 
diversionary welfarist agenda, but rather a pre-emptive measure to retain 
their considerable autonomy over this cohort. 
There is also some evidence that the police also embraced cautioning: 
‘partly because of dislike of the delays of the juvenile courts which 
replaced the earlier cuff-on-the-ear methods… [and] it is probably 
thought by some officers that the attitude of the juvenile courts is too 
“soft”’ (Osborough, 1965:424).  
Others though suggest that police autonomy concerning outcomes for 
young people who offend derived from the fact that the young “street” 
population has always been the prime focus of police order-maintenance 
and law enforcement work and due to the inherent disadvantages young 
people experience they are considered no less than ‘police property’ (Lee, 
1981; Loader, 1996; Reiner, 2000; McAra and McVie, 2005). 
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Support for this theory is perhaps borne out by the Commissioner of the 
Metropolitan Police who declared that: 
‘In some parts of West London, which attract the weekend “beat and 
drug” set, juveniles sweeps are carried out by the police, in the 
course of which youngsters under the age of 17 who are clearly away 
from home all night are taken to the police station and their parents 
sent for. The purpose is to bring the facts to the notice of parents and 
inform them of the moral danger to which the juveniles are exposed. 
The vast majority of parents are grateful this action is taken’ 
(Simpson, 1968:124). 
Commissioner Simpson also argued that although there were inherent 
benefits in the multi-agency approach of Juvenile Liaison Schemes, the 
police should have a greater decision making remit within these schemes, 
despite the perception that: 
‘the police officer, even though it be a woman who devotes the 
majority of her time to this sort of case, has been looked upon as a 
person untrained and ignorant of the ways in which the evils of 
criminal contamination may be dealt with’ (Simpson, 1968:127). 
Nevertheless, despite the tensions between the magistracy, the police, and 
policy makers concerning jurisdiction over young people who offended, the 
judiciary consistently recognised the principle of constabulary 
independence, and that the initiation of any criminal proceedings was 
exclusively the remit of the police. As Lord Denning forcefully stated in R v 
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Commission of Police of the Metropolis, ex p. Blackburn [1968] 2 W.L.R. 
893 at 902: 
‘I hold it to be the duty of…every Chief Constable to enforce the law 
of the land…. he must decide whether or not suspected persons are 
to be prosecuted; and if need be, bring the prosecution or see that it 
brought. But in all these things he is not the servant of anyone, save 
the law itself. No Minister of the Crown can tell him that he must or 
must not…. prosecute this man or that one. Nor can any police 
authority tell him so. The responsibility of law enforcement lies on 
him. He is answerable to the law and to the law alone.’ 
Police autonomy within criminal justice processes concerning outcomes for 
young people is a central theme in any discourse concerning diversion of 
young people who offend from a formal prosecution. Newburn argues that 
whilst the police continue to occupy the key position as ‘gate-keepers’ and 
‘agenda setters’ regulating the flow of young people into the criminal justice 
system, any efforts at reform will always be incomplete (Newburn, 2011:96). 
4.14 Continuing criticisms of the police caution  
Despite increasing advocacy from the 1960s until the early 1990s for 
alternative diversionary processes to the police caution, which variously 
promoted either a welfarist, minimal or radial non-intervention model 
(Bottoms, et al, 1970; Bottoms, 1974; Morris and Giller, 1987; Pitts, 1988; 
Pratt, 1989; Evans, 1994), the police caution as a diversionary disposal 
continued to lack unequivocal support. 
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The Ingleby Committee, which had endorsed the use of the police cautions 
for young people who commit low level offences and declared them a 
‘courageous departure from [an] orthodox outlook’ were still nevertheless 
concerned that they were not as successful as other interventions available 
under a sentence imposed by the court as: 
‘Young offenders were often of extremely low intelligence or 
maladjusted: police officers, however good their intentions, lacked 
the special training necessary to help those who suffered from such 
handicaps. Trivial offences were often only a symptom of an 
underlying condition, requiring early and specialised treatment, that 
was revealed only by the full enquiries made when the child came 
before a court’ (Home Office, 1960:51). 
The magistracy again continued to resist increasing cross-party political 
support for the non-judicial police caution, arguing it usurped their function 
at the expense of the executive (Dingwall and Harding, 1998; Bottoms, et al, 
1970). There were also concerns that cautions were being issued in the 
absence of sufficient evidence that an offence had been committed, issued 
without adequate consultation with victims, and young people were on 
occasion issued with cautions not for the commission of any offence, but as 
a preventative measure concerning ‘future misconduct’ (Steer, 1970:35; 
Nelken, 1976).  
A further criticism concerned the causal effect of cautions on subsequent 
stages of the criminal justice process, with the ‘predictable result’ of 
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‘consequential adjustments’ (Nelken, 1976) by the juvenile court, which 
made less use of nominal penalties such as discharges and fines, having 
assumed the police had sifted cases suitable for that disposal through 
cautioning, and only initiated prosecutions for more serious offences or 
offenders (Steer, 1970). Home Office Guidance (Home Office, 1978) 
authorising the citing of previous cautions issued to a young person in any 
subsequent Juvenile Court proceedings further compounded the reluctance 
of the Magistrates to impose nominal sentences for low level offences, as 
recidivism was considered sufficient cause for imposition of a sentence in 
excess of the gravity of the offence, and where ordinarily if considered in 
isolation a discharge or nominal penalty would have been imposed (Tutt and 
Giller,1983’ Henman, 1990). 
In addition to the ‘inflationary’ consequences of citing police cautions in 
Juvenile Court proceedings (Ditchfield, 1976:8), the expansion of youth 
cautioning schemes resulted in a significant increase in the number of 
young people issued with a formal and recordable caution (Gibson and 
Cavadino, 1995; Gelsthorpe and Morris, 1999) despite no commensurate 
rise in offending or corresponding reduction in prosecutions. This ‘net-
widening’ was not only reflected in the increase in the number of young 
people accruing antecedents and escalation in sentence tariff, but was also 
the subject of further criticism for widening police discretionary powers and 
‘the net of social control over young people’ (Goldson, 2000:45). Advocates 
of labelling theory also continued to argue that despite the diversionary 
objectives of police cautions, formal police cautions escalated delinquent 
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identities and behaviours a consequence of this negative or adverse 
engagement with the police (Gold and Williams, 1969; Klein, 1974; 
Farrington, 1977). 
Criticisms of the statistical collation and analysis of cautioning were 
common, with data considered unreliable and ‘notoriously difficult to 
interpret’ (Tutt and Giller, 1983), especially as a consequence of police 
misclassification of cautions and informal warnings, with these two terms 
often used interchangeably (Somerville, 1969; Steer, 1970; Dingwall and 
Harding, 1998). The influential Ingleby Report made no distinction 
whatsoever between these two practices and seemingly did not appreciate 
the differences. 
There were other concerns that the discretion afforded to police officers as 
adjudicators was not only disproportionate to the powers afforded to them 
(Laycock and Tarling, 1985), but also engendered discriminatory practices, 
as ‘extra-legal’ factors such as race, gender, social class, demeanour, 
educational attainment and perceived levels of parental control were 
improperly influencing decisions in favour or against the issuing of a police 
caution (Bennett, 1979; Fisher and Mawby, 1982; Landau and Nathan, 
1983; Gelsthorpe, 1989; Sanders and Young, 2002).  
The absence of any established or considered criterion for the issuing of a 
police caution was of concern to some, and despite the considerable 
jurisdiction the police held concerning outcomes for young people who 
offended, there are few records of what, if any, training was provided to 
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police concerning how to determine whether a caution was a suitable 
disposal, and just as significantly, how to administer it. The apparent 
difficulty in implementing such training was noted by one commentator as: 
‘the question of how and when to apply discretion is left to the 
approach of the individual officer. It is not regarded within the police 
service as a subject which can readily be taught or imparted in 
training’ (Somerville, 1969:408). 
The various Home Office guidelines concerning police cautioning (Home 
Office, 1970; 1980; 1985) were also criticised as being excessively broad 
and absent of practical detail, advising the police: 
‘what to do but not how to do it’ (Evans and Wilkinson, 1990:174),  
though the introduction of national standards in cautioning practices sought 
to address this (Home Office, 1990), though unsuccessfully (Bateman, 
2002). 
A persistent criticism of police youth cautioning was the geographical 
disparity of use between regional police forces, and sometimes within a 
singular force as well; with considerably greater use of cautioning in the 
north of England than other regions, and a significant disparity between low 
rates of cautioning in cities and higher cautioning rates in rural areas (Royal 
Commission on the Police, 1962; Patchett and McClean, 1965; McLintock 
and Avison, 1968; Steer, 1970; Ditchfield, 1976; Tutt and Giller, 1983; 
Laycock and Tarling, 1985; Giller and Tutt, 1987; Pitts, 1990; Evans, 1993a; 
Ball, 2004). In 1966 for example, 6 city regions cautioned less than 10% of 
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boys under the age of 14, in comparison to almost 70% of boys in 25 rural 
and semi-suburban areas (Steer, 1970:14).  
Steer concluded that reasons for this disparity were uncomplicated and 
explained by the fact that the police in rural and smaller urban areas were 
more ‘able to keep an eye on potential delinquents’ (Steer, 1970:17). 
Ditchfield however gave greater weight to the influence of varying regional 
crime patterns, and concluded that: 
‘in the cities there is readier access to courts; there is also a higher 
rate of offending and a feeling on the part of the police that, because 
of the greater impersonality of the urban situation, the courts are in a 
better position to assess the needs of offenders than are the police.’ 
(Ditchfield, 1976:25). 
Somerville suggested that informal measures were practiced more 
frequently in rural districts as a consequence of: 
‘the “village bobby”, who knows most of the inhabitants personally 
and is therefore often able to deal with and contain minor 
infringements of the law by a timely word of warning’ (Somerville, 
1969:409). 
Tutt and Giller (1983) argued that reasons for this disparity were more 
complex and included police cautioning for young people lacked any 
coherent theoretical basis, which was especially reflected in the 
considerable variation in attitude towards youth cautioning by Chief 
Constables who dictated their local youth justice practices.  They also 
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concluded that Chief Constables favoured either a ‘welfare’ approach, which 
focused primarily on the circumstances and needs of the young person, or a 
‘justice’ approach, where decision making was centred on the nature and 
seriousness of the offence committed by the young person. 
Osborough however argued that although there was no sinister explanation 
for the considerable regional variations in the cautioning of young people, 
the discretion this practice afforded to individual police officers was so great 
that inevitably: 
‘there is bound to be an element of caprice about the manner in 
which that power is exercised’ and ‘an acceptable uniformity of 
practice is merely a pipe dream’ (Osborough, 1965:424-425).  
In addition to geographical disparities of use, the police caution was also 
found to be issued disproportionately between genders and racial groups, 
with more boys than girls and more black youths than their white 
counterparts issued with formal cautions (Steer, 1970; Landau and Nathan, 
1993; Goldson and Chigwada-Bailey, 1999; Home Office, 1999a; Worrall, 
1999). The absence of an independent prosecuting authority at that time 
also resulted in recommendations by the Magistrates Association, Law 
Society for England and Wales and other interested parties that: 
‘the police in England and Wales should have more legal advice in 
deciding upon prosecution or issuing summonses than is the present 
practice in some areas’ (Royal Commission on the Police, 1962:113). 
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Despite these criticisms, until the profound change in political mood in the 
1990s (Gelsthorpe and Padfield, 2003) - discussed further in this thesis at 
paragraphs 4.20 and 5.3 – there continued to be broad support for the 
practice of diverting children and young people from the court by way of a 
police caution for low level offending where no entrenched pattern of 
offending was identifiable or likely. The diversion of young people who 
offend from formal processes correspondingly became enshrined in 
international law, and subsequently entwined with human rights principles - 
discussed further at Chapter Five). 
Proponents argued it was good for police relations and presented them in a 
‘new light’ in the role of assisting parents to keep their children out of trouble 
and avoiding a court appearance; improved recidivism rates amongst young 
people (Mack, 1975); was a flexible and enlightened model of police 
practice (Wortley, 2003); reduced congestion in the Juvenile Court 
(Osborough,1965); and though had imperfections and further safeguards 
were necessary, police discretion was usually used wisely, and it was a 
humane and pragmatic process for young people and other vulnerable 
groups where there were strong public interests grounds not to initiate a 
formal prosecution (Steer, 1970).  
Up until the early 1990s the Home Office also continued to promote 
cautioning, and endorsed the prevailing view that there was: 
‘widespread agreement that the courts should only be used as a last 
resort, particularly for juveniles and young adults; and diversion from 
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courts by means of cautioning or other forms of action may reduce 
the likelihood of re-offending. These factors would support a policy 
within which cautioning is used for a wide range of offences and 
offenders’ (Home Office, 1990: paragraph 7). 
4.15 Continuing demise of informal police action 
Historically ‘there is ample evidence that much delinquency was subject to 
informal admonition’ (Dingwall and Harding, 1998:26) and for reasons 
including cost, proportionality and effectiveness, informal measures were 
often implicitly utilised not as an intentionally diversionary measure, but 
rather as the usual, expected and natural response to youth offending 
(Sharpe, 1980). Although the increasing formalisation of the police caution 
and diversionary schemes diminished the use of informal measures, until 
the early 1990s the practice of taking no action or informal procedures was 
an accepted course of action in certain circumstances (Home Office, 1978; 
Home Office, 1990, Muncie, 1999). Somerville’s study of cautioning 
practices identified: 
‘Police cautioning of petty offenders as an alternative to prosecution 
operates at two levels. Primarily, there is the informal caution or 
warning issued verbally by a patrolling police-man as an alternative 
to invoking the full legal process…the second level of 
discretion…involves decision making on the part of senior-police 
officers in the matter of a prosecution. Where a decision is made not 
to prosecute, a formal caution is issued’ (Somerville, 1969:409). 
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The dangers of undermining the use of informal action were acknowledged 
by the Home office Circular 14/1985 ‘The Cautioning of Offenders’ (Home 
Office, 1985), which although encouraging the use of informal measures, 
greater consistency in decision making and improved inter-agency liaison, 
also provided a ‘steer’ towards greater use of the police caution as the 
standard disposal for all young first time offenders for all but serious 
offences (Giller and Tutt, 1987; Goldson, 2000:35; Evans and Wilkinson, 
1990; Evans and Wilkinson, 1990a; Muncie, 1999). The Circular also 
however recognised that increased cautioning risked increased net-
widening, and: 
‘…it should not follow that simply because a juvenile is brought to the 
police station formal action (e.g. a caution) is required, as against a 
decision to take less formal action at all. This is an area which 
supervisory officers will need to monitor carefully’ (Home Office, 
1985). 
Confusion between the practice of informal but recordable admonishments 
and formal youth cautioning also persisted, and was compounded by Home 
Office Circular 59/1990 ‘The Cautioning of Offenders’ (Home Office, 1990), 
which referred to informal police cautions as an ‘instant caution’ (paragraph 
14) as opposed to a formal and recordable caution. Despite an earlier 
warning against these confused practices (Home Office, 1985) this 
misnomer inadvertently resulted in a sharp increase in the number of police 
cautions issued to young people who would ordinarily have been dealt with 
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informally, and engendered a cultural reluctance by the police to routinely 
deal with young people informally (see Goldson, 2000). 
Though the Home Office acknowledged in its subsequent circular 18/1994 
‘The Cautioning of Offenders’ (Home Office, 1994) that the earlier reference 
to an ‘informal caution’ in the 1990 Guidance was unhelpful and the 
expression ‘informal caution’ should not be used, this error arguably 
contributed significantly to the diminution of informal measures for young 
people who offended. Similarly, the Association of Chief Police Officers 
(ACPO) introduced in 1995 its own ‘formal warning’ procedure which was 
intended to be non-citable in any subsequent criminal proceeding, but a 
record was retained locally to assist future determination of case disposal in 
the event of re-offending (ACPO, 1995). This procedure operated alongside 
formal police cautions and further confused informal and formal cautions.  
Though these types of informal measures were primarily a benevolent 
diversionary disposal, they were not without criticism. Concerns included 
that they were being issued in the absence of any safeguards and contrary 
to any suitable pre-conditions for suitability, and were being recorded on 
‘personal’ records kept by the police which disproportionately influenced 
subsequent pre-court decision making (Evans and Wilkinson, 1990a). 
Similarly, advocates of ‘radical non-intervention’ disapproved of even 
informal measures, advocating that ‘we should leave kids alone wherever 
possible’ (Schur, 1973).  
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Other criticisms included the absence of supervision or regulation of the ‘low 
visibility’ processes involved with informal disposals (Evans and Puech, 
2001:796) and that informal decision making tolerated discriminatory police 
practices, as: 
‘police discretion is not an equal opportunity phenomenon. Some 
groups are much more likely than others to be at the receiving end of 
the exercise of police powers. A general pattern of benign under-
enforcement of the law disguises the often oppressive use of police 
powers against unpopular or uninfluential and hence powerless 
minorities’ (Reiner, 1994:725-726). 
Exponents of ‘labelling theory’ and ‘judicious non-intervention’ both similarly 
condemned even informal measures as an often disproportionate societal 
reaction to trivial deviant behaviour which was likely to result in a deviant 
self-perception and secondary deviancy (Lemert, 1967).  
The ‘return to justice’ movement (see Morris, et al, 1980) further argued that 
welfare centred justice, which promoted certain informal interventions, were 
in practice insufficiently proportionate to the misdemeanour and/or issued 
inconsistently, and despite the benevolent intention of informal measures, 
children’s rights were better safeguarded through a court hearing, legal 
representation and a statutory appeals process (Asquith, 1983). Arguments 
in support of the associated ‘just deserts’ principle, were similarly promoted 
to support police cautioning as a proportionate response to minor offences 
by persons of low culpability, such as children and young people.  
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4.16 The police caution and the ‘bifurcation’ of youth justice 
Despite official recognition of the value of out of court disposals for young 
people who offended, the earlier radicalism of the 1960s failed to 
substantively transform youth justice practice and procedures, with 
increasing numbers of young people entering the criminal justice system, 
resulting in a ‘hybrid’ system of welfarism and justice ideologies (Randall, 
2011:2). This ‘bifurcation’ of youth justice during the 1970s and 1980s saw a 
dichotomy between punitive and diversionary measures for young people 
who offended (Bottoms, 1977; Pitts, 1988) and cautioning arguably had no 
coherent theoretical basis (Tutt and Giller, 1983).  
Despite the increase in use of the police caution there remained: 
‘no statutory basis for the formal caution. As is well known, the 
phrase “formal caution” in this context is used to describe a 
discretionary procedure adopted by the police which was developed 
with special reference to juvenile offenders but is now used quite 
extensively for adults’ (R v Commissioner of the Police of the 
Metropolis ex p Thomson [1997] 1 WLR 1519 at 1520). 
Moreover, the various Home Office Guidelines intended to promote and/or 
regulate youth cautioning practices (Home Office, 70/1978, 14/1985, 
59/1990, 18/1994) were not binding on the police as: 
‘It is therefore the responsibility of each Chief Constable to set out his 
own policy, though for reasons of consistency, the Chief Constable 
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will wish to take into account the views of the Home Office, 
particularly if, as in the case of Home Office Guidance on cautions, 
the guidance is clear and careful’ (R (on the application of Stratton) v 
Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police [2013] EWHC 1561 at 41 
(Admin)). 
Pratt argues however that debate concerning diversionary justice and 
welfare models were no more than a ‘sideshow’ as a third model of youth 
justice emerged, namely ‘corporatism’, driven by managerial and actuarialist 
discourse within the youth justice system (Pratt, 1989). The fact that 
cautioning had yet to be put on a statutory footing made it especially 
susceptible to wide discrepancies not only between various police regions, 
but also within a single police region (Ditchfield, 1976; Tutt and Giller, 1983; 
Giller and Tutt, 1987; Evans and Wilkinson, 1990; Evans, 1993). 
Nonetheless, by the late 1960s the police caution for young people who 
offended had:  
‘won the support of successive Conservative administrations (Home 
Office, 1980, 1984; liberals (Schaeffer, 1980; radicals (Smith, 1984) 
and juvenile justice pressure groups (Association for Juvenile Justice, 
1985)’ (as cited in Pratt, 1986:212), 
and continued though throughout the 1970s and 1980s as a recognised but 
non-statutory police function, and an accepted disposal for young people 
with no or few antecedents who committed less serious offences (Ball, 
2004).  
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The uncertain legal status of diversion was reflected in a 1976 study of the 
Juvenile Court, which found that:   
‘Juveniles are not to be brought before the court if they can equally 
well or better be dealt with by more normal means. Persons who may 
be concerned in bringing proceedings are therefore required or 
encouraged to explore alternative possibilities before arriving at a 
decision’ (Cavenagh, 1976:2). 
Home Office Circular 59/1990 encouraged the diversion of young people 
from the criminal justice system, and advocated there was:  
‘widespread agreement that the courts should only be used as a last 
resort, particularly for juveniles and young adults; and diversion from 
courts by means of cautioning or other forms of action may reduce 
the likelihood of re-offending. These factors would support a policy 
within which cautioning is used for a wide range of offences and 
offenders’ (Home Office, 1990). 
The Circular additionally emphasised the desirability of multi-agency 
decision making in diversionary processes and the continued need for 
improved consistency of practice (Evans, 1994). Given that within less than 
a decade this policy became inimical to the political and public mood, Home 
Office Circular 59/1990 arguably represents the highpoint of official 
recognition and promotion of diversionary practices for young people who 
offend. 
  Cushing, K., 2016, Chapter Four 
95 
 
At the same time however, the increasing formalisation and use of the 
police caution had displaced the victim ‘from their one empowered position’ 
to invoke personal discretion over the prosecution and punishment process, 
and had shifted it to the state (Kirchengast, 2006:159). In response, victims’ 
advocacy became increasingly mobilised and campaigned that cautioning 
practices were made with little bearing on the needs or wishes of the victim, 
denied them the opportunity to secure compensation or reparation and to 
also have an offender held publicly to account (Shapland, et al, 1985).  
Left-realist criminologists, who were critical of left idealists’ failure to 
recognise the effect of crime on the working class, similarly contended that 
cautioning practices and models of minimum or radical non-intervention 
often put the needs of the offender above those of the victim (Young, 1986). 
In consequence, a Victim’s Charter (Home Office, 1990a) was introduced 
and sought to give greater emphasis to the rights of victims and bring 
greater parity to decision making processes (Davis, et al, 1989; Dignan, 
1992).  
Although the Home Office claimed the police caution was highly successful 
in preventing recidivism and actively promoted its use (Home Office 
Statistical Bulletin, 1992; Home Office Statistical Bulletin, 1995; Bateman, 
2012), it still failed to implement any consistent uniformity of practice despite 
frequent issue of further guidelines and National Standards (Parliamentary 
All-Party Penal Affairs Group, 1981; Home Office, 1976; Home Office, 1980; 
Home Office, 1985; Home Office, 1990; Wilkinson and Evans, 1990). This 
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period also saw a significant increase in the cautioning of young people who 
offended (Bottoms, 1974; Rutherford, 1992), reaching a peak in 1992.  
The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) was established in 1985 in part to 
bring greater consistency to the decision making process, with an 
identifiable remit to develop specialist juvenile prosecutors (Timmons, 1986) 
and divert young people who offended wherever possible (Crown 
Prosecution Service, 1986). The police though continued to retain primary 
responsibility for out of court disposals for young people who committed low 
level offences and the CPS only intervened in more complex cases (Home 
Office, 1990).  
4.17 Radical Diversionary Models 
In certain regions, notably Northamptonshire, there operated between 1981 
and 1992 a progressive multi-agency diversionary regime led by Juvenile 
Liaison Bureaus (LBJs), which comprised of social workers, probation 
officers, police constables, teachers and youth workers (Kemp, et al, 2002). 
The Northamptonshire model, heavily influenced by labelling theory 
advocates (Becker, 1963; Matza, 1969; Lemert, 1967; Schur, 1973; Home 
Office, 1980), operated on principles of minimum intervention or judicious 
non-intervention, and sought to keep young people who had offended 
outside of all formal and recordable processes wherever possible and not 
intervene in the: 
‘near relatives of delinquency such as truancy and disruptive 
behaviour’ (Davis et al, 1989:219).  
  Cushing, K., 2016, Chapter Four 
97 
 
LBJs promoted diversion by way of no action at all for trivial offences, 
informal action or an informal warning for the majority of young people who 
offended, or a formal caution for more serious offences. Decision making 
was premised on the presumption that a formal charge was a last resort and 
unlike traditional diversionary models, LBJs sought to divert both first time 
and persistent offenders, and also divert even when serious offences had 
been committed (Tutt and Giller, 1983; Davis, et al, 1989; Bell et al, 1999).  
Although LBJs were technically an advisory body to senior police officers 
who retained their traditional authority to determine the outcome, their 
recommendations were ordinarily accepted and the historical jurisdiction of 
the police to determine the outcome for young people who offended was in 
practice considerably diminished.  
Despite the Northampton model perhaps embodying the most ‘true’ 
diversionary process undertaken in England and Wales (Cohen, 1985:51), 
and the fact it was primarily benevolent in intention, it, together with other 
similar models, failed to attract universal support. LBJs and the diversionary 
theories which drove it were criticised for having unaccountable 
discretionary powers, inconsistent decision making, and ‘uncertain 
philosophy’ (Evans and Ellis, 1997; Davis et al, 1989:232); failing to give 
suitable consideration to the views of victims or parents, and substituting 
judicial decision making for a new model of unaccountable administrative 
decision making. Davis et al argued that: 
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‘It is easy to forget that the juvenile court was itself devised as a 
means of diverting children from the more formal court procedures 
applied to adults. Now we find that administrative decision making is 
justified on the basis that an appearance in the juvenile court is itself 
a step on the downward spiral of imprisonment and recidivism. If 
follows that we need to invent complex pre-prosecution processes 
which delay the young person’s arrival not at the prison door, but at 
the court door…if that is the problem, one wonders why it is not 
tackled directly (Davis et al, 1989:234).  
Similar diversionary programmes in the United States were criticised as: 
‘Increasing the number of programs for juvenile offenders is 
incompatible with the idea of diversion from the system: New 
programs, however we label them, are certainly a part of the overall 
system for responding to delinquency, and sending youngsters to 
those programs cannot fairly be characterized as keeping them out of 
the system’ (Bullington, et al,1978:66). 
Others argued, not unlike Platt’s criticisms of the nineteenth century ‘child-
savers’ who established judicial and correctional institutions which 
unintentionally resulted in increased punitiveness for children and young 
people, that the minimal intervention principles operated within the 
Northampton model were too radical for socially acceptable practices at that 
time and contributed to a reactionary backlash against diversionary 
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practices and the subsequent emergence of a more punitive youth justice 
system (Davis et al, 1989).  
4.18 Continuing regional disparities in the operation of the police caution 
and diversionary disposals 
Despite the efforts of the Home Office throughout the 1980s and early 
1990s to improve the consistency of police cautioning for young people 
(Home Office, 1985; Home Office, 1990; Home Office, 1994), there 
remained considerable regional disparity in practice and procedure (Seeba, 
1967; Gelsthorpe and Giller, 1990; Pitts, 1990; Wilkinson and Evans, 1990; 
Evans and Wilkinson, 1990; Westwood, 1991; Evans, 1991; Evans and 
Ellis, 1997; Worrall, 1999; Bateman, 2002; Kemp and Gelsthorpe, 2003).  
Tensions between the historical authority and jurisdiction of regional police 
authorities to determine their own youth justice cautioning practices, and 
government initiatives to implement consistent practices and procedures 
emerged, with the police arguing that Home Office initiatives reflected an 
urban policing model, to the disadvantage of rural policing, and also failed to 
recognise necessary geographical variances in policing methods (Hirst, 
1994).  
Despite government initiatives to centralise policy making concerning 
diversionary measures for young people who offended, certain police areas, 
such as Hampshire and Northumbria, scaled back or abolished entirely their 
juvenile bureaux’s on cost efficiency grounds and introduced their own 
‘instant caution’ procedure; where a young person suspected of committing 
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an offence would be taken to a police station, their antecedents examined, 
and if considered suitable for a caution their parents invited to attend and 
within only a few hours of their attendance a caution was issued, with no 
multi-agency liaison as to the suitability of this or any other disposal (Tutt 
and Giller, 1983). 
Contrarily, other regions established: 
‘sophisticated diversionary partnerships and inter-agency 
relationships …between the police, social workers, probation officers 
and education professionals which pluralised agency decision 
making and served (to some extent at least) to diffuse the power and 
influence of the police’ (Goldson, 2000:36).  
In an ostensive rejection of Home Office youth cautioning guidelines which 
encouraged greater use of the formal police caution, ACPO also introduced 
their own guidance for regional police forces, and in direct contrast to the 
Home Office Guidelines, encouraged a greater use of informal warnings, as 
opposed to a formal caution, for the most trivial of offences, or where it was 
impractical to issue a formal caution (ACPO, 1995). 
4.19 The police caution and the ‘bifurcation’ of youth justice 
Although the 1980s were described as ‘a decade of diversion’ (Dignan, 
1992:453), and generally dominated by the notion that a prosecution should 
be a last resort (Evans, 1991; Graham, 2010), youth justice diversionary 
policies increasingly reflected the ‘bi-furcation’ (Bottoms, 1997:88) or twin 
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tracking of criminal justice. Police cautions for young people arguably began 
to fall outside of a true definition of diversion, or the: 
‘The process of keeping offenders and other problem populations 
away from the institutional arrangements of criminal justice or 
welfare’ (Lee, 2013:102), 
when they officially became citable in any Juvenile Court hearing (Home 
Office, 1978; see also Goldson, 2002).  
Home Office Circular 14/1985 ‘The Cautioning of Offenders (Home Office, 
1985) however still actively promoted the use of the police caution and 
informal disposals, and greater emphasis was placed on the benefits of 
other non-custodial sentences (Pitts, 1988; Evans and Wilkinson, 1990; 
Rutherford, 1992; Charman and Savage, 1999:193). Conversely though, 
increasingly punitive sentences were encouraged for young people 
considered to have committed more serious offences (Koffman, 2006; 
Koffman and Dingwall, 2007) and there was a ‘rise in vindictiveness’ of 
sentencing policies for serious offences (Pitts, 1998:40).  
By the early 1990s however the diversion of young people who offended 
from formal processes came under increasing criticism and: 
‘it is difficult to envisage a policy reversal [so great] in any area of 
public policy’ which took place ‘from a point somewhere in 1992’ 
(Charman and Savage, 1999:195). 
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4.20 The ‘new youth justice’ and the demise of the police caution 
The politicisation of police cautioning began in the 1990s during the period 
of the Conservative government, and measures to restrict its use and other 
diversionary measures were implemented by them (Pitts, 2003; Graham, 
2010)). In 1994 the Conservative Home Secretary initiated another rotation 
in the ‘cycle of youth justice’ (Bernard, 1992) or ‘circular motions’ (Goldson, 
2013a:3), and reversed almost twenty years of government policy which 
favoured the diversion of ‘young offenders’ who committed low level 
offences by way of a police caution (Evans, 1994). 
Restrictive guidance was issued discouraging the issuing of multiple 
cautions (Home Office, 1994); young people were removed from the 
category of vulnerable people in the National Standards for Cautioning (Ball, 
2004); the ‘caution plus’ was introduced which attached a package of 
intervention to a caution (Home Office, 1994) (though this type of scheme 
was already operating under various guises in some regions); and the Code 
for Crown Prosecutors was amended to discourage the presumption that 
young age alone was a positive pre-requisite for diversion (Crown 
Prosecution Service, 1994).  
Diversionary measures were further subjected to overtly hostile rhetoric, as 
reflected by Home Office Minister Michael Howard’s declaration that for all 
offenders, including young offenders: 
‘From now on your first chance is your last chance. Criminals should 
know that they will be punished. Giving cautions…to the same 
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person time and time again, sends the wrong message to criminals 
and the police (The Times, March 16, 1994, as cited in Ball, 
1995:198). 
The opposition Labour Party, in an apparent volte face of its traditional left-
ideological position, correspondingly rejected its previous support for 
welfare based diversionary models, and now decreed that ineffective 
cautioning practices had contributed to a wholescale crisis in youth justice 
(Labour Party, 1994; Labour Party, 1995; Labour Party, 1996). Others 
suggest however that there had been a policy vacuum concerning law and 
order within the Labour Party (Downes and Morgan, 1997), and until it 
sought to reposition itself electorally to be ‘tough on crime’ it had been 
disinterested in this area of policy (McLaughlin, et al, 2001).  
The opposition Labour Party paper ‘Tackling Youth Crime: Reforming Youth 
Justice’ characterised the perceived failure of police cautioning practices as 
a crisis where:  
‘Youth crime is one of the most serious problems facing England and 
Wales today. Young offenders wreck their chances of leading 
worthwhile and fulfilled adult lives and they can wreck the lives of 
those whom they victimise. The current system of repeat cautioning 
is not working…too many people involved in the system are unclear 
whether the purpose is to punish and to signify society’s disapproval 
of offending, or whether the welfare of the young offender is 
paramount’ (Straw and Michael, 1996:1). 
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This alleged ‘substantial retreat…from traditional socialist thinking on crime’ 
(Brownlee, 1998:313) by the opposition Labour Party resulted in juvenile 
justice becoming ‘spectacularly re-politicised’ (Goldson, 2000:36) and a 
‘veritable paradigm shift’ (Charman and Savage, 1999:192) from 
mainstream welfare centred youth justice policies began (Muncie, 1999; 
Pitts, 2003; Gelsthorpe and Morris, 1994).  
Youth crime became increasingly hyper-politicised as a consequence of 
competing political stratagems throughout the 1990s to secure electoral 
support for law and order, as well as other factors including the ‘political 
storm’ which accompanied the murder of two year old James Bulger by two 
ten year old boys (Smith, 1995; Goldson, 1998; Roberts, 2003; Pitts, 
2003:10), concomitant escalating tabloid interest in youth justice (Loader, 
1996; Reiner, 2007; Jones, 2010) and ensuing electoral anxiety concerning 
a perceived surge in youth crime and disorder (Haydon and Scraton, 2000; 
McLaughlin, et al, 2001).  
Previously tolerated adolescent nuisance behaviour became increasingly 
classified as ‘anti-social behaviour’ and necessitated some form of official 
intervention (Hough and Roberts, 2004; Muncie, 2008), a ‘parenting deficit’ 
identified as a contributory cause of youth offending (Goldson and 
Jamieson, 2002:82) and repeat cautioning of recidivist young offenders was 
especially condemned (Bateman, 2002). 
This period of ‘populist punitiveness’ (Bottoms, 1995:18; Brownlee, 
1998:313) and ‘penal populism’ (Koffman and Dingwall, 2007:3) concerning 
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youth justice was précised in the Audit Commission’s report ‘Misspent 
Youth’, which concluded that repeat police cautioning for persistent young 
offenders was ineffective, and this cohort was responsible for the majority of 
crime committed by young people (Audit Commission, 1996:8).  
‘Misspent Youth’ also examined for the first time the economic impact of 
diversionary and other interventionist disposals, and whether the youth 
justice system represented ‘value for money’ (Pitts, 2003:33). It 
recommended removing from Chief Constables the historical right to 
determine their own diversionary agenda, and also that diversionary policies 
become centralised, with local multi-agency teams answerable to a new 
Youth Justice Board (Reid, 1997; Ball, et al, 2001). Though a highly 
influential report, Misspent Youth was subsequently subjected to criticism 
for allegedly sourcing selective and superficial data in order to 
disingenuously overstate the need for radical reform (Jones, 2001). 
Somewhat ironically, and perhaps reminiscent of the inadvertent net-
widening consequences of the ‘child saver’ movement, criticisms of 
inconsistent cautioning practices by ostensibly welfare based agencies 
(Nacro, 1993) were cited as evidence of the need for reform by those in 
favour of a more restrictive and structured youth cautioning model.  
Concomitantly, the radical left paradigm, which had actively promoted 
diversionary models, was the subject of not inconsiderable criticism from 
left-realists, who argued that the effects of crime should not be disregarded 
in the pursuit of a welfare led ideology, especially as most working class 
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crime was intra-class, and it was the constituents of the left who suffered 
most from the adverse effects of crime (Young, 1997).  
The traditional operation of the police caution was also further reconsidered 
in the light of increasingly popular neoteric policing philosophies, which 
emphasised ‘zero-tolerance’ for trivial and minor offences, on the 
presumption that early and aggressive intervention would prevent an 
escalation in offending, especially by young people, or ‘broken windows’ 
theory (Wilson and Kelling, 1982; Bratton, 1998; Rutherford, 2006).  
This change in political mood was not commensurate however with 
statistical analysis of youth crime, which suggested that only 8% of young 
people received more than two cautions, and no evidence that recidivist 
offenders were routinely cautioned (Ball, 2004:176). Statistics also 
suggested that despite some imperfections, cautioning of young people who 
committed an offence was on the whole a successful practice (Bateman, 
2002; Ball, 2004). The authors of Misspent Youth also acknowledged that 
cautioning: 
‘worked well for first time offenders, and 7 out of 10 are not known to 
re-offend within 2 years’ (Audit Commission, 1996:22), 
and even radical diversionary models, such as that operating in 
Northampton, had elements of exemplary practice (Audit Commission, 
1996:46). 
Nevertheless, the police youth caution and other diversionary regimes fell 
spectacularly out of political, tabloid and societal favour, and from 1992 the 
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number of cautions issued to young people consistently fell (Bateman, 
2002), with a consequential increase in the number of young people 
entering the court system (Evans and Ellis, 1997). This was despite the fact 
that overall detected youth crime was declining (Bateman, 2002). 
4.21 The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 – the end of the police caution  
Upon election in 1997, and consistent with its political stratagem to 
reposition itself as the natural party of ‘law and order’ (Michael, 1993; Straw 
and Michael, 1996; Straw, 1997; Labour Party, 1996; Labour Party, 1997; 
Pitts, 2003) the New Labour government abandoned entirely any previous 
endorsements of welfare centred policies (Home Office, 1965; Home Office, 
1968), and declared in the White Paper ‘No More Excuses’ that major 
reform of the cautioning system was necessary as: 
‘Inconsistent, repeated and ineffective cautioning has allowed some 
children and young people to feel that they can offend with 
impunity…radical action is now needed’ (Home Office, 1997:5.10).  
The subsequent Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (CDA) together with the Final 
Warning Scheme Guidance for the Police and Youth Offending Teams 2002 
(as amended 2006) rejected the notion that out of court disposals should be 
a primarily a benevolent measure to prevent young people who had 
committed a low level offence unnecessarily entering the criminal justice 
system, and a prosecution should be a ‘last resort’. In response to the 
delays in delivering police cautions cited in Misspent Youth (Audit 
Commission, 1996; Home Office, 1997a) diversionary processes were to be 
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expedited and improved by ‘modernisation through managerialisation’ 
(McLaughlin, et al, 2001:301)   
The CDA abolished the traditional notion and practice of the ‘police caution’, 
and the ‘caution plus’, and replaced them with an intentionally and 
inherently punitive alternative (Lee, 1995; Puech and Evans, 2001), the 
‘reprimand’ and ‘warning’ (known thereafter as a ‘Final Warning’). Although 
the CDA unequivocally promoted early intervention, it severely restricted 
both the opportunities for informal measures and the number of out of court 
disposals available to a young person. Young people were expected to 
respond positively to the two or three opportunities given to them to avoid a 
formal prosecution by way of a reprimand or Final Warning, and failure to do 
so was to be followed if necessary by ‘significant punishment’ (Leng, 1999; 
Goldson, 2000:37). 
Formal prosecution by way of a charge and subsequent appearance in the 
Youth Court became mandatory for a third offence, unless a two year period 
had elapsed from the issuing of a Final Warning and the commission of 
another offence, when a second Final Warning could be issued (Card and 
Ward, 1998; Leng, et al, 1998). Though the issuing of a second Final 
Warning was semantically illogical, under no circumstances could a young 
person receive more than two Final Warnings, and the commission of a third 
offence would almost inevitably result in a formal charge and court 
proceedings.  
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A prosecution became mandatory even when there was a considerable gap 
between previous offending and the commission of a new offence, or where 
there had been a significant change in circumstances, or the latter offence 
would ordinarily fall within a diversionary disposal under the new Gravity 
Factor Matrix (contained within the Final Warning Scheme Guidance), which 
graded offence seriousness and aggravating/mitigating features. The CDA 
further prohibited young people from refusing to accept a reprimand or Final 
Warning, and they could be imposed in the absence of a young person’s 
cooperation or consent.  Reprimands and Final Warnings were also not 
available where a young person had conviction, even if that had been 
issued for a first offence 
The CDA did not prohibit entirely informal and non-recordable warnings, 
admonishments, or on occasion taking no action at all, however it severely 
restricted these practices. The interventionist principles of the CDA 
mandated that formal disposals would be issued in the vast majority of 
cases and informal action should be an exceptional course (Home Office, 
1997) 
In response to the belief that a parental deficit was a contributor to youth 
crime, parents were also expected to undertake a more authoritarian role in 
diversionary processes, and attend and participate when reprimands and 
Final Warnings were issued (Straw and Anderson, 1996; Williams, 2000; 
Final Warning Scheme Guidance 2002:9.14; Goldson and Jamieson, 2002). 
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The CDA was the subject of considerable academic criticism – described as 
a punitive three strikes rule (Pitts, 1998); the human equivalent of 
dangerous dogs legislation (Wilson and Ashton, 1998:62); having an 
ambiguity of principle (Fionda, 1999); an act of institutionalised intolerance 
(Muncie, 1999); potentially consolidating delinquent identities by deceptive 
packaging and insidious spin (Goldson, 2000); inimical to the ideal of a just 
and proportionate response to youth offending (Morris and Gelsthorpe, 
2000); punitive and controlling in principle and practice (Evans & Puech, 
2001); expurgation of all youth justice knowledge (Jones, 2002); an 
acceleration and net widening of young people through the criminal justice 
system (Bateman, 2002); a dramatic penalisation of minor youth offending 
(Burnett and Appleton, 2004); thrusting ‘trouble-makers’ too rapidly into the 
criminal justice system (Commissioner for Human Rights, 2005:81); 
potentially incompatible with the UNCR and other international instruments 
concerning children's rights (Lady Hale in R v Durham Constabulary and 
another ex parte R [2005] UKHL 21 at 40-42); a strange blend of 
authoritarianism and liberalism (Fortin, 2009); inflexible and unjust (Liberty, 
2009:3); a legislative communitarian crusade for the benefit of an idealised 
middle England (Silvestri, 2011); and engendering age discrimination into 
the criminal justice system (Flacks, 2012). See also (Goldson and Muncie, 
2006b), for a summary of other critiques.  
Despite the managerial and interventionist principles of the CDA, its 
emphasis on inter-agency cooperation and the establishment of Youth 
Offending Teams (Morris and Gelsthorpe, 2000; Goldson, 2000; Bateman; 
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2002), in practical terms the CDA did not promote multi-agency partnerships 
at the pre-charge stage. The decision to charge or divert by way of a 
caution, caution plus or by way of an alternative diversionary package had 
previously become, to a greater or lesser extent throughout England and 
Wales, a pluralised inter-agency decision making process (Bell, et al, 1999). 
The CDA however dissolved these processes and primary decision making 
authority concerning outcomes for young people who offended was restored 
to the police and other prosecuting authorities, though with their discretion 
fettered considerably (Goldson, 2000; Kemp and Gelsthorpe, 2003).  
Decision makers were instead provided with a Gravity Factor Matrix (Final 
Warning Scheme Guidance 2002 (as amended 2006)) to determine the 
appropriate disposal for young people who had offended, with primary 
considerations for disposal including the seriousness of the offence, 
whether an admission had been made, whether there were any relevant 
antecedents, and whether there were any aggravating or mitigating features 
of the offence. 
The rigid determining criterion for reprimands and Final Warnings under the 
CDA and Final Warning Scheme Guidance restricted the decision maker’s 
discretion to give proportionate weight to other relevant public interest 
factors not set out in the Gravity Factor Matrix, including the age of the 
offender, individual mitigating factors, the need, if any, for punishment, and 
the interests, where relevant, of the victim (Ashworth, 1997: Dingwall and 
Harding, 1998; Koffman and Dingwall, 2007). The inevitable ‘net-widening’ 
and ‘up-tariffing’ of young people who offended under the CDA and Final 
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Warning Scheme was especially criticised (Pickford, 2000; Evans and 
Puech, 2001; Nacro, 2000; Bateman, 2002; Pitts, 2003). 
The CDA also restricted the capacity of decision makers to balance their 
statutory obligations under the CDA with other competing statutory 
considerations, including taking into consideration the welfare of a young 
person and what outcome is in their best interests (Section 44 Children and 
Young Persons Act 1933 and Article 3(1) of the United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of the Child), and what outcome best prevents a young person 
committing further offences (section 37(1) Crime and Disorder Act 1998). 
The courts however consistently sought to favourably interpret into the Final 
Warning Scheme Guidance the inherent right of decision makers to deviate 
from it - however these were usually cases where decision makers deviated 
by way of prosecuting young people who were eligible for a reprimand or 
Final Warning under the Gravity factor matrix (D,B v Commissioner of Police 
for the Metropolis, Crown Prosecution Service, Croydon Justices [2008] 
EWHC 442 9 Admin; R. (on the application of A) v South Yorkshire Police 
[2007] EWHC 1261). 
The absence of cases to the contrary is not unsurprising though, given the 
improbability of any party seeking a judicial review of a decision not to 
prosecute a young person who should have been charged, and it may be 
that decision makers benevolently exercised their discretion outside of the 
rigid scheme more often than is recognised or known.  
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The inexorable political hype concerning the perceived failures of repeat 
cautioning of recidivist young offenders arguably extended from the political 
to the judiciary.  When the High Court was obliged for the first time in R v 
Durham Constabulary and another ex parte R [2005] UKHL 21 to consider 
the operation of the CDA and Final Warning Scheme Guidance, though it 
recognised that out of court disposals were 
‘often a constructive and pragmatic response to offending by young 
people when a formal prosecution is unnecessary’ (Lord 
Bingham:33),  
it also unquestionably accepted the prevailing political rhetoric that:  
‘significant numbers of persistent young offenders were cautioned 
time after time…the procedure did not achieve its intended objective 
of stopping young offenders in their tracks before they had time to be 
habituated to a life of crime’ (Lord Bingham:4). 
The effect of the prevailing political hostility towards cautioning practices on 
Lord Bingham’s obiter dicta cannot be underestimated, given the absence of 
any corroborative statistical evidence that recidivist offenders were routinely 
and excessively cautioned. Lord Bingham’s obiter dicta arguably does, 
however, support the hypothesis that youth cultures and youth crime 
recurrently experience episodes of indignation and outrage – often in the 
absence of facts or reasoning (Pearson, 1983) - and the practice of the 
police caution for young people who offended became caught up at that 
time in the: 
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‘endless and vengeful discussion about what to do with young 
offenders’ (Curtis, 1999:228).  
Despite the court in R v Durham Constabulary and Another ex parte R 
[2005] UKHL 21 endorsing the merits of informal and non-recordable 
disposals for young people who transgress the law, and recognising that 
there are always cases which: 
‘although disclosing a breach of the criminal law, were so trivial as to 
be properly ignored or dealt with by way of informal and unrecorded 
advice or admonition’ (Lord Bingham:2), 
it found the CDA to be compatible with all international human rights 
obligations, though Baroness Hale had ‘considerable misgivings’ (paragraph 
49) and Lord Steyn did so ‘reluctantly’ (paragraph 22).  
4.22 Alternative out of court disposals 
Despite the ostensible claim that the CDA would introduce certainty into 
youth justice processes, within a very short period of implementation other 
out of court disposals and measures to tackle youth offending were 
implemented. By 2007 there was acknowledgement by policy makers that 
the CDA and Final Warning Scheme Guidance had perhaps unnecessarily 
and disproportionately widened the net of first time entrants into the formal 
criminal justice system (Home Office, 2005, Home Office, 2006, Home 
Office, 2007) and: 
  Cushing, K., 2016, Chapter Four 
115 
 
‘Despite the huge investment… the principal aim of the youth justice 
system, as set out in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, ‘to prevent 
offending by children and young persons’, has yet to be achieved in 
any significant sense’ (Solomon and Garside, 2008:11). 
This, together with a number of other factors, including: 
• statistical evidence that the managerialist and target agenda had not 
achieved desired outcomes (Solomon and Garside, 2008); 
• persistent criticisms of the rigidity and punitiveness of youth justice 
policies (Goldson, 2000; Muncie, 2002; Pitts, 2003; Allen, 2007; 
Flanagan, 2007; Morgan, 2008); 
• the early stages of economic rationing which incentivised the use of 
efficient resources and cost-effective diversionary measures; 
• evidence that many minor offences were reaching the courts and this 
was adversely diverting resources away from persistent offenders 
(Audit Commission, 2004); 
• a subtle change in the climate of opinion as to what constituted 
proportionate treatment of young people who offended (Mattinson 
and Mirrlees-Black, 2000; MORI, 2006; Office of Criminal Justice 
Reform, 2010; Bateman, 2012); 
• a general shift away in the political mood away from earlier hostile 
stances (Smith, 2014:48), 
collectively resulted in the development of other diversionary disposals 
which operated along the CDA and Final Warning Scheme Guidance, and 
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the ‘green shoots of ambiguity’ (Smith, 2014a:41) in New Labour’s 
responses to youth crime and youthful misdemeanours. 
Increased enthusiasm for diversion, whether formal or informal, was also 
propelled by increasing support for the previously out of favour labelling 
theory and the re-emergence of leftist-ideology, which held that system 
contact was inherently criminogenic and increased the likelihood of further 
adverse contact with the police (Hine, 2007; Crawford, 2008; Goldson, 
2010). Supportive research based on a large scale longitudinal study 
concluded that: 
‘The key to reducing offending lies in minimal intervention and 
maximum diversion…doing less rather than more in individual cases 
may mitigate the potential for damage that system contact 
brings…targeted early intervention strategies are likely to widen the 
net….and early involvement will result in constant recycling into the 
system…in some cases doing less is better than doing more (McAra 
and McVie, 2007:315-340). 
Conversely however, the alternative statutory and non-statutory out of court 
initiatives introduced between 2007 and the change of government in 2010 
were also promoted as not only closing the perceived ‘justice gap’ -  the gap 
between reported crime and detected crime (Home Office, 2003b) - but also 
to demonstrate additional political efforts to assuage public anxiety 
concerning adolescent anti-social behaviour (Crawford, 2009a) and 
perceptions of: 
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‘binge drinking youths rampaging city streets after dark’ (Measham, 
2006:265). 
The plethora of new out of court disposals, as discussed further in this 
chapter, targeted not just statutory and common law criminality but also 
‘anti-social behaviour’, reflecting the historical conflict in youth justice 
policies concerning whether intervention should target not just official 
breaches of the law by young people, but also their moral and social 
transgressions (Muncie, 2000). They also reflected the persistent ideological 
tension concerning diversionary practices, which oscillated between 
intervention ostensibly targeted at recidivism, and intervention within a 
criminal justice context primarily for the care and protection of young people 
(Home Office, 1927, 1960, 1968, 1976; Nejelski, 1976; Dingwall and 
Harding, 1998; Goldson, 2000; Bateman, 2002; McAra and McVie, 2010; 
Richards, 2014).  
These measures were primarily however a response to the significant 
escalation of young people being drawn into formal processes, peaking in 
2006-2007 with more than 110,000 young people entering the formal 
criminal justice system for the first time (Bateman, 2012; Youth Justice 
Board for England and Wales, 2014). The CDA and Final Warning Scheme 
Guidance had severely fettered the discretion of decision makers to 
consider appropriate or proportionate out of court disposals for young 
people who had had committed low level offences, and where there was no 
discernible benefit in initiating a formal prosecution.  
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The desire for greater expediency in the processing of young people who 
offended was an additional factor in the introduction of alternative out of 
court summary disposals (Morgan, 2008), and vastly extended police 
primacy concerning young people (Young, 2008). A notable change of 
direction from the zeal and intention of the CDA was apparent in the ‘Youth 
Crime Action Plan’, which pledged to reduce the numbers of young people 
entering the criminal justice by one-fifth by 2020 (Home Office, 2008).  
In their last months of government New Labour seemingly recognised that 
the CDA and Final Warning Scheme Guidance had significantly widened the 
net of first time entrants, and acknowledged this was perhaps ‘potentially 
serious’, and resulted in a ‘fundamental shift in how justice is delivered’. It 
maintained however that the additional raft of out of court disposals they 
had introduced to operate alongside the CDA were pragmatic responses to 
particular operational challenges which provided the police with a further set 
of tools to deal quickly and proportionately with offending (Office for Criminal 
Justice Reform, 2010:2-11).  
This thesis argues that the proliferation of out of court disposals outside of 
the CDA and Final Warning Scheme Guidance was both a response by the 
government to the unacceptably high numbers of young people 
unnecessarily entering the formal criminal justice system as a consequence 
of the severity of the statutory regime, but also as a consequence of police 
and other inter-agency initiatives intended to creatively circumvent it. Many 
of the new out of court disposals were outside of any government control, 
regulation or accountability, and resulted in considerable geographical 
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disparities of use, which perversely, were not unlike many pre-CDA regional 
regimes.  
Smith also suggests, persuasively, that although there were a number of 
‘identifiable drivers’ in terms of policy shifts as well as practitioner 
innovations outside of statutory procedures, the extent to which the growth 
in additional out of court disposals was at all planned or controlled is 
debatable (Smith, 2014:111). 
4.22.1 Penalty Notices for Disorder and Fixed Penalty Notices 
Penalty Notices for Disorder (PNDs), which were introduced for adults under 
sections 1-11 Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 were extended to 16 and 
17 year olds in 2004 under section 87 of the Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003 
(Home Office, 2005, Home Office, 2005a). They were considered a less 
intrusive measure than reprimands and Final Warnings, and provided a 
young person with the opportunity to discharge liability for their offending by 
paying a financial penalty, which ranged from £30.00 - £80.00 depending on 
the gravity of offence committed. 
Unlike reprimands and Final Warnings, PNDs were available to 16 and 17 
year olds with a recorded antecedent history, and were introduced as: 
‘an additional method of disposal to officers for dealing with offences 
which compromise low level, anti-social and nuisance behaviour. The 
scheme is not designed to cater for serious or repeat offending, but 
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subject to that, a PND may be used at any stage in the offending 
career of a child or young person’ (Home Office, 2005:2). 
PNDs for 10-15 year olds were piloted between July 2005 and June 2006 
however this extension was not rolled out nationally (Home Office, 2005a; 
Amadi, 2008). A PND could be issued either immediately or at a later date 
by a constable for a range of ‘recordable’ and ‘notifiable’ offences, including 
low value criminal damage and theft, wasting police time and littering. 
Payment involved no admission of guilt, however a record of the PND was 
retained on the Police National Computer and though theoretically not 
citable in any subsequent proceedings, could potentially be used as ‘bad 
character’ evidence during any trial (section 101 Criminal Justice Act 2003) 
or as evidence for an Anti-Social Behaviour Order (Nacro, 2007).  
With remarkable similarity to the known geographical variances in the 
issuing of police cautions prior to the CDA, there were striking variations in 
the take-up and use of PNDs by police regions, and an absence of 
consensus as to where PNDs fitted within the structure of youth justice 
disposals (Office of Criminal Justice Reform, 2010). Despite this, and 
although PNDs were an intended diversionary disposal, more than 75,000 
were issued between 2006 and 2013 (Youth Justice Board, 2014), many of 
which were for offences or behaviours which ordinarily may have attracted 
no more than an admonishment and had previously been formally dealt with 
as ‘No Further Action’. 
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In addition to PNDs widening the net of young people ‘brought within the 
criminal justice fold’ (Morgan, 2011:18; Office of Criminal Justice Reform, 
2010; Smith, 2010, Stone, 2011), their terms of reference were such that it 
was: 
‘difficult for children to be clear about what kinds of behaviour are 
permissible, and what might lead to PNDs’ (Robert and Garside, 
2005:5). 
Critics of PNDs claimed they undermined the rule of law by reversing the 
burden of proof and moderating the right to trial by jury, took no account of 
disparity of means to pay, extended the sub-judicial role of the police, were 
often issued in the custody suite and not as expeditious or economical as 
intended, and in the absence of any other targeted intervention was 
inconsistent with wider government policy to provide supportive intervention 
in the lives of young people who offended (Young, 2008; Grace, 2014).  
The enthusiasm with which the police operated PNDs was also arguably the 
result of government policy to impose targets on the police for ‘offences 
brought to justice’ (‘OBTJ’), which: 
‘created a strong incentive for officers to deal formally with low level 
offences by administering an out of court disposal in order to secure a 
sanction detection and an offence brought to justice’ (Office for 
Criminal Justice Reform, 2010:11), 
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and perversely incentivised them to impose a formal sanction when 
ordinarily informal measures would have been suitable (Morgan, 2008, 
2011), and consequently:  
‘the impact of increasing the numbers of OBTJ has simply served to 
accelerate (albeit it to a breakneck pace) a process that was already 
underway, to reduce professional discretion and curtail the potential 
for informal resolution’ (Bateman, 2008:4). 
Similarly, Fixed Penalty Notices (FPNs) were piloted for young people aged 
between 10-17 for a range of low level offences, predominantly littering and 
graffiti, under the Clean Neighbourhoods and Environments Act 2005 and 
the Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003 (Department for Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs, 2007). The power to issue FPNs was extended beyond the 
police to include Local Authorities, the Environment Agency and National 
Park Authorities. FPNs could be issued either immediately or through the 
post, and were similar in operation to a PNDs. Guidance sought to 
distinguish the issuing of FPNs between 10-15 year olds and 16-17 year 
olds (Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, 2006), though 
FPNs were subsequently restricted to adult offenders only. 
PNDs and FPNs were subsequently abolished by the Conservative-led 
Coalition government as out of court disposals for young people (section 
132 and Schedule 23 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of 
Offenders Act 2012).  
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4.22.2 Anti-Social Behaviour Orders and Acceptable Behaviour Contracts 
Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs) and Criminal Anti-Social Behaviour 
Orders (CrASBOs) were introduced in the CDA (subsequently amended by 
the Police Reform Act 2002, Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003 and Serious 
Organised Crime and Police Act 2005) and operated in a similar manner to 
an injunction, by prohibiting certain behaviour by any person aged 10 years 
or more that ‘causes or is likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress’ to 
others (Home Office, 2003; Home Office, 2003a; Home Office, 2004). 
Though ASBOs were not an out of court disposal, they resulted in the 
emergence of a non-statutory and non-judicial alternative targeting anti-
social behaviour, the Acceptable Behaviour Contract (ABC). 
The interpretation of what constituted ‘anti-social behaviour’ has been the 
subject of considerable study, as the capacious and subjective definition 
extended beyond actual criminality to include a wide range of activities, 
misdemeanours and incivilities (Home Office, 2000; R (McCann) v 
Manchester Crown Court [2003] 1 AC 787 at 16; Ashworth, 2004; Ramsay, 
2004; Squires and Stephen, 2005; Squires, 2008; Rodger, 2008; Burney, 
2009; Crawford, 2009; Millie, 2009). Not unlike other historical interventions 
which transgressed the boundaries between criminality, juvenile 
delinquency and welfare needs, ASBOs and ABCs were a conflicting 
amalgam of civil liberty constraints and public protection imperatives 
(Ashworth, 2011; Anderson, et al, 2011).  
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ABCs were pioneered initially by the London Borough of Islington (Home 
Office, 2003) as a cheaper and simpler alternative to an ASBO, and were 
ordinarily a written agreement between a young person believed to have 
engaged in anti-social behaviour, and the police or local authority, and 
contained both prohibitive and mandatory terms (Sikand, 2006:2.14).  
ABCs were subsequently embraced by the Home Office and ACPO (Home 
Office, 2003a) and adopted by the majority of local authorities and police 
forces. They embodied the continued conflict between measures intended 
to benignly avert further offending by young people considered at high risk 
of doing so, and measures which in practice widened the net of young 
people entering the criminal justice system absent of any actual criminality.  
Though ABCs were ostensibly introduced as a cost-efficient and pragmatic 
response to increasing public anxiety concerning young people in public 
places, and an additional measure to keep young people away from more 
formal procedures (Crawford, 2007a; Mayer, 2008; Home Office, 2007, 
Home Office, 2007a), they were subject to a number of criticisms. Concerns 
included processes were coercive and very few young people genuinely 
consented to either an ABC or the prohibitions contained therein (Squires 
and Stephen, 2005); they imposed excessive prohibitions for low level, but 
persistent offending, which ordinarily would have been dealt with informally 
(Burney, 2009; Padfield, 2004), and as one police officer contended, they 
were being issued in the absence of other supportive measures, and: 
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‘I have done 400 acceptable behaviour contracts. Not one of those 
young people were actually doing anti-social behaviour because they 
wanted to…in the lives of those 400 people, 10% were known to the 
youth justice system and were going through the courts and getting 
the support that they would be offered, but 69% were known to child 
protection due to drugs, drink, mental health issues, tenancy issues, 
domestic issues in the family, lack of parental guidance or peer group 
pressure. All these issues were underlying the consequences of bad 
behaviour’ (Collins and Cattermole, 2006:182). 
Though ABCs were on the face of it a voluntary contract between a young 
person and the local authority or police, and considered a less draconian 
measure than an ASBO, a refusal to accept an ABC or a failure to comply 
with an ABC could result in an ASBO being sought, and was citable in any 
subsequent ASBO application (Koffman, 2006a). Though not a legally 
enforceable contract and did not contain any sanction for breach, (Ashford 
et al, 2006:29.3) it was an out of court disposal with considerable punitive 
and net-widening corollaries.  
ABCs further returned to the police their pre-CDA autonomy concerning 
outcomes for young people who committed low level offences, though 
during this period some historical vagaries of regional policing was 
moderated by the amalgamation of forces from 117 to 43 regions, together 
with the increasing influence of the Home Office, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate 
of Constabulary and the National Policing Improvement Agency 
(McLaughlin, 2005; Raine, 2014) 
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In 2014 the Conservative-led Coalition government abolished ASBOs, 
having earlier advocated that they were unduly complex, bureaucratic and 
expensive, and an ineffective initiative with unacceptably high breach rates 
(around 57%) resulting in them becoming a ‘conveyor belt to serious crime 
and prison’ (Home Office, 2010; Ashworth, 2011).  The subsequent Anti-
Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, replaced ASBOs with Crime 
Prevention Injunctions and CrASBOs with Criminal Behaviour Orders, 
however there remains some support for the continued use of ABCs, but 
with appropriate safeguards (Cornford, 2012; Standing Committee for Youth 
Justice, 2015).  
There is also some contention that the new statutory initiatives targeting 
anti-social behaviour reflect more of a change of tone than of substance, 
and: 
‘Over the past 15 years, UK governments have developed a strategy 
designed to eradicate anti-social behaviour, imbued with the rhetoric 
of intolerance. Despite some difference in emphasis, the central 
communicative aspects of this strategy and the rhetoric are 
maintained in the plans of the current Conservative-led coalition 
government’ (Bannister and Kearns, 2012:393).  
4.22.3 Youth Restorative Disposals  
Youth Restorative Disposals (YRDs) were a non-statutory police led 
initiative intended to simplify diversionary processes, mitigate against the 
rigidity of the CDA and Final Warning Scheme, re-introduce greater 
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discretion and fairness into diversionary processes (Department for 
Children, Schools, and Families, 2007) and anticipated as: 
‘a quick and effective means for dealing with low-level, anti-social 
and nuisance offending, offering an alternative to arrest and formal 
criminal justice processing’ (Youth Justice Board, 2011:2; Home 
Office, 2008a; Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2012).  
Initially piloted in 2008 by the Association of Chief Police Officers (‘ACPO’) 
and the YJB, YRDs were available for young people aged 10-17 years with 
no antecedent history, as an immediate and one off admonishment by the 
police, but ordinarily combined with some restorative intervention where 
appropriate or possible. They were recorded locally and not on the Police 
National Computer (‘PNC’) unless an arrest had been made and an 
endorsement of ‘No Further Action’ (‘NFA’) was entered on the PNC (Youth 
Justice Board, 2011). 
YRDs were subsequently adopted by most police regions, and were 
available to any young person with no antecedent history suspected of 
committing a Level 1 or 2 offence on the Gravity Factor Matrix (Home 
Office, 2006) and also for offences or behaviours which fell under the newly 
termed ‘neighbourhood’ crime which incorporated street-level low level 
offending and nuisance behaviours (Youth Justice Board, 2011). 
YRDs also further restored to the police some of their considerable pre-CDA 
autonomy over the young street populations and outcomes for young people 
who commit low level offences (Loader 1996; Reiner, 2000), and were 
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arguably the modern equivalent of the ‘clip around the ear’ (Duckfoot, 
2012:8) in lieu of a more formal out of court disposal, though they were still 
recorded locally. Similarly, YRDs again echoed historical initiatives targeting 
nuisance behaviour by young people falling outside statutory or common 
law criminality, but where intervention was considered desirable or 
necessary. The traditional police remit over young street populations was 
further enhanced with the creation of Police Community Support Officers, 
and a greater focus on ‘neighbourhood policing’ (Home Office, 2010a). 
The non-statutory YRD Guidance creatively circumvented the rigidity of the 
CDA, by mandating that diversion by way of a YRD was not incompatible 
with the Final Warning Scheme if the police considered that issuing a YRD 
as opposed to a reprimand, Final Warning or formal charge would ‘be 
sufficient to prevent future offending’ (Ministry of Justice, 2014:3.3).  
YRDs were subsequently renamed ‘Community Resolutions’ (CRs) by the 
Conservative-led Coalition government and have been endorsed as a 
diversionary process for both adults and young people (ACPO, 2012; 
Ministry of Justice, 2013) and intended to resolve low level offending and 
anti-social behaviour in an informal manner, with the consent of all relevant 
parties, outside of the traditional formal criminal justice processes (Youth 
Justice Board, 2014). This highly discretionary and unregulated practice 
now accounts for a significant number of disposals, though there is no 
accurate or reliable data as to determine to the extent of use (Home Office 
Statistical Bulletin 2014:12; Youth Justice Board, 2015:15).  
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4.22.4 Restorative justice and out of court disposals 
The Final Warning Scheme Guidance 2002 encouraged the use of 
‘restorative processes’ (paragraph 9.22), when issuing a reprimand or Final 
Warning, and out of court disposals were expected to, where possible, 
incorporate the principles of restorative justice. There is no statutory or 
common law definition of restorative justice however it is generally accepted 
as affording: 
‘victims the chance to meet or communicate with their offenders to 
explain the real impact of the crime - it empowers victims by giving 
them a voice. It also holds offenders to account for what they have 
done and helps them to take responsibility and make amends… is 
about victims and offenders communicating within a controlled 
environment to talk about the harm that has been caused and finding 
a way to repair that harm’ (Restorative Justice Council, 2013:1; see 
also Braithwaite, 2003 and Bottoms, 2003). 
Although some commentators believed the CDA provided an opportunity for 
restorative justice: 
‘to take root and flourish as an integral part of the criminal justice 
system’ (Dignan, 1999:50),  
others were sceptical concerning whether the CDA and Final Warning 
Scheme Guidance was genuinely seeking to introduce restorative ideals 
such as mediation, reparation and restoration, and questioned whether 
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restorative justice was being cynically promoted in order to exculpate a 
primarily punitive system (Walgrave, 1995; Dignan, 1999; Ball, 2000; Morris 
and Gelsthorpe, 2000; Puech and Evans, 2001; Koffman and Dingwall, 
2007; Newburn, 2007).  
Similarly, the ‘blanket’ use of restorative justice was arguably excessive for 
low level offences (Bottoms, 2003:110), and the effectiveness of restorative 
processes doubtful if young people were obliged to engage and were not 
voluntary participants (Fox, et al, 2006). Additionally, another concern was 
that the national implementation of restorative processes may re-victimise 
the victim if inexperienced or unskilled practitioners mismanaged the 
processes (Roach, 2000; Morris, 2002). 
Restorative processes were often incorporated into YRDs, which was 
primarily a police led initiative affording them considerable sub-judicial 
authority, and there was some reluctance amongst the police concerning 
this duty, with: 
‘Senior police…uncomfortable that frontline officers are currently the 
only arbiters of whether a restorative disposal is used, casting them 
in the role of ‘adjudicator’ as well as ‘interviewer’ (Independent 
Commission on Youth Crime and Anti-Social Behaviour, 2010:60-61). 
4.22.5 Triage schemes 
Despite the intention that the CDA and Final Warning Scheme Guidance 
would impose uniformity of practice for all out of court disposals, consistent 
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with every other attempt to bring about uniformity, separate regional 
practices developed outside of the statutory framework. By 2010 there had 
been an incalculable expansion of diversionary schemes operating outside 
of the intended rigid statutory framework, and vastly more diversionary 
schemes than before the CDA was implemented (Independent Commission 
on Youth Crime and Anti-Social Behaviour, 2010; Audit Commission, 2012; 
Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2012; Department of Health, 2012; Home 
Office, 2012a).  
Triage schemes were established in 2009 (Department for Children, 
Schools and Families, 2008) and sought to assess young people as they 
entered the criminal justice system and to: 
‘avoid the unnecessary criminalisation of young people on the fringes 
of criminal activity’ (Home Office, 2012a; Ministry of Justice, 
2013a:1).  
Decision makers within in Triage - which operated in some police stations 
but not all - considered when determining the outcome for young people 
who offended not just the gravity of an alleged offence and any relevant 
antecedents, but also broader factors including a young person’s social 
care, mental health, and educational and housing needs. Triage processes 
were intended to identify need and substitute where possible a formal 
sanction with an alternative package of supported intervention. Though 
primarily a diversionary process, Triage schemes were ordinarily based at 
police stations and operated from custody suites post-arrest, and thus 
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arguably not entirely diversionary, though some schemes also sought to 
prevent where possible the initial arrest and detention of young people 
(Home Office, 2012a). 
Triage schemes on occasion ran concurrently to other local initiatives within 
pilot areas, and other regions not part of the official pilot implemented 
similar schemes, described variously as ‘informal resolutions’, ‘restorative 
resolutions’, ‘street resolutions’, ‘community resolution disposals’ and ‘Youth 
Justice, Liaison and Diversion Schemes’ (Walker, et al, 2007; Mackie, et al, 
2008; Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2012).  
Any considered assessment of the effectiveness or otherwise of these 
schemes was hindered by their often unregulated and/or unsupervised 
proliferation, the fact that differing diversionary schemes often operated 
concurrently, and the ‘endless sequence of reforms’ which targeted young 
people either committing low level offences or who were on the periphery of 
entering the criminal justice system (Goldson, 2010:155; Home Office, 
2012a; Haines, et al, 2012). The development of non-statutory Triage again 
highlighted the failure of the CDA and Final Warning Scheme to introduce 
consistency and simplicity into diversionary youth justice practices (Home 
Office, 1997), and efforts to circumvent it perversely increased 
inconsistency within pre-court decision making processes.  
4.22.6 Youth Conditional Cautions 
Despite the intention that the CDA and Final Warning Scheme Guidance 
was to be the exclusive diversionary regime for young people who offended, 
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another significant additional alternative out of court disposal, Youth 
Conditional Cautions (YCCs) were piloted during the last months of the New 
Labour government. YCCs re-introduced the previously disparaged idiom of 
the ‘police caution’ into youth justice discourse, and redolent of the pre-1998 
practice of the ‘caution plus’, was intended as a formal recordable disposal 
with conditions attached to a diversionary disposal.  
YCCs were piloted 2010 for young people aged 16 and 17 years in 
Merseyside, Hampshire, Norfolk, Cambridgeshire and Humberside and 
subsequently rolled out nationally by the Conservative-led Coalition 
government in 2012 under the Criminal Justice Act 2003, as amended by 
Section 48 and Schedule 9 Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 
(Crown Prosecution Service, 2013b; Ministry of Justice, 2010; Ministry of 
Justice, 2012; Ministry of Justice, 2013b). Although ostensibly diversionary, 
YCCs are considered by some as a punitive disposal which sets some 
young people up to fail (Liberty, 2009) and are further examined in this 
thesis at paragraph 6.10.2.  
4.22.7 Out of court disposals and the ‘performance landscape’ 
The OBTJ target (discussed at paragraph 4.22.1) intended that 1.2 million 
offences were to be ‘brought to justice’ by way of sanction detection by 
2005-2006, though this was subsequently revised down in 2008 to focus on 
more serious offences (Home Office, 2003b). This contributed to a 
significant increase in the number of young people receiving formal and 
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recordable disposals for minor offences or ‘insignificant misdemeanours’ 
(Flanagan, 2007; Bateman, 2008; Smith, 2014:55). 
In response to this escalation, other targets were introduced requiring the 
police and other partner agencies to reduce the number of young people 
receiving a reprimand or other formal disposal, and also those at risk of 
offending, as measured by a First Time Entrants Target (Department for 
Children, Schools and Families, 2008; Bateman 2009; Smyth, 2010; Allen, 
2011; Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2012; Audit Commission, 2012; 
Bateman, 2012; Smith, 2014; Smith 2014a:32).  
These targets reflected not only the considerable interest in diversionary 
measures, but also the overall ‘performance landscape’ of the youth justice 
system (Office for Criminal Justice Reform, 2010:3.16). A policy of 
integrated Targeted Youth Support also encouraged the establishment of 
multi-agency partnerships to co-ordinate efforts to prevent young people 
entering the criminal justice system, and to address any identifiable welfare 
needs (Department for Education and Skills, 2007; Allen, 2011; Munro, 
2011).  
4.23 The New Youth Justice – Again? 
New Labour’s intended ‘root and branch’ (Home Office, 1997) reform of 
youth justice cautioning practices resulted not in the intended simplification 
of out of court procedures, but rather a prolonged period of procedural 
instability which contrarily created ‘no legislative stability’ at all (Morgan and 
Newburn, 2012:523). 
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This ‘near permanent reform’ (Goldson, 2010: 155) resulted in a: 
‘melting pot of contending, competing or directly contradictory 
measures’ concerning the diversion of young people from formal 
criminal processes (Ferguson, 2007:192; see also Downes, 2008; 
House of Commons Public Accounts Committee, 2011). 
By 2010 and the election of a Conservative-led Coalition Government, the 
earlier punitive rhetoric and political hype concerning young people who 
offended had begun to abate, economic issues primarily dominated the 
political landscape and a ‘determined calm’ emerged in the ‘corridors of 
Westminster and Whitehall’ concerning youth justice (Morgan and Newburn, 
2012:491). On election in 2010, the Conservative-led Coalition government 
criticised the automatic escalation of young people under the CDA and Final 
Warning Scheme and claimed that:  
‘disposals given out-of-court are particularly important and account 
for over 40% of responses to young offending…under the current 
system of out of court disposals, young offenders are automatically 
escalated to a more intensive disposal, regardless of the 
circumstances or severity of their offence…we believe that this rigid 
approach can needlessly draw young people into the criminal justice 
system, when an informal intervention could be more effective in 
making the young person face up to the consequences of their crime, 
provide reparation for victims and prevent further offending (Ministry 
of Justice, 2010a:68).  
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The Conservative-led Coalition Government was also critical of the 
proliferation of out of court disposal schemes (Stone, 2011), which although 
were intended under the CDA to: 
‘provide a progressive and effective response to offending behaviour, 
provide appropriate and effective intervention to prevent reoffending 
and ensure that young people who do reoffend …are dealt with 
quickly and effectively be the courts’ (Final Warning Scheme 
Guidance, 2002: 1.4), 
had failed due to the fact that: 
‘Rapid expansion of the types of out of court disposals has caused 
confusion about how the various disposals fit together, the 
circumstances in which one would be used rather than another’ 
(Ministry of Justice, 2010a:9). 
The Conservative-led Government proposed instead to: 
‘create a clear national framework for dealing with offences out of 
court…we will also replace the current youth out-of-court disposals 
with a system of youth cautions, and youth conditional cautions, 
repeal youth penalty notices for disorder and promote informal 
restorative disposals’ (Ministry of Justice, 2010a:9). 
Under the auspices of economic austerity (Yates, 2012) and together with 
an ideological agenda centred on the ‘Big Society’, de-regulation, reducing 
managerialism, increasing localism and increasing discretion within decision 
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making processes (Hollingsworth, 2012), but again reminiscent of the 
cyclical vicissitudes of youth justice policies and procedures (Bernard and 
Kurlychek, 2010), the Conservative-led Coalition Government implemented 
substantial changes to diversionary processes under the Legal Aid, 
Sentencing of Offenders and Punishment Act 2012 (‘LASPO’).  
Reprimands, Final Warnings and PNDs were abolished and replaced with 
youth cautions and youth conditional cautions (YCCs). Significantly, the 
Conservative- led Coalition Government ended the ‘hierarchical escalator’ 
under the rigidly prescriptive CDA and Final Warning Scheme (Stone, 
2011:171) and placed no limit the number of youth cautions or YCCs which 
could be issued, and further extended this out of court option to young 
people with previous convictions.  
Greater use of informal and non-recordable measures such as informal 
resolutions and warning letters were encouraged and the Anti-Social 
Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 was intended to simplify other out 
of court disposals which targeted anti-social behaviour (Hodgkinson and 
Tilley, 2011; Home Office, 2011; Stone, 2011; Home Office, 2012).  
Though New Labour had by its third term in government established ‘early 
intervention’ and ‘integrated youth support’, (Department for Education and 
Skills, 2007; Department for Children, Schools and Families, 2008), 
inequities between the equality of opportunity between socio-economic 
groups to access these services was identified, as well as concern that the 
behaviour of lower socio-economic groups and ethnic minorities was 
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disproportionately targeted as necessary for early intervention (Muncie, 
2009).  
The Conservative-led Coalition Government amended these initiatives 
through structural and budgetary changes and re-branded them as 
‘Targeted Youth Support’, merging some early intervention services with 
Youth Offending Teams, ostensibly to facilitate improved multi-agency early 
interventions, though economic austerity was arguably a contributory factor 
(Allen, 2011; Munro, 2011).  
A broader economic agenda further resulted in the introduction of ‘payments 
by results’ which intended to implement performance-based rewards for 
successful diversionary interventions ((Ministry of Justice, 2010a:38; 
Padfield, 2011; Fox and Albertson, 2011). Calculation of this funding was 
controversial however (Hollingsworth, 2012) and the willingness of local 
authorities to participate may have: 
‘as much to do with limiting their losses from funding cuts as with 
initiating major practice innovations’ (Smith, 2014a:70). 
Despite the absence of reliable data concerning the use of informal 
disposals, the number of ‘first time entrants’ to the criminal justice system 
officially fell from a peak of 94,535 in 2004/2006 to 22,393 in 2013/2014 and 
the number of formal, recordable out of court disposals decreased from a 
peak of 94,836 in 2006/2007 to 25,625 in 2013/2014 - (Youth Justice Board, 
2006; Ministry of Justice and Youth Justice Board, 2015; Bateman, 2015).  
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The known use of informal disposals for youth and adult offenders also 
increased from 0.5% in 2008 to 12% in 2011, though thereafter there is 
insufficient data to verify with any certainty how often informal action is 
taken - though it is likely to be considerably higher for young people (Youth 
Justice Board, 2015). 
The uncertainty concerning the nature and extent of local regional 
diversionary schemes is striking given earlier statutory initiatives to restrict 
this type of disposal, and presently: 
‘the status of Community Resolutions and other Restorative Justice 
outcomes is unclear’ (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2012:24; see 
also Youth Justice Board, 2015:15),  
Other types of informal measures are now variously known as:  
‘restorative disposals, restorative justice, informal resolutions, 
restorative resolutions, community resolution disposal, local 
resolutions, instant restorative justice, police resolutions, 
neighbourhood resolutions, extending professional judgement, and 
street resolutions’ (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2012:15-16). 
The overall effect of the statutory changes introduced by the Conservative-
led Coalition Government, together with other factors such as the impact of 
economic austerity; a national decline in overall offending rates (Bateman, 
2012; Office for National Statistics, 2014); new initiatives intended to identify 
at an early stage the health and ‘well-being’ of young people (Nacro, 
2011:5) and the abolition of the OBTJ - which freed the police from sanction 
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target arrests and increased their use of informal disposals - together 
brought about system–wide reductions in the numbers of young people 
being arrested, those receiving a formal recordable out of court disposal and 
also entering the formal court system (Smith, 2014).  
Bateman suggests these factors also subtly influenced the ‘prevailing mood’ 
concerning young people who offended, resulting in a diminution of hostility 
and increasing approval of outcomes which were fair and proportionate 
(Bateman, 2012:45; see also Smith, 2014; 57). The opposition Labour Party 
however argued that: 
‘this success has its roots in the radical changes that began under 
Labour in 1998’ (New Statesman, 2014).  
In response to recommendations that greater provision for the health and 
well-being of young people was necessary to keep them out of the formal 
criminal justice (Department of Health, 2009; Talbot, 2010; Coleman, et al 
2011; Department of Health Department for Children, Schools and Families, 
Ministry of Justice, 2013a), a ‘Youth Justice Liaison and Diversion Pilot’ was 
conducted in six areas and in 2014. Managed by NHS England, the pilot 
placed mental health practitioners in police custody suites who screened 
young people for mental health, learning, communication or other 
vulnerabilities, and facilitated where possible diversion to other supportive 
agencies outside of the criminal justice system.  
Although intended primarily as a diversionary measure, this pilot and other 
Triage processes have not systematically kept young and vulnerable people 
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out of the criminal justice system entirely, and perhaps at best kept them 
only out of court. There is some evidence that triage processes are still 
issuing formal and recordable out of court disposals, and: 
‘Anecdotally, this approach has helped identify opportunities where 
the police can make conditional cautions [my italics], such as referral 
into treatment (Atkinson, 2014:30).  
Although the Conservative-led Coalition Government facilitated far greater 
use of out of court and informal disposals for young people, there remained 
an absence of clarity concerning the purpose of some of these new 
measures, and 
‘it appears that the Government's priority for these diversionary 
schemes is a form of expedited or ‘fast track’ justice, rather than a 
more considered, consultative and evidenced diversionary approach’ 
(Haines, et al, 2013). 
A 2014 review of diversionary procedures and the operation of the Youth 
Court in England and Wales heard evidence from a number of professionals 
that the term ‘diversion’ lacked clarity and engendered confused practices, 
and despite considerable statutory initiatives to introduce simplicity and 
consistency into diversionary processes, it is: 
‘a ‘post-code lottery...patchwork system of diversion that’s in place. 
This is because ‘system diversion’ schemes are not universally 
implemented across England and Wales. The Department for Health 
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told us that it currently funds 37 Liaison and Diversion schemes with 
the aim of achieving 50% coverage by 2015/16. There are also 
between 50 and 70 Triage schemes in operation’ (Independent 
Parliamentarians’ Inquiry into the Operation and Effectiveness of the 
Youth Court, 2014:11). 
4.24 Devolution and diversionary youth justice in Wales 
Although LASPO and the other changes introduced by the Coalition-led 
Conservative Government operated throughout England and Wales, social 
policies between England and Wales became increasingly divergent after 
Welsh devolution in 1999, with Welsh policy makers increasingly focused on 
the welfare of young people and increasing use of diversionary practices 
(Haines, 2010).  In addition to ratifying the UNCRC 1989, the Welsh 
Government introduced a number of distinct strategy policies which 
endorsed young people’s universal entitlements and promoted diversionary 
practices within the criminal justice system in Wales (National Assembly 
Policy Unit, 2002; Welsh Assembly Government and Youth Justice Board, 
2004). 
In 2010 the unique Swansea Bureau was also created by YOS officers and 
South Wales Police. The Bureau operated in a similar manner to the earlier 
and broadly restorative Northampton Model, and sought to divert young 
people who offended wherever possible away from formal systems, to treat 
young people as children first and offenders second, and to tackle the 
causes of offending through ‘positive and prosocial behaviour’ (Morgan, 
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2012; Haines, et al, 2013:171).  Diversionary policies in England and Wales 
thus became increasingly distinct, and should arguably be examined in 
isolation from 1999 onwards.   
4.25 Out of court disposals and procedural fairness 
Diversionary measures have always historically been low visibility and sub-
judicial processes operated in the main by the police, affording them vast 
discretionary power as both interviewer and adjudicator in determining and 
administrating out of court disposals (Evans and Puech, 2001; Cape and 
Young, 1998). By 2010 the proliferation of out of court disposals accounted 
for over 40% of all responses to all detected youth offending (Ministry of 
Justice, 2010a; Youth Justice Board, 2011). By 2014 this figure was 
perhaps more than 50% - if Community Resolutions are taken into 
consideration - though the absence of reliable recording of this disposal 
given the vast number of regional non-statutory diversionary schemes 
operating outside of government and YJB supervision makes quantifying the 
actual number of out of court disposals problematic (Ministry of Justice and 
Youth Justice Board, 2015:14-15).  
The introduction of PNDs was a principally sub-judicial disposal, where the 
police held dual roles of interviewer and adjudicator. Young (2008) argues 
that the risk of PNDs being issued in the absence of evidence sufficient to 
bring a prosecution was considerable, and similarly Lord Thomas of 
Gresford warned that: 
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‘[PNDs] reduce the burden of proof, remove the safeguards of the 
court process and impose penalties on an individual who is thought 
to be committing or to have committed those offences simply on a 
constable's belief. That is a dangerous principle to bring into the 
criminal law of this country’ (Hansard, 2000: Column.482). 
The statutory diversionary schemes (CDA, Final Warning Scheme, PNDs, 
YCC pilot scheme) did not establish a designated appeal or review 
procedure outside of the existing judicial review process, and the only 
avenue for a reconsideration of a decision to issue a reprimand or Final 
Warning was either via an appeal to a senior police officer, CPS review if 
the matter reached court, or through a costly and complex judicial review in 
the Administrative Court (Brownlee, 2007; Crawford, 2008). Though some 
police regions implemented forms of ‘quality assurance schemes’ to 
supervise and if necessary rescind out of court disposals issued in error 
(Office for Criminal Justice Reform, 2010:15), these were primarily internal 
police processes and not formal or accessible appeal procedures. 
Notwithstanding Baroness Hale’s confidence that the courts were an 
‘effective safeguard’ against the improper issue of out of court disposals (R 
v Durham Constabulary and Another ex parte R [2005] UKHL:46), very few 
PNDs were challenged either at the Magistrates Court or by way of judicial 
review – despite more than 80,000 being issued between 2004 and 2013 
(Ministry of Justice, 2014:22). In 2008 for example only 1% of PNDs were 
challenged at court (Morgan, 2011), and although this may conceivably be a 
consequence of exemplary police practice, it is a suspiciously low number. 
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Although it is a well-established principle that a decision by the police to 
issue a caution is subject to the right to a judicial review (R v Bar Council, ex 
p. Percival [1991] Q.B. 212; R v Chief Constable of Kent Ex p. L and R v 
DPP Ex p. B [1993] 1 All E.R.; Uglow, et al, 1992), it is realistically an 
onerous and potentially unaffordable avenue for many who would wish to 
seek this redress. The courts are also traditionally reluctant in any event to 
interfere in these decisions unless there are ‘exceptional circumstances’ (R 
(F) v CPS and Chief Constable of Merseyside [2003] EWHC 3266:77; R 
(Mondelly) v Commissioner for the Metropolitan Police [2006] EWHC 2370); 
or there has been: 
‘a total disregard of policy…or…a lack of enquiry into the 
circumstances’ (R v Chief Constable of Police Ex p. L and R v DPP 
Ex p. B [1993] 1 ALL E.R. 756; R v Commissioner of Police of the 
Metropolis, ex parte Thompson [1997] 1 WLR 1519),  
and: 
‘it will be a rare case where a person who has been cautioned will 
succeed in showing that the decision was fatally flawed’ (R v 
Metropolitan Police Commissioner ex parte Thompson [1997] 1 
W.L.R. 1519:1521) 
See also R v Commissioner for the Metropolis, ex parte P (1995) 160 JP 
367; R. (on the application of A) v South Yorkshire Police [2007] EWHC 
1261 Admin; D v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2008] EWHC 
442 (Admin); Lee v Chief Constable of Essex Police [2012] EWHC 283 
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(Admin); Dingwall and Harding, 1998; Stone, 2007; Ellis and Bigg, 2013; 
Von Berg, 2014).  
The decision making process comprises a series of ‘significant decision 
making gateways’ (Bateman, 2012:40) and the radical expansion out of 
court disposals arguably should have necessitated the establishment of an 
accessible pre-court appeal procedure.  This was especially necessary 
given the proliferation of out of court disposals conferred on the police 
considerable discretionary decision making powers, and: 
‘low visibility discretion’ decisions, [which are] not subject to the same 
standard of public scrutiny as those decisions which result in court 
proceedings (Evans and Puech, 2001:796), 
and 
‘within this new context of pre-charge decision making, the need to 
ensure the legal rights of children are properly protected within the 
early stages of the criminal justice process [are] more urgent’ (Kemp, 
et al, 2011:29). 
The need for an accessible and regulated appeals procedure is particularly 
acute for young people, who ordinarily lack the means or competence to 
adequately assert their rights or challenge police decision making (Hine, 
2007; Hazel et al, 2002; Hollingsworth, 2012). This is especially salient 
given the judicial review process is often not properly understood or used by 
adults involved in this process (R v DPP, ex p. Jones (Timothy) [2000] Crim 
LR 858). 
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The introduction of the Criminal Records Bureau and Criminal Records 
Certificate System under Part V of the Police Act 1997, which made 
provision for mandatory disclosure to prospective employers of certain 
disposals on the Police National Computer, further highlighted the necessity 
for an accessible appeals procedure. Although reprimands and Final 
Warnings were intended to be immediately spent upon issue (Rehabilitation 
of Offenders Act 1974 (Exceptions) Order 1975), enhanced Criminal Record 
Bureau certificates disclosed these sanctions, and the court recognised the 
potentially adverse and disproportionate consequences of disclosure for 
future employment and immigration (Lord Hope in R (L) v Commissioner of 
Police of the Metropolis [2010] 1 AC 410).  
The proliferation of out of court disposals also re-ignited the debate between 
the legitimacy of the police and magistracy concerning jurisdiction over 
young people who offend. The Magistracy, consistent with its traditional 
position seeking to retain inherent jurisdiction over young (Parker, et al, 
1989), disapproved of the increasing use of out of court disposals, not only 
on the grounds that they usurped their perceived remit to determine the 
sanction for even low level offences, but because these disposals lacked in 
their view sufficient independent scrutiny and monitoring (House of 
Commons Justice Committee, 2013).  
The Right Honourable Lord Justice Leveson expressed similar concern that 
the beneficial expediency of out of court disposals was jeopardising 
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principles of procedural fairness, and in a lecture to the Liverpool John 
Moores University Foundation for Citizenship expressed hope that he was: 
‘not alone in expressing concern about these powers. It is not a 
question of not trusting the police or the CPS, or challenging the will 
of parliament. It goes back to the origins of our system of summary 
justice, carried out in public by members of the public, appointed as 
magistrates, whose decisions can be scrutinised by the public, can 
be the subject of public debate and, if appropriate, appeal to the court 
in public…where is the mechanism for accountability for these 
important decisions taken behind closed doors?’ (Leveson, 2010). 
The managerialist ethos of the CDA (Muncie, 2000; Newburn, 2003), which 
fettered the discretion of decision makers, together with the return to the 
police of significant discretionary powers, and the subsequent proliferation 
of other out of court disposals, resulted in a substantive shift from judicial to 
summary administrative justice for young people who offended. 
Cumulatively, this resulted in the diminishment of a young person’s 
entitlement to traditional due legal processes (Evans and Puech, 2001; 
Dingwall and Koffman, 2007; Brownlee, 2007; Morgan, 2008; Young, 2008; 
Crawford, 2009a; Hollingsworth, 2012).   
4.26 ‘Cautioning myopia’ and renewed anxiety concerning cautioning 
practices 
This thesis seeks to highlight the historical variances of political and social 
attitudes towards cautioning practices in England and Wales. Though the 
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reform of out of court disposals introduced by the Conservative-led Coalition 
Government contributed significantly to a decrease in the number of young 
people being dealt with by way of a formal out of court disposal, and it was 
hoped that crime and justice would not again be the focus of political 
posturing (Smith, 2010:380), almost inevitably there were criticisms of the 
new cautioning practices.  
Despite the intense political interest in out of court disposals since the early 
1990s, and the recent simplification of some procedures, there is still 
concern by some that cautioning practices continue to be: 
‘confusing official guidance documents from various bodies which 
need to be brought into harmony with one another, and expressed 
simply and concisely for the benefit of those who administer the 
cautioning system’ (Leigh, 2013). 
Magistrates have again raised concerns that extensive use of cautions is 
usurping their role, with the Chairman of the Magistrates Court claiming that: 
‘Every crime has a victim, and every victim deserves some 
paperwork. If you think that 11,000 individuals were cautioned 
because of violent crime last year, therefore there were 11,000 
victims. None of those victims got compensated by the court’ (British 
Broadcasting Corporation, 2013). 
Victims groups similarly advocated that: 
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‘Cautions mean that victims do not have their day in court…[they] are 
not enough in most circumstances because a court can impose more 
robust rulings for victims and strong bail terms’ (The Guardian, 2014). 
In response to emerging criticisms of perceived excessive or inappropriate 
cautioning of offenders, the Justice Secretary Grayling announced that: 
‘While we should not remove police officer discretion, the public and 
victims have a right to expect that people who commit serious crimes 
are brought before a court’ (Ministry of Justice, 2013c). 
The recurrent historical myopia concerning youth crime (Pearson, 1983) has 
recently again resulted in cautioning practices becoming the target of 
competing political stratagems.  
Predictably, the opposition Labour Party Justice Secretary has sought to 
refocus political attention on out of court disposals, claiming that: 
‘Under David Cameron’s Government, too many criminals have been 
getting away with serious crimes…on their watch cautions have been 
dished out wrongly for serious sexual and violent crimes…slap on the 
wrist community resolutions meant for minor crimes have instead 
been used by the police thousands of times for violent offences…this 
Government’s actions have cheapened our justice system, leaving 
the public to question whether this Government is truly on the side of 
innocent victims of crime’ (Khan, 2013). 
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The Conservative-led Coalition Government subsequently announced a 12 
month adult pilot scheme, to be operated in Staffordshire and West 
Yorkshire, which will abolish the police caution, conditional police caution 
and all other out of court disposals, and replace them with Community 
Resolutions and a new disposal – a Suspended Prosecution (though to be 
initially piloted for adults only). In November 2014 the Conservative-led 
Coalition Government further announced that: 
‘It isn’t right that criminals who commit lower-level crime can be dealt 
with by little more than a warning… it [is] time to put an end to this 
country’s cautions culture...every crime should have a consequence 
(Grayling, 2014). 
The renewed hostile rhetoric concerning diversionary measures from 
mainstream political parties suggests that the likelihood of any cessation of 
the incessant changes to out of court procedures is remote (Ellis and Biggs, 
2013:9). Pitts similarly argued in 2003 that the ‘extraordinary’ pre-
occupation with youth crime recycles the same time honoured anxieties 
expressed in the rhetoric of indiscipline and social deterioration, and the 
monologue concerning young people who offend will continue with 
‘relentless banality’ (Pitts, 2003:2-3).  
Given this, together with the historical vicissitudes of youth justice 
diversionary policies, the existing regime under LASPO is unlikely to remain 
unchanged for any sustained period, and there is little prospect of any 
constancy of diversionary processes in the near future. Nevertheless, in 
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2015 the Conservatives secured an outright electoral majority and at 
present there is no indication they have any immediate plans to reform to 
current processes or targets. As the Bulger case demonstrated however, 
constancy of processes in youth justice is at the mercy of high profile events 
and occurrences, which often propels policies towards punitive processes.  
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5.0 CHAPTER FIVE: HUMAN RIGHTS AND DIVERSIONARY PRACTICES 
5.1 Emergence of human rights for young people who offend 
The origins of international law and human rights concerning the field of 
youth justice date back to 1923, when the International Save the Children 
Union adopted its own Declaration of the Rights of the Child, which was 
subsequently adopted in 1924 by the League of Nations as the Geneva 
Declaration of the Rights of the Child (also known as the World Child 
Welfare Charter). In 1959 this declaration was expanded and adopted by 
the United Nations as the Declaration of the Rights of the Child (Hart, 2006). 
Both declarations were primarily ‘moral’ in character and derived from a 
belief that all children should have the right to childhood as a time of play, 
innocence and protection from the adult world (Stephens, 1995; Gadda, 
2008).  
Although children’s rights movements during this period sought to distance 
themselves from the earlier moralistic ‘child savers’ (Platt, 1969:3), they 
were similarly preoccupied with a child’s moral development and prevention 
of deviancy, and interchanged the ideology of the rights of the child with 
pragmatic advocacy of the needs of the child (Pupavac, 2001). Neither the 
1924 or 1959 Declarations made reference to any specific practice or 
procedure relevant to youth justice, and were both primarily concerned with 
broader themes of provision, protection and participation (Alderson, 2000). 
Between 1960 and the 1990s the principle of diverting children and young 
people from formal criminal proceedings wherever possible, and the 
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promotion of separate and specialist juvenile/youth justice systems, became 
enshrined in international law (Resolution 40/33 United Nations Standard 
Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice 1985 (‘The Beijing 
Rules’; Fortin, 2009; Goldson and Muncie, 2006).  
The Beijing Rules mandated that: 
‘Consideration should be given, wherever appropriate, to dealing with 
juvenile offenders without resorting to formal trial by the competent 
authority…the police, the prosecution or other agencies dealing with 
juvenile cases shall be empowered to dispose of such cases, at their 
discretion, without recourse to formal hearings’ (Rule 11.1- 11.2), 
and domestic youth justice policies should prohibit strictly punitive 
sanctions, and be proportionate to not only: 
‘the gravity of the offence but also to the circumstances and the 
needs of the juvenile as well as to the needs of society’ (Rule 
17.1(a)). 
Though the Beijing Rules are not binding on member states, they provided a 
‘clear steer’ concerning the importance of diversion to domestic youth 
justice policy (Goldson and Muncie, 2006:97). Welfare orientated 
diversionary principles were further underpinned in the subsequent United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 (UNCRC), which 
mandated that: 
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‘In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or 
private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative 
authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be 
a primary consideration’ (Article 3(1)), 
and, 
‘Every child alleged as, accused of, or recognized as having infringed 
the penal law [is] to be treated in a manner consistent with the 
promotion of the child's sense of dignity and worth, which reinforces 
the child's respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of 
others and which takes into account the child's age and the 
desirability of promoting the child's reintegration and the child's 
assuming a constructive role in society (Article (40(1)), 
and that:  
‘Whenever appropriate and desirable, measures for dealing with such 
children without resorting to judicial proceedings, providing that 
human rights and legal safeguards are fully respected’ (Article 
40(3)(b)). 
Similarly, the United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile 
Delinquency (The ‘Riyadh’ Guidelines, 1990) stipulated that youth justice 
policies should: 
‘avoid criminalising or penalising a child for behaviour that does not 
cause serious damage to the development of the child or harm to 
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others’ (I.3)…official interventions should be ‘pursued primarily in the 
overall interests of the young person and guided by fairness and 
equity’ (I.5(c), 
and: 
‘Law enforcement and other personnel… should be familiar with, and 
use, to the maximum extent possible, programs and referral 
possibilities for the diversion of young people from the justice system’ 
(paragraph 98). 
In 2002 the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union also set 
out its own set of rules concerning ‘the rights of the child’ and declared that: 
‘In all actions relating to children, whether taken by public authorities 
or private institutions, the child's best interests must be a primary 
consideration’ (Article 24(2)). 
5.2 Human rights and the ‘best interests’ principle 
The United Kingdom Supreme Court in ZH (Tanzania) v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department [2011] 2 WLR 148 held that this ‘best interests’ 
principle had been ‘translated’ into domestic law under section 11 of the 
Children Act 2004 and: 
‘This is a binding obligation in international law, and the spirit, if not 
the precise language, has also been translated into our national law. 
Section 11 of the Children Act 2004 places a duty upon a wide range 
of public bodies to carry out their functions having regard to the need 
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to safeguard and promote the welfare of children’ (Baroness Hale, 
paragraph 23),  
and: 
‘It is ‘a universal theme’ of both international and domestic 
instruments that in reaching decisions that will affect a child, primacy 
of importance must be accorded to his or her best interests…Where 
the best interests of the child clearly favour a certain course, that 
course should be followed unless countervailing reasons of 
considerable force displace them’ (Lord Kerr, paragraph 46).  
Other international instruments concerning outcomes for children and young 
people who offended include the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules 
for Non-Custodial Measures (the ‘Tokyo’ rules, 1990), the United Nation’s 
General Comment (No.10, 2007) on ‘Children’s Rights in Juvenile Justice’ 
and the ‘European Rules for Juvenile Offenders Subject to Sanctions or 
Measures’ (Council of Europe, 2008). 
5.3 The ‘new youth justice’ and human rights compliance 
The United Kingdom has been the subject of recurrent criticism for failing to 
either adopt measures fully compatible with these rules and conversely 
implementing incompatible legislation antithetical to a welfare based 
approach (United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, 1996, 
2000, 2008; Goldson, 2000; Fortin, 1998; Scraton and Hayden, 2002; 
Dingwall, 2006; Muncie, 2010; Bateman, 2012; Flacks, 2012). The rigid 
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decision making processes introduced in the CDA was especially criticised 
for failing to proportionally respond to minor offending by children and young 
people, allegedly in breach of a rights compliant youth justice system 
(Muncie, 2010:204; Hollingsworth, 2012) and:  
‘the U.K. Government has been able with impunity to be 
contemptuous of criticism from the UN Committee monitoring the 
UNCRC’ (Ball et al, 2001: 1.26). 
The removal in the CDA of a child’s right to consent to a formal and 
recordable diversionary disposal was arguably incompatible with Rule 11 of 
the Beijing Rules and Article 6 of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Although LJ 
Latham in R v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis, ex p. Thompson 
[1997] 1 W.L.R. 1519 held that in order to comply with Article 6 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
consent should be obtained from a young person before the imposition of a 
reprimand or Final Warning, his dissenting judgement failed to attract any 
significant interest. 
The New Labour government rejected all criticisms of the CDA and Final 
Warning Scheme Guidance, and defended it as a necessary amalgam of 
rights, needs and entitlement which was wholly consistent with international 
human rights obligations and necessary: 
‘to ensure that, if a child had begun to offend, they are entitled to the 
earliest possible intervention to address that offending behaviour and 
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eliminate its causes…the [CDA and Final Warning Scheme 
Guidance] will contribute to the right of the children to develop 
responsibility (United Kingdom Government, 1999, as cited in Fortin, 
2009:48-49). 
The CDA arguably fell within Hegel’s retributivist ‘right to punishment’ 
theory; that the criminal law should not be exclusively focused on 
punishment as a deterrent, a threat or reformation, and that rights an only 
be safeguarded when those who deserve punishment receive punishment, 
thus annulling the crime and restoring rights to the offender (Hegel, 1832; 
Easton and Piper, 2012). 
The court in the seminal case of R v Durham Constabulary and Another ex 
parte R [2005] UKHL 21 considered the history of the police caution and 
other out of court disposals for young people who offended, and whether the 
CDA and Final Warning Scheme Guidance 2002 was compatible with the 
United Kingdom’s international human rights obligations. The majority found 
no incompatibility between domestic legislation and international human 
rights obligations, though Baroness Hale had: 
‘grave doubts about whether the statutory scheme is consistent with 
the… international instruments dealing with children’s rights. The 
rigidity of the scheme undermines the emphasis given to diverting 
children from the criminal justice system, propels them into it and on 
a higher rung of the ladder earlier than they would previously have 
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arrived there, and thus seriously risks offending against the principle 
that intervention must be proportionate’ (paragraph 42).   
Despite this, the majority in R v Durham held that the CDA and Final 
Warning Scheme Guidance 2002 was compatible with all international 
human rights obligations, as reprimands and Final Warnings did not 
represent the determination of a criminal charge since they were not of a 
penal character and did not to amount to any public condemnation, and the 
Act and Guidance were intended to promote the welfare of the child 
(Dingwall, 2006). The potentially adverse consequence of a formal 
recordable disposal, albeit ostensibly diversionary, on the life opportunities 
of a young person were seemingly given little weight, or the net-widening 
consequences of these schemes. 
R v Durham Constabulary and Another ex parte R [2005] UKHL 21 is further 
examined throughout this thesis at Chapters 4.25; 5.3; 6.3; 6.4; 6.5; 6.16; 
6.22; 6.29; 7.3; 8.2; 8.3 and 8.6. 
The courts have subsequently however expressed concern that the Criminal 
Records Bureau and Criminal Records Certificate System under Part V of 
the Police Act 1997 (subsequently amended to the Disclosure and Barring 
Service) is not compatible with a person’s Article 8 ECHR right to a private 
life (MM v The United Kingdom, Application no.24029/07; R. (T) v Chief 
Constable of Greater Manchester & Others [2013] EWCA Civ 25; R (on the 
application of T and another) (Respondents) v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department and another (Appellants) [2014] UKSC 35).   
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Enhanced criminal record certificates result in the disclosure of all previous 
antecedents - even those spent under the (Rehabilitation of Offenders Act, 
1974 (Exceptions Order, 1975)), and include all recordable and ostensibly 
diversionary sanctions outside of the court system. As such, it is ‘largely 
academic’ that reprimands, Final Warning, cautions and youth cautions are 
technically considered spent upon issue, as they are still disclosable if an 
enhanced criminal record certificate is required (Ellis and Biggs, 2013:7) 
Disclosure of formal out of court disposals issued to children and young 
people for low level offences has the potential to adversely affect 
subsequent life opportunities to secure employment, undertake voluntary 
work, or apply for an immigration document, and the consequences of this 
formal recordable disposal may be grossly disproportionate to the severity 
of the original offence (Independent Parliamentarians’ inquiry into the 
Operation and Effectiveness of the Youth Court, 2014:13: Bateman, 2014).  
Although the statutory changes implemented under the Conservative-led 
Coalition Government under LASPO has moderated criticisms of the United 
Kingdom’s compliance with international obligations concerning youth 
justice and human rights (Stone, 2011), the absence of any synchronisation 
between LASPO and the Disclosure and Barring Service remains arguably 
an unresolved incompatibly. 
It was additionally of significance that none of the respondents who 
participated in the primary research - police officers, civilian interviewers 
and legal representatives - raised at any stage the issue of compliance or 
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non-compliance of human rights obligations and statutory welfare principles 
(compliance or non-compliance) when discussing either diversionary 
processes or the admission criterion (Chapters 6.12 and 7.1-7.17).  
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6.0 CHAPTER SIX: ANALYSIS OF THE ADMISSION CRITERION 
It is ‘good for children to own up when they have done wrong’ (Baroness 
Hale, R v Durham Constabulary and another ex parte R [2005] UKHL: 
21:46) 
6.1 Historical perspective  
Historically, an admission to an offence has been a mandatory pre-
condition for a young person to gain eligibility for a formal out of court 
disposal, and this necessity has pervaded almost every diversionary 
practice since their formalisation. Failure to make a satisfactory admission 
can be an immediate barrier to an out of court disposal for a young person 
who offends, yet despite the critical importance of the mandatory 
admission criterion there has been a notable absence of rationalisation as 
to why it should be a central element of diversionary practices.  
This is even more curious given that cautioning practices historically 
afforded decision makers, ordinarily but not exclusively the police, 
considerable discretion to determine outcomes for young people (Fisher 
and Mawby, 1982; Hawkins, 1992; Cape and Young, 1998) and the court 
has also consistently promoted discretionary decision making above any 
statutory criterion (Dingwall and Harding, 1998; R v Chief Constable of the 
Kent Constabulary, ex parte L and Another [1993] 1 ALL E.R 756; The 
Queen on the Application of A v South Yorkshire Police, Crown 
Prosecution Service [2007] EWHC 121 (Admin)). The mandatory 
admission criterion is also seemingly incompatible with other domestic 
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statutory and international obligations which mandate that decision makers 
should safeguard and promote the welfare of young people who offend 
and endeavour when possible to divert them from the formal criminal 
justice system (Cushing, 2014).  
Prior to the formal establishment of youth cautioning practices in the 
1970s, determining what, if any, admission criterion operated throughout 
England and Wales is hindered by the inestimable number of regional 
cautioning schemes, inaccurate and disparate recording of informal and 
formal cautions, and the absence of national guidelines (Somerville, 1969; 
Steer, 1970; Tutt and Giller, 1983; Dingwall and Harding, 1998). 
Surprisingly, studies which examined regional disparities in youth 
cautioning practices gave no consideration as to whether the existence or 
otherwise of differing admission criterion may have contributed to these 
identifiable variances (Grunhut, 1956; Mack, 1963; Patchett and McLean, 
1965; Seeba, 1967; McLintock and Avison, 1968; Somerville, 1969; 
Watson and Austen, 1975; Ditchfield, 1976; McBarnet, 1978; Nacro, 
1986). 
The first significant government policy on youth cautioning, Children in 
Trouble (Home Office, 1968), despite promoting and encouraging the use 
of cautions and intending to improve consistency of use, similarly failed to 
consider whether there were any identifiable differences in the nature and 
operation of the admission criterion amongst regional police forces, and 
whether this contributed to the notable variances of use. It also neglected 
to examine the necessity or otherwise of the admission criterion, what form 
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of admission would be reasonable or proportionate, and made no 
recommendations for a standard admission criterion for regional police 
forces to use. This was despite the fact that an admission had become a 
conventional mandatory pre-requisite to a diversionary disposal and was 
by then seemingly central to diversionary policies and practices. 
The first comprehensive review of cautioning practices in England and 
Wales was undertaken by Steer in 1970, and though his report concluded 
that substantial regional variations in cautioning policies had developed 
throughout the twentieth century, he observed that it was customary in 
most regions that a caution was usually only issued if ‘the offence is 
admitted’ (Steer, 1970:5). 
Despite identifying that an admission was a mandatory pre-requisite for a 
caution, Steer did not examine whether any police region had a formal 
admission criterion, if so whether it was written or operated by custom or 
convention, and whether any variances or otherwise in the definitions or 
interpretations of the admission criterion contributed to the wide regional 
variances in cautioning practices. 
Similarly, during the same period, proponents of child-centred welfarist 
policies advocating greater use of informal and non-recordable measures 
also omitted to examine why the mandatory admission criterion had 
become a conventional gateway to a diversionary disposal, whether it was 
unnecessarily propelling young people into the formal criminal justice 
system, and why an admission was deemed so necessary that it 
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outweighed welfare considerations (Lemert, 1967; Schur, 1973; Bottoms, 
1974). Given abolition of the mandatory admission criterion would most 
likely have promoted more flexible processes when determining the 
outcome for young people who offended, it is surprising that those 
advocating greater use of informal measures gave so little consideration to 
such an important feature of diversionary processes.  
6.2 The admission criterion – what is it?  
Prior to the formalisation of youth cautioning, the proliferation of regional 
cautioning schemes and their disparate operation hinders analysis of what 
type of admission was required from a young person in order to again 
eligibility for a police caution. It is probable however that the admission 
criterion was broadly uncomplicated, with the simple requirement that: 
‘the offence is admitted’ (Steer, 1970:5), or: 
‘the juvenile freely admits having committed the offence; and his 
parents are content with his admission’ (Watson and Austen, 
1975:80), or: 
‘the offender admits his guilt’ (Ditchfield, 1976:1), or:  
‘the offender must admit the offence’ (Landau and Nathan, 
1983:131). 
The first Home Office Guidance on the issuing of police cautions for young 
people who offended, ‘The Citing of Police Cautions in the Juvenile 
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Courts’, was similarly pellucid, and stipulated that in order to receive a 
caution, it was necessary that: 
 ‘the juvenile admitted the offence’ (Home Office, 1978),  
though this guidance was intended primarily to permit the citation of 
cautions in any subsequent Juvenile Court hearing and was not intended 
to provide definitive guidance on cautioning procedures.   
The subsequent report of the Parliamentary All-Party Penal Affairs Group 
examining youth diversionary practices endorsed the regulation and 
extension of the police caution, but with the proviso that:      
‘all first time minor offenders under 17 who admit guilt [my italics] 
should be cautioned, and this should also be the practice in regard 
to those who commit a second minor offence’ (Parliamentary All 
Party Penal Affairs Group, 1981:9). 
Remarkably, the Group gave no reasoning or explanation as to why all 
first time offenders could only gain eligibility for a caution if they admitted 
an offence, even for very young people who offended or if a trivial offence 
had been committed, and also why an admission should outweigh any 
welfare considerations. The absence, however, of any notable comment or 
reaction to this recommendation suggests an admission of some type was 
uncontroversial and consistent with the status quo, and probably by that 
time already a feature of most regional cautioning schemes. 
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By 1985 the mandatory admission criterion as a gateway to a diversionary 
disposal had become an entrenched diversionary pre-requisite, and 
accepted and unchallenged by policy makers and most interested groups, 
even for low level offences or where there were strong public interest 
reasons to divert a young person from formal court processes. Seemingly 
without debate however, the simple admission criterion became more 
rigorous, with circular 14/1985, ‘The Cautioning of Offenders’, declaring 
that not only should a young person or ‘offender’ admit all or some of the 
facts, but additionally ‘recognise his guilt’ (Home Office, 1985:1).  
Commensurate with the general absence of interest by policy makers, 
practitioners, the academic community and welfare agencies concerning 
the criticality of the admission criterion to diversionary outcomes, Nacro’s 
1988 guide to best practice for the monitoring of juvenile cautioning did not 
cite at all an admission as a relevant consideration for such purposes 
(Nacro, 1988). This was regrettable given grass roots movements such as 
the Sheffield Black Justice Project had already identified that young black 
males were disproportionately entering the formal criminal justice system 
for the sole reason that they were reluctant to engage with the police or 
make any admission in a police interview (Woodhill and Senior, 1993).  
The subsequent Home Office circulars 59/1990 ‘The Cautioning of 
Offenders (Home Office, 1990) and 18/1994 ‘The Cautioning of Offenders’ 
(Home Office, 1994), again mandated that an admission was necessary in 
order to receive a police caution. Neither circular gave any discernible 
explanation as to why an admission should be an essential element of the 
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cautioning process, even for trivial or low level offences, and did not 
expound why it superseded welfare considerations and mitigating features 
of an offence or offender. 
Both circulars primarily sought to promote and standardise cautioning 
practices. Circular 59/1900 stipulated that: 
‘The offender must admit the offence’ (Home Office, 1990: 
Annexe B.2), 
however Circular 18/1994 heightened the standard of admission deemed 
acceptable and mandated that: 
‘a caution will not be appropriate where a person does not make a 
clear and reliable admission of the offence (for example if his health 
is denied or there are doubts about his mental health or intellectual 
capacity’ (Home Office, 1994: Note 2B). 
This amendment was, in part, intended to address earlier research which 
identified the police practice of routinely cautioning suspects in the 
absence of an admission which could be considered by any reasonable 
standard unequivocal (Evans, 1993; McConville and Hodgson, 1993; 
Moston and Stephenson, 1993). Although Circular 18/1994 was intended 
as a safeguard by ensuring that young people who did not accept any 
wrongdoing did not have a formal out of court disposal imposed on them, it 
also (perhaps unintentionally) imposed on children and young people an 
additional and onerous diversionary pre-requisite which amplified the 
standard of admission required of them. 
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The simple admission criterion that an offender ‘admit the offence’ had 
earlier been considered by the court in R v DPP Ex p. B [1993] 1 All E.R. 
756, where it was held that a 12 year old girl with no previous convictions, 
suspected of committing the offence of theft, was not eligible for a caution 
for the singular reason that she failed to make an admission. The court 
found that her young age, previous good character, the statutory 
obligations upon decision makers to consider her welfare, and the 
published guidance on the ‘positive advantages for society as well as the 
individual in using prosecution as a last resort’ (Home Office, 1985:1) were 
outweighed by her reluctance to admit the offence. Likewise, failures by 
the police and the Youth and Community Service (which operated at that 
time in a similar manner to YOS) to consider any wider issues surrounding 
her personal circumstances, in the spirit of the relevant Home Office 
Circulars, had no bearing in the absence of an admission.  
Similarly, the court in R v DPP ex p. B made no inquiry or distinction 
between a young person who wilfully refused to make an admission and a 
young person who may have felt unable to make an admission. In that 
case a 12 year old girl had denied the offence despite overwhelming 
evidence, and there was no discern 
ible advantage to her in denying the offence, which denied her the 
advantages an out of court disposal and resulted in criminal charges. 
Factors which may possibly have contributed to her denial, such as her 
young age, immaturity, fear of the consequences of making an admission 
either of the criminal justice system or parental disapproval, or inadequate 
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knowledge of criminal processes, were considered less important than 
whether an admission had been made.  
6.3 The ‘amplified’ admission criterion 
The CDA and the Final Warning Scheme Guidance for Police and Youth 
Offending Teams 2002, as amended 2006 (Home Office, 2006) abolished 
the police caution and caution plus, introduced the reprimand and Final 
Warning, strictly limited out of court disposals, with a formal prosecution 
mandatory for a third offence unless a two year period had elapsed from 
the issuing of a Final Warning to the commission of another offence, and 
abolished a young person’s traditional right to consent or refuse a formal 
recordable diversionary disposal (Bateman, 2002).  
Although the CDA was promoted as a radical departure from long 
established practices (Home Office, 1997), it adopted the prevailing 
practice that an admission was a mandatory pre-requisite for diversion. In 
this respect the CDA and Final Warning Scheme Guidance 2002 
constituted: 
‘not a brand-new diversionary scheme which leapt onto the statute 
book with the aim of diverting children away from a life of crime. 
They were, as is clear from the Home Office Consultation Paper, 
Tackling Youth Crime, 1997, and White Paper, No More Excuses – 
A New Approach to Tackling Youth Crime in England and Wales, 
1997, Cm 3809, a very considerable toughening up upon what had 
  
 Cushing, K., 2016, Chapter Six 
172 
 
gone before’ (Lady Hale, R v Durham Constabulary and another ex 
parte R [2005] UKHL 21:37), 
and a continuation of the previous pre-condition that to be diverted from 
formal proceedings (by way of a police caution), a young person must first 
admit their guilt.  
The CDA and Final Warning Scheme Guidance 2002 were subject to 
considerable analysis and critique; however, there was an apparent 
absence of interest in the continuation of the admission criterion as a 
barrier to a diversionary disposal for young people. Evans and Puech 
(2001) and Gillespie (2005) are seemingly the only academics who 
observed that the admission criterion in the CDA and Final Warning 
Scheme were an impediment to diversionary outcomes for young people, 
and there is no identifiable evidence that welfare agencies took any 
interest or issue with this aspect of the new statutory diversionary regime. 
This is especially remarkable given the Final Warning Scheme Guidance 
arguably imposed an admission criterion that was ill-defined, unduly 
onerous and was arguably applied more rigorously than was intended.  
Initially, the statutory admission criterion was uncomplicated, with section 
65(1)(c) of the CDA requiring simply that: 
‘the offender admits to the constable that he committed the 
offence’.  
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This test was seemingly made more rigorous, however, in the Final 
Warning Scheme Guidance 2002 (Home Office, 2002) which at paragraph 
4.7(c) stated:  
‘There must be an admission of guilt’, 
but further mandated that: 
‘A reprimand or warning can be given only if the young person 
makes a clear and reliable admission to all elements of the offence. 
This should include an admission of dishonesty and intent, where 
applicable’ (paragraph 4.12). 
Unhelpfully, the 2002 Guidance also defined the admission criterion as: 
‘the young person admits the offence’ (Home Office 2002: Annexe 
A 3(iii)), and: 
‘the young person admits a specific criminal offence’ (Home Office, 
2002: Annexe B). 
The only guidance provided to decision makers should a young person fail 
to make an admission was that: 
‘If the young person does not make an admission, he or she cannot 
be reprimanded or finally warned. The police will decide whether to 
take no further action or to charge the young person, and may seek 
the advice of the CPS before making the decision’ (paragraph 4.14 
2002 Guidance). 
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The Guidance accordingly strictly fettered the discretion of decision 
makers to explore a diversionary disposal in the absence of an admission, 
even in circumstances where this disposal was entirely in a young 
person’s best interests, or there were mitigating reasons why they failed to 
make an admission. 
Annexe G of the 2002 Guidance further set out an example text for a 
leaflet to be provided to young people and their parent/Appropriate Adult, 
titled ‘A Final Warning and How it might Affect You’, and posed the 
question ‘Do I have to accept a Final Warning?’. The model explanation 
was suggested as: 
‘Final Warnings are only for people who accept they committed the 
offence being investigated. If you don’t accept that you committed 
the offence you should talk to the Police or the Youth Offending 
Team about seeking legal advice’ (Annex G:54). 
Remarkably, this does not include any information that if an admission is 
not made and it is subsequently decided that there is sufficient evidence 
for a realistic prospect of conviction and it is in the public interest to 
proceed, a formal charge was likely to be the only outcome.  
The substantially more rigorous admission criterion set out in the 2002 
Guidance was considered in R. (on the application of M) v Leicestershire 
Constabulary [2009] EWHC 3640, where the court concluded that it had 
considerably ‘amplified’ the original statutory admission criterion 
(paragraph 12). Although this amplification was perhaps intended to 
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ensure the quality and consistency of decision making and safeguard the 
rights of young people by ensuring any admission made was reliable, its 
practical effect was to impose a complex and onerous pre-condition for 
young people, which gave no consideration to the difficulties some young 
people may have in articulating such a high standard of admission. 
Subsequent evaluations of the implementation of the Final Warning 
Scheme did for the first time identify that the operation of the admission 
criterion was problematic and:  
‘Guilt must be admitted before a Final Warning can be given. Police 
officers interviewed were clear about this basic point. Case studies, 
however, suggested that admissions of guilt could be contentious 
and unresolved even though a warning [Final Warning] had been 
given’ (Youth Justice Board, 2004:7).  
The operation of the CDA and Final Warning Scheme Guidance, as well 
as the necessity of the admission criterion, were considered by the High 
Court in the in seminal case of R v Durham Constabulary and another ex 
parte R [2005] UKHL 21, where a 15 year old youth (R) challenged the 
decision to issue him with a Final Warning without his consent, in 
contravention of his right to a fair trial in accordance with Article 6 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights. A more persuasive ground of 
appeal was arguably that the answers R gave in his police interview could 
not by any reasonable standard be considered ‘a clear and reliable 
admission to all elements of the offence’ as required by the CDA and Final 
Warning Scheme Guidance, as R believed he was only admitting to acts 
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of ‘horseplay’ and not the alleged offence of indecent assault, and as such 
the Final Warning issued to him would appear to have been unlawful.  
6.4 Admissions and shame recognition 
Although Baroness Hale in R v Durham had ‘considerable misgivings’ 
(paragraph 49) when ruling that the CDA and Final Warning Scheme were 
compatible with statutory and international obligations to ensure the 
welfare of a child is central to the decision making process when young 
people offend, she nevertheless endorsed the admission criterion as a 
necessary pre-requisite for a diversionary disposal as: 
‘it is good for children to learn to take responsibility for their actions: 
that is part of growing up to be responsible members of society. It is 
therefore good for children to learn to ‘own up’ when they have 
done wrong’ (paragraph 46). 
Although Baroness Hale ruled that an admission should be ‘voluntary and 
reliable’ (paragraph 46) and young people should not be induced to make 
an admission so that they can be ‘let off’ (paragraph 46), she did not 
distinguish at all between the ideal that although it may be good for 
children to own up, the CDA imposed a rigid statutory obligation that they 
must own up in order to receive a diversionary disposal, and this 
superseded any welfare considerations. 
Baroness Hale’s ratio that it is good for children to ‘own up’ when they 
have done wrong was also arguably an endorsement of the practice of 
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shame management, or the invocation of moral regret by offenders 
(Braithwaite and Braithwaite, 2001; Harris, 2006) within diversionary 
practices. The notion that:  
‘those who are able to feel shame for their actions will be less likely 
to offend in the future’ (Scheuerman and Keith, 2015:158), 
falls within the statutory definition of the purpose of the youth justice 
system, which is to ‘prevent the commission of further offending’ (section 
37(1) CDA). There is no statutory or common law reference however to 
the necessity or desirability of requiring young people who offend to 
express shame or moral regret, and it is arguable that the traditional 
inclusion of the admission criterion within diversionary processes seeks to 
adduce from young people not only an admission to the facts of the 
offence, but also an acknowledgement of shame and moral regret. 
6.5 Admissions and Human Rights 
Although the majority in R v Durham did recognise that decision makers 
must comply with domestic and international obligations to act in a young 
person’s best interests when they are suspected of transgressing the law, 
and keep them away from formal processes wherever possible, they still 
approved the principle that a failure to make an admission outweighed 
these obligations. The court also held that the mandatory admission 
criterion was not incompatible with domestic and international human 
rights obligations, despite the fact that a young person could only receive 
an out of court disposal if they made an admission. 
  
 Cushing, K., 2016, Chapter Six 
178 
 
The UNCRC mandated however that:  
‘Every child alleged as or accused of having infringed the penal law 
has at least the following guarantees…not to be compelled to give 
testimony or to confess guilt’ (UNCRC 1989: Article 40(2)(b)(iv).  
The admission criterion was further not considered by the court in the 
context of the barriers a young person may be likely to experience when 
asked to make an admission to the police, such as fear of parental 
admonishment, the pressures of arrest and detention in custody, and the 
limited opportunities available to make an admission; which were usually 
in one police interview only.  
Baroness Hale did though acknowledge that the information available to 
young people and their parents or Appropriate Adults had initially been 
inadequate concerning the likely outcome if they did not make an 
admission (paragraph 48). Regrettably, this was also not put forward as a 
ground of appeal on behalf of R. 
6.6 Admissions and the proliferation of out of court disposals between 
1998 and 2010  
By 2007 there was gradual acceptance by policy makers that the CDA and 
Final Warning Scheme 2002 (as amended 2006) had significantly widened 
the net of first time entrants into the formal criminal justice system 
(Bateman, 2009). This, together with a shift in political mood (Smith, 
2014a), statistical evidence that managerialist and target agendas had not 
  
 Cushing, K., 2016, Chapter Six 
179 
 
achieved desired outcomes (Solomon and Garside, 2008), persistent 
criticisms of the rigidity and punitiveness of youth justice policies (Goldson, 
2000; Muncie, 2002; Pitts, 2003; Allen, 2007; Flanagan, 2007; Morgan, 
2008) and a moderation of the castigatory climate of opinion as to what 
constituted proportionate treatment of young people who offended 
(Bateman, 2012) resulted in the proliferation of other diversionary 
disposals operating along the CDA and Final Warning Scheme.  
Although these new disposals were promoted as a ‘pragmatic response to 
particular operational challenges’ which ‘provided the police with a set of 
tools to deal quickly and proportionately’ with young people who offended 
(Office for Criminal Justice Reform, 2010:2-11), they resulted in divergent 
practices concerning what constituted an admission, and also whether it 
should be a mandatory pre-requisite for an out of court disposal. 
6.7 Admissions and Youth Restorative Disposals 
Guidance issued for non-statutory Youth Restorative Disposals (YRDs) 
reversed the admission criterion, and introduced an alternative pre-
requisite that a young person was eligible for a YRD if: 
‘the young person has not denied outright involvement for the 
behaviour amounting to an offence or harm’ (Ministry of Justice, 
2011:4.1(i)). 
When operating YRDs however local areas were permitted to ‘build upon 
this [Ministry of Justice Guidance] with their own local guidance’, and 
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ACPO’s own guidance did not adopt the statutory admission criterion, but 
instead recommended a less rigorous and simpler test, namely that: 
 ‘the offender must take responsibility’ (ACPOa, 2012:4), 
Analysis of the regional operation of YRDs found that unlike statutory 
disposals, key considerations for decision makers when deciding whether 
to issue a YRD were wider factors including: 
‘the wishes of the victim, the national guidance, circumstances of 
the incident and the demeanour and background of the offender 
(Youth Justice Board, 2011:4). 
It also found that a significant number of victims did not want the young 
person who had offended to be criminalised, and instead: 
‘simply wanted an apology and an assurance that the young person 
would not do the same thing again’ Youth Justice Board, 2011:24). 
Given this, it may be that measures which seek to obtain some form of 
recognition of harm or apology from a young person, rather than insisting 
that they make a clear and reliable admission to all elements of an 
offence, best satisfies the needs of victims - and as such the public 
interest - in determining whether or not a prosecution should take place. 
YRDs were later replaced by the Conservative-led Coalition Government 
and discussed at 2.22.4, 2.24 and 4.94.  
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6.8 Admissions and Penalty Notices for Disorder 
Payment of a Penalty Notice for Disorder (PND) would ordinarily suggest a 
young person accepted some wrongdoing and was commensurate with an 
admission. Payment of a PND however was not deemed to be an 
admission of any wrongdoing or impugn good character, and could not be 
cited in any subsequent bad character proceedings (R v Hamer (Gareth) 
[2010] EWCA Crim 2053).  
6.9 Admissions and Acceptable Behaviour Contracts 
Acceptable Behaviour Contracts (ABCs) did not require a young person to 
make any specific admission of criminality or misbehaviour within the 
broad definition of what constituted anti-social behaviour (Home Office, 
2000; R (McCann) v Manchester Crown Court [2003] 1 AC 787 at 16; 
Ashworth, 2004; Ramsay, 2004; Squires and Stephen, 2005; Squires, 
2008; Rodger, 2008; Burney, 2009; Crawford, 2009; Millie, 2009). Young 
people were however invited to sign a contract which: 
‘specifies a list of anti-social acts in which the person has been 
involved and which they agree not to continue…This may 
encourage them to recognise the impact of their behaviour and take 
responsibility for their actions’ (Home Office, 2003:52). 
The nature and type of admission required from a young person for an 
ABC was thus vague and imprecise, as acceptance of a voluntary, non-
enforceable contract to refrain from similar future conduct inferred an 
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admission of some previous anti-social behaviour, without insisting on a 
formal admission as such. 
The acceptance of the ABC however was citable in any subsequent 
application for an Anti-Social Behaviour Order (ASBO) or Criminal Anti-
Social Behaviour Order (CRASBO) and it could be reasonably inferred in 
support of the application for either Order that the young person had 
previously acknowledged his or her anti-social behaviour through their 
acceptance of the ABC.  
6.10 The Conservative-led Coalition Government and the admission 
criterion  
On election in 2010 the Coalition-led Conservative Government 
acknowledged that out of court disposals accounted for over a third of all 
known youth offending, and proposed to abolish the rigid diversionary 
criterion under the CDA and Final Warning Scheme and to simplify 
diversionary procedures (Ministry of Justice, 2010a:68). Consistent with 
this position, section 135 of The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of 
Offenders Act 2012 (‘LASPO’) repealed reprimands and Final Warnings 
and replaced them with a new ‘Youth Caution’.  
6.10.1 Admissions and Youth Cautions 
LASPO however retained the mandatory admission criterion as a pre-
requisite to diversion, and stated that a Youth Caution can only be issued 
if a young person (Y): 
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‘admits to the constable that Y committed the offence’ (66ZA(1)(b)). 
Moreover, the 2013 Guidance for Police and Youth Offending Teams 
similarly adopted the rigours of the CDA and Final Warning Scheme 
amplified admission criterion and states:  
‘A Youth Caution can only be given if the young person makes a 
clear and reliable admission to all elements of the offence. If a 
defence is raised a Youth Caution should not be given’ (Ministry of 
Justice, 2013h: para. 4.6). 
The inclusion of the enhanced mandatory admission criterion in the 
Coalition Government’s replacement statutory regime is arguably in 
tension with their earlier stated intention of promoting a ‘more flexible 
response’ to youth offending and encouraging greater use of out of court 
disposals for young people who commit low level offences (Ministry of 
Justice 2013h: para.1.6). This same mandatory admission requirement 
also fails, as its predecessor the CDA and Final Warning Scheme 
Guidance did, to offer any real practical guidance concerning what can be 
considered a ‘clear and reliable’ admission from a young person, 
especially those aged as young as 10 years. 
6.10.2 Admissions and Youth Conditional Cautions 
The Conservative-led Coalition Government additionally formalised in 
2012 the Youth Conditional Cautioning (‘YCC’) pilot scheme which had 
been piloted under the previous government in 2010, and it operated 
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alongside Youth Cautions as a more robust second tier response to youth 
offending, and involved a formal recordable caution together with a 
mandatory package of intervention (Ministry of Justice, 2010; Ministry of 
Justice, 2012i; 2013b). 
Remarkably, although the YCC criterion retained the necessity for an 
admission, and in order to gain eligibility for a YCC a young person is 
required to: 
‘admit to the authorised person that he has committed the offence’ 
(Ministry of Justice, 2013b:1.1.3), 
the Code for Youth Conditional Cautions does not require an admission to 
be made during a formal police interview under caution, or to be made 
prior to the determination that a YCC would be a suitable disposal, and 
alternatively states: 
‘[Although] the offender must admit the offence, the… Act does not 
require an admission to be made by the young person before the 
decision maker determines whether a conditional caution is 
appropriate. However, the offender must make an admission at the 
time the youth conditional caution is given [emphasis added] that he 
has committed the offence (or all the offences) for which the youth 
conditional caution is being given (Ministry of Justice, 2013b:14.2)’. 
This is arguably the most radical revision to youth justice diversionary 
practices since the formalisation of police cautioning in the 1970s. It 
vitiates the traditional need for ‘early frankness’ and for a young person to 
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acknowledge guilt at the ‘earliest opportunity’, abandons the convention 
that an admission is ordinarily made in a police interview, and also 
circumvents the established common law requirement that an admission 
must be made prior to the determination of a suitable disposal (R v The 
Commissioner of the Metropolis Ex p. Thompson [1997] W.L.R. 1519). 
6.10.3 Youth Cautions and Youth Conditional Cautions – confused 
practices? 
The YCC admission criterion results in a significant anomaly between the 
two diversionary schemes established under the Coalition Government, 
and begs the question as to why an admission and ‘early frankness’ is not 
necessary for a YCC, but is for the lesser disposal of a Youth Caution? 
This is especially perplexing given that a YCC is intended as a more a 
more robust second tier disposal for offending or an antecedent history 
that is deemed too serious for a Youth Caution. 
The standard of admission required for a YCC is also significantly altered 
from other previous statutory criterion, and the imprecise notion of a ‘clear 
and reliable admission’ is replaced with the more transparent requirement 
that:   
‘A youth conditional caution cannot be given to an offender who 
does not make a clear and unambiguous admission to committing 
the offence when the conditional caution is administered’ (Ministry 
of Justice, 2013b:14.3). 
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The substitution of the usual statutory requirement that an admission be 
‘reliable’ with the requirement in the YCC Code that an admission be 
‘unambiguous’ also results in the unnecessary operation of separate 
admission conditions in the two primary diversionary regimes. No 
discernible explanation for this variance has been offered, and risks 
consequential confused practices. 
The resultant practical complexities of decision making processes for 
determining eligibility for a YCC are also not inconsiderable. The Code for 
Youth Conditional Cautions warns decision makers they: 
‘may not offer a conditional caution in order to secure an admission 
that could then provide sufficient evidence to meet the evidential 
stage of the Full Code Test (Ministry of Justice, 2013b:5.3). 
However, if a young person meets all criterion for a YCC but they have 
exercised their right to silence in their police interview (Code C 10.5 Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1996 (‘PACE’)) the decision maker will not 
know whether a young person is willing to accept a YCC and engage in 
any diversionary package, and whether to propose such a disposal.  
This uncertainty in determining whether a YCC should be offered to a 
young person exposes both decision makers and young people to the 
possibility of complex and confusing out of court disposal engagement 
processes. Similarly, decision makers may be reluctant to explore a YCC 
in order to avoid any suggestion of improper inducement of an admission. 
The YCC criterion is also arguably inconsistent with the common law 
  
 Cushing, K., 2016, Chapter Six 
187 
 
principle that an offer of a caution should not be made prior to any 
admission and not before the determination of a suitable outcome (R v 
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, Ex p Thompson [1997] 1 WLR 
1519). 
The YCC criterion also arguably jeopardises the safeguards concerning 
the questioning of suspects established under s.39 and Code C of the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (‘PACE’). An admission for the 
purposes of a YCC can now be sought outside of a formal police interview 
and the custody suite, and the protections concerning the interviewing of 
young people, such as the tape recording of interviews and the 
supervisory role of the Custody Sergeant regarding the welfare of the 
young person whilst being interviewed is diminished. 
Conversely however, the YCC criterion may vitiate the need for any police 
interview and the unnecessary detention of young people in custody for 
the purposes of securing an admission, as is the current default position 
for formal diversionary outcomes (Kemp, et al, 2011). The removal of the 
need for an admission during a police interview may also be of particular 
benefit to those young people who do not admit an offence not as a 
consequence of any wilful refusal to acknowledge wrongdoing, but owing 
to other factors such as fear of parental admonishment, a cultural 
identification that ‘no comment’ answers should always be made in a 
police interview, and the known reluctance of young BME people to 
engage with the police and make admissions. 
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Further research concerning the processes and outcomes concerning 
YCCs will hopefully evidence whether this radically different regime has 
had any effect on the number of young people securing an out of court 
disposal who would ordinarily have been formally charged as a 
consequence of failing to make an admission, and also whether decision 
makers feel able to offer a YCC in the absence of a clear and reliable or 
clear and unambiguous admission having been made.  
6.10.4 Admissions and Community Resolutions  
The Conservative-led Coalition Government replaced non-statutory Youth 
Restorative Disposals with the broadly similar Community Resolution 
(CR), and decision making for this informal but recordable out of court 
disposal remains within the exclusive remit of the police (ACPO, 2012; 
Ministry of Justice, 2013c; Youth Justice Board, 2014a).  
The Association of Chief Police Officers (‘ACPO’) criterion does not 
require an admission in order to gain eligibility for a CR, but rather that: 
‘the offender accepts responsibility and agrees to participate in CR 
and is capable of understanding the situation and process (ACPO: 
2012:2.1.2), 
and they must have expressed: 
‘genuine remorse’ (ACPO, 2012:1.1.2). 
Distinct from all other diversionary regimes since the formalisation of youth 
cautioning schemes, this criterion uniquely omits all reference to an 
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‘admission’ as a mandatory gateway to an out of court disposal, and 
assesses suitability for a diversion with broader concepts of remorse and 
responsibility.  Although CRs do not constitute a conviction in legal terms 
and as such an admission is not strictly necessary, this criterion still 
necessitates an acceptance of responsibility, a willingness to engage in 
diversionary processes and remorse, and as such may be a suitable 
criterion for Youth Cautions and YCCs, and more suitably achieve the 
intention of the Conservative-led Coalition Government, as set out in 
‘Breaking the Cycle’ (Ministry of Justice, 2010a). 
6.11 Mandatory admissions and the welfare principle – conflicting 
ideologies? 
The opportunities available to make an admission under the CDA and now 
LASPO are narrow, and with the exception of the YCC criterion, often only 
available in one police interview. This inflexible approach arguably 
encourages decision makers to prioritise an admission as the primary 
gateway to diversion, as opposed to considering other factors such as 
offence seriousness or the welfare of young people who offend. Serious 
offences however are likely to result in a formal prosecution no matter 
what account is given by a young person (Crown Prosecution Service, 
2015). 
Although a statutory obligation was imposed on the courts almost a 
century ago to ‘have regard to the welfare of the child or young person’ 
(section 44 Children and Young Person Act 1933), no statutory obligation 
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was similarly imposed on the police. This was despite the considerable 
jurisdiction the police possessed concerning young people who offended 
and the increasing recognition of the use of the police caution as a formal 
disposal. 
There is regrettably no statutory definition of ‘welfare’, though the 
generally accepted common law definition:  
“connote[s] a process whereby, when all relevant facts, 
relationships, claims and wishes, risks, choices and other 
circumstances are taken into account and weighed, the course to 
be followed will be that which is most in the interests of the child's 
welfare as that term has now to be understood” (Re P (A Child) 
(Residence Order; Restriction Order) [1999] 3 All ER 734-755 (CA), 
quoting MacDermott LJ in J v C [1970] AC 688 at 710). 
This definition arguably lacks lucidity for the purposes of understanding 
and satisfactorily safeguarding welfare considerations within diversionary 
decision making processes, and does not sufficiently offset the primacy of 
other factors in the decision making process which are contrary to welfare 
considerations, including the need for ‘early frankness’ and the need for a 
‘clear and reliable admission to all element of the offence’ in order to gain 
eligibility for an out of court disposal. 
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The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 made no specific reference to welfare 
considerations and instead held that the principal aim of the youth justice 
system was simply to: 
‘prevent offending by children and young persons’ (section 37(1)).  
Despite the nebulousness of both the common law definition of welfare 
and the statutory definition of the purpose of the youth justice system, the 
mandatory admission criterion is arguably in direct conflict with both 
designations, and contrary to other welfare centred statutory duties 
imposed on decision makers. These include taking into consideration a 
young person’s age, maturity, personal, social, geographical and 
educational circumstances, gravity of any alleged offence, aggravating 
and mitigating features of any alleged offence, previous good character or 
facts and circumstances concerning previous offending, mental and 
physical health, any remorse, willingness to engage in a diversionary 
package, and whether the consequences of a formal sanction would 
adversely or disproportionately prejudice a young person’s subsequent life 
opportunities (Crown Prosecution Service, 2013; Crown Prosecution 
Service, 2015). 
The mandatory admission criterion is arguably also contrary to other 
statutory and non-statutory duties decision makers must comply with when 
determining what outcome is in the best interests of a young person when 
they have offended. These are considerable, and include: 
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i. what outcome best prevents a young person committing further 
offences (section 37(1) Crime and Disorder Act 1998); 
ii. what outcome best prevents criminalising a young person and their 
escalation through the criminal justice system (Sentencing 
Guidelines Council, 2009:1.3);  
iii. the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children (sections 
1-5 Children Act 2004); 
iv. whether a prosecution will have an adverse impact on the future 
prospects of a young person and is disproportionate to the 
seriousness of the offending (Crown Prosecution Service, 
2013:4.12(d); Crown Prosecution Service, 2015); 
v. the obligation to ensure all decisions are consistent with 
international human rights obligations to act in a child’s best 
interests, use fairness and equity in the decision making process 
and use a prosecution as a last resort (ECHR, 1950 (as amended); 
‘The Beijing Rules’, 1985; The United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, 1989; ‘The Riyadh Guidelines’,1990; ‘The 
Tokyo Rules’, 1990; The Human Rights Act, 1998; The Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000);  
vi. the duty to exercise adequate discretion against the prosecution of 
children and young people who are both victims and offenders (for 
example those trafficked into unlawful activities such as prostitution 
or drug cultivation/supply (R v N; R v Le (vinh Cong [2012] EWCA 
Crim 189; Crown Prosecution Service, 2015a); 
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vii. taking fully into account the views of other agencies and victims in 
child abuse and sexual offences when determining an outcome (R 
(on the application of (1) E (S) and (3) (R) and The Director of 
Public Prosecutions [2011] EWHC 1465); and 
viii. ensuring a formal recordable criminal disposal is not an automatic 
response for ‘Looked after Children’, irrespective of any relevant 
antecedents (Crown Prosecution Service, 2014b). 
6.12 Admissions, welfare and the competing need for ‘early frankness’ 
Goldson argues that during the last 25 years: 
‘the distance between child welfare and youth justice has widened 
and been institutionalised (in England and Wales at least)’ 
(Goldson, 2013a:3). 
This thesis argues that despite the innumerable diversionary policy 
initiatives during this same period, the admission criterion has adversely 
impacted on child welfare considerations more than any other legislative 
or policy initiative. 
The anomalies between the mandatory admission criterion and statutory 
welfare obligations to determine an outcome that is primarily in the best 
interests of a young person who has offended were apparent in R. (on the 
application of F) v Crown Prosecution Service and Chief Constable of 
Merseyside Police [2003] EWHC 3266, where F, a 15 year old, was 
arrested together with others of a similar age on suspicion of Taking a 
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Motor Vehicle Without Consent and Being Carried in a Stolen Motor 
Vehicle, contrary to section 12 of the Theft Act 1968. 
For reasons unknown, F answered ‘no comment’ in his one police 
interview whilst he was detained in custody, and consequently lost the 
opportunity to receive a reprimand - unlike those arrested with him who all 
made admissions and received either a reprimand or Final Warning. Post-
charge F requested another police interview so that he could make an 
admission and also gain consideration for an out of court disposal. The 
police however refused to offer a second interview and maintained they 
had no duty to do so under Code C paragraph 16.5 of PACE 1984 
(subsequently revised). The court upheld the police decision, declaring the 
2002 Guidance encouraged ‘early frankness’ (paragraph 56) from young 
people who hoped to receive an out of court disposal, and a reprimand or 
Final Warning should be given post-charge only in exceptional 
circumstances if a satisfactory admission is not made at the outset.  
The court further rejected the argument, on behalf of F, that only one 
opportunity to make an admission may be unduly difficult for some young 
people, especially for those with no prior experience of the criminal justice 
system, and subject at the time of interview to the pressures of arrest, 
detention in police custody; often at an unsocial hour. The court held that 
the police had given sufficient consideration to F’s welfare during their 
decision making processes, despite F’s later willingness to admit the 
offence and engage in any diversionary package, and the sole ground for 
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refusal relied on by the police was that F had not made an admission 
expeditiously in the proceedings. 
The prioritisation of the admission criterion at the expense of statutory 
welfare considerations was also apparent in R (on the application of O) v 
DPP [2010] EWHC 804, where the court upheld the refusal by the Crown 
Prosecution Service (CPS) to offer a Final Warning to a 14 year old youth 
(O) who had put forward a technical defence in his police interview to the 
offence of possession of a bladed article, contrary to section 1 Prevention 
of Crime Act 1953, but was also subsequently willing to accept a Final 
Warning. 
O’s first account to the police - that he had only recently found the knife 
and was going to throw it away at the earliest opportunity - was initially 
deemed a satisfactory admission by the police and a Final Warning was 
proposed. This was later withdrawn as the Crown Prosecution Service 
determined that O had raised a defence of ‘reasonable excuse’ in his 
police interview, and the circumstances surrounding how F was found to 
be with the knife and his arrest suggested O’s account also lacked 
sufficient credibility.  
O sought a review of the decision to withdraw the offer of a Final Warning, 
and claimed he had a legitimate expectation that he should be issued with 
a Final Warning despite a variance of opinion as to whether his account 
was a satisfactory admission. The court however upheld the CPS decision 
to withdraw the Final Warning and was satisfied that O had failed to make 
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a satisfactory admission by either knowingly or unknowingly raising a 
defence in his police interview. The court held that despite the initial 
promise of a Final Warning, even if offered in error and which ordinarily 
would have created a legitimate expectation, (Wells, 2011:8.113), this did 
not override the fact that O failed to make a satisfactory admission.  
In this case, the requirement that an admission be clear and reliable and 
made at an early stage in the criminal investigation was again considered 
more persuasive than what outcome was in O’s welfare and best interests, 
his willingness to accept an out of court disposal, and the possibility that 
his minimisation of culpability was perhaps simply an ordinary 
consequence of his adolescent immaturity rather than any devious or 
sinister attempt to deceive the police. 
The practicalities of diversionary processes are salient however, and it 
would no doubt be administratively burdensome to re-interview young 
people who fail to make an admission without good reason, and then who 
post-charge seek to change their position in order to secure an out of court 
disposal. It is also undesirable to encourage those guilty of an offence, no 
matter what their age, who refuse to admit their guilt and subsequently 
seek the opportunity to put themselves in the position they would have 
been had they made admissions at the outset. But such objections are 
only relevant to the extent that an admission is a pre-requisite to an out of 
court disposal in any event, and fail to give adequate weight to the 
ordinary vicissitudes of young people in these circumstances.  
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In these cases, F was only 15 years of age, had only one opportunity to 
provide an account to the police, and was perhaps considerably more 
reliant than an adult would have been on legal advice when he answered 
‘no comment’ in his police interview. His decision not to answer police 
questions, if indeed made by him and not for him by his legal advisor or 
Appropriate Adult, was made whilst subject to the pressures of arrest and 
detention, and although there is no suggestion that his rights whilst in 
custody were not complied with fully, to what extent F understood the 
consequences of answering ‘no comment’ in his one and only police 
interview is germane.  
Similarly, O was also only 14 years of age and the legal elements of the 
offence of possession of a bladed article were perhaps wholly unknown to 
him, and he too had only one opportunity to provide an account. 
Additionally, O did not have the benefit of legal advice, and may simply not 
have understood that he was putting forward a technical defence, and this 
would forfeit the opportunity to receive an out of court disposal. This latter 
scenario seems probable given O was always willing to accept a Final 
Warning and engage in diversionary processes.  
O’s minimisation of his own culpability was also arguably commensurate 
with the predictable ‘tempering’ of responsibility and accountability by 
many young people within the criminal justice system, as a consequence 
of simply their age and immaturity (Zappavigna, 2007). The CDA and Final 
Warning Scheme, and their successor, LASPO, afford no recognition or 
guidance to decision makers that a failure to make a clear and reliable 
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admission is not necessarily commensurate with wilful deceit, and this 
should in isolation not necessarily be a barrier to a diversionary outcome. 
The CDA and the Final Warning Scheme, and now LASPO, also omit any 
guidance to decision makers to consider the broader circumstances in 
which a clear and reliable admission is sought at an early opportunity, and 
that: 
‘Police station custody areas can be very frightening places… for 
young people. Children brought into police custody may be 
traumatised or distressed, or under the influence of alcohol or drugs 
(or their after-effects). A significant number have communication, 
learning, language or health needs, and many do not understand 
what is happening to them or the terminology used’ (Criminal 
Justice Joint Inspection, 2011:5). 
The decisions to prosecute F and O gave precedence to whether an 
admission had been made, and not what outcome was in their best 
interests; despite the willingness of both to accept a diversionary disposal 
and no other apparent barrier to their suitability. The decisions to 
prosecute also gave no consideration to the likelihood that F and O’s 
custody experience may have adversely affected their ability to make a 
satisfactory admission at the earliest opportunity. 
These cases also raise the question as to whether the decision to admit or 
deny an offence, or exercise a right to silence, is in fact made by the 
young person, or by a legal advisor or Appropriate Adult. The CDA and 
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now LASPO however hold the young person entirely accountable for this 
decision.  
Furthermore, the desire to ensure that young people who offend not only 
admit their guilt but also recognise their guilt in order to qualify for a 
diversionary disposal is also contrary to the principal duty of the youth 
justice system to prevent offending and ensure welfare is central to 
decision making processes. The admission criterion diverts attention from 
these core duties, and is worthy of reconsideration as: 
‘This debate is not about right and wrong. A six-year-old will know 
the difference between right and wrong but this does not make 
them criminally responsible. The debate needs to move away from 
issues of right and wrong and focus on the question of what is the 
right thing for us to do in relation to children of this age’ (All Party 
Parliamentary Group for Children, 2009/2010:10). 
6.13 ‘Old heads on young shoulders’ – are young people able to make a 
satisfactory admission? 
The criminal law makes few concessions to the youth of an accused 
(Ashford et al, 2006:6.13) and the CDA and now LASPO make no 
concession for the probability that young people who offend may have little 
knowledge or understanding of legal complexities.  Young people are 
often confronted in police interviews with questions concerning intention, 
dishonesty, knowledge, recklessness, foreseeability, possession, joint 
enterprise, duress, appropriation, and self-defence. These often dense 
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legal definitions are no doubt far from the grasp of many young people, yet 
the statutory diversionary regimes expect young people to not just 
understand them, but to articulate them (Grisso and Schwartz, 2003). 
The age of criminal responsibility in England and Wales is 10 years of age 
(s.16 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1963) and the abolishment of 
doli incapax - the rebuttable presumption that a young person aged 
between 10 and 14 years was incapable of committing an offence (s.34 
Crime and Disorder Act 1998; Bandalli, 1999; Bandalli, 2000; Goldson, 
2000; Stokes, 2000; McDiarmid, 2013) resulted in the very youngest of 
offenders within the criminal justice being subject to the same rigid and 
enhanced admission criterion as older adolescent offenders, and adults.  
Despite international and domestic criticisms of the low age of criminal 
responsibility (Lipscombe, 2012) it became a requirement for all young 
people, even the very youngest, that they make either a ‘clear and reliable 
admission to all elements of the offence’ under the CDA, and 
subsequently a ‘clear and reliable’ or ‘clear and unambiguous admission to 
all elements of the offence’ under LASPO and the Code for Youth 
Conditional Cautions. This is despite Code of Practice C 1.5 of PACE 
recognising that young people, as a consequence of their age alone, are 
susceptible to interrogative suggestibility and may be prone to providing 
an account which is unreliable, misleading or self-incriminatory in a police 
interview (Brookman and Pierpoint, 2003). 
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The introduction of the rigid and enhanced mandatory admission criterion 
at the same time as the abolition of doli incapax also arguably failed to 
give sufficient consideration to the fact that if it was recognised that 
children and young people may not be capable of distinguishing between 
seriously wrong, naughty or mischievous behaviour (JM v Runeckles 
[1984] 79 Cr App R 255; Farmer, 2011), they may consequently be unable 
to also articulate a clear and reliable admission to all elements of an 
offence.  
There is a body of research which also found that young people are less 
likely than adults to understand criminal processes and their rights, even 
when explained to them in terms which appear child friendly. They are less 
likely to understand what the right to silence means, especially younger 
children aged below 12 years, and during the interview process are highly 
suggestible (Gudjonsson, 1992; Grisso and Schwartz, 2000; Redlich and 
Goodman, 2003).  
This principle was accepted by the House of Commons Justice Committee 
which found that: 
‘Children’s ability to understand is constrained by their intellectual 
development and reasoning capacity. Research shows that 
younger children tend not to fully understand their rights in a police 
station and court, even when these are explained to them’ (House 
of Commons Justice Committee, 2012-2013:114). 
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One police officer acting as a Juvenile Liaison Officer explained this in 
similar but rather more colourful terms when accounting for the likely 
reason a 13 year old boy failed to attend his appointment to receive a 
police caution for the offence of theft of a can of beans, and said: 
 ‘This lad is two brain cells below dead’ (Lee, 1998:89). 
Supporters of the abolition of doli incapax however held the firm view that 
it was an anachronism which permitted young people with a sound 
understanding of right of wrong to escape justice with impunity (Law J in C 
(A Minor) v DPP [1994] 3 WLR 888; Home Office, 1997).  
The complexities of determining whether a young person has made a 
clear and reliable admission are also considerable, with decision makers 
faced with a myriad of subjective and objective tests.  There are 
precedents that the age and stage of developmental maturity of an 
offender may be a relevant factor in assessing whether they are guilty of 
an offence, and young people who commit an assault can have their age, 
intellectual capacity and maturity considered when assessing whether they 
acted reasonably and in the honest belief they acted in self-defence (R v 
Shannon [1980] 71 Cr. App. R. 192). Similarly, if a young person claims 
they acted under duress, their age is taken into account when considering 
the reasonableness of their behaviour and their understanding of the 
immediacy of any threat (R v Bowen [1997] 1 WLR 372).  
The United States federal judiciary has historically recognised that the 
account a young person gives to the police should be subject to particular 
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scrutiny as a consequence alone of their young age, and in Haley v. Ohio 
332 U.S. 596, 601. (1948) held that: 
‘when, as here, a mere child—an easy victim of the law—is before 
us, special care in scrutinizing the record must be used …He 
cannot be judged by the more exacting standards of maturity...[We] 
cannot believe that a lad of tender years is a match for the police in 
such a contest (599–601), 
and in Gallegos v. Colorado 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962): 
‘[a] 14-year-old boy, no matter how sophisticated… is not equal to 
the police in knowledge and understanding’ (370). 
The US courts have also at times encouraged a ‘totality of the 
circumstances’ approach and permit decision makers to consider the 
circumstances attendant to a young person’s maturity or immaturity when 
determining whether they were competent to understand the processes 
adequately (Owen-Kostelnik, et al, 2006:289). 
The statutory admission criterion under the CDA and now LASPO 
however assumes young people adequately understand often complex 
legal issues, and are competent to articulate a clear and reliable 
admission to all elements of the offence (should they chose to make one). 
This requirement is arguably ‘a dangerous blindness to the incapacities of 
childhood’ (Fionda, 1999:39), illustrative of age discrimination (Flacks, 
2012) and contrary to the more benevolent view of Lord Diplock that: 
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‘to require old heads upon young shoulders is inconsistent with the 
law’s compassion to human infirmity’ (Director of Public 
Prosecutions v Camplin Appellant [1978] AC 705-727(717)).  
This ‘responsibilisation and adultification’ (Goldson, 2013:113) of young 
people within the youth justice system, especially concerning the high 
standard of participation required as a consequence of statutory 
admissions, assumes that young people are adequately able to participate 
in all processes, and understand the consequences of failing to make an 
admission. It is naïve however to assume that young people, including 
children as young as ten years of age, are competent to do understand 
these processes as well as articulate a satisfactory admission. 
Similarly, young people are routinely found to minimise their own 
culpability during police interviews or restorative processes, with variants 
of this minimisation categorised as ‘shame displacement’ (Scheuerman 
and Keith, 2015), ‘tempering’, ‘reduced graduation’, ‘heteroglassic 
distancing’, ‘ideational perspective’ (Zappavigna, 2007), ‘neutralisation’ 
(Sykes and Matza, 1957) and ‘egocentric bias’ (Lickona, 1983). Studies 
concerning the relationship between moral reasoning theory and offending 
behaviour have also identified patterns where young people engage in 
‘cognitive distortions’ or ‘non-veridical beliefs’ (Palmer, 2004:102) 
concerning themselves and their own behaviour, as a psychological 
defence mechanism to minimise culpability of harm (Kohlberg, 1965; 
Bandura, 1991; Gibbs, 1995).  
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The strict requirement that a young person makes a ‘clear and reliable’ or 
‘clear and unambiguous’ admission to an offence in order to gain eligibility 
for a diversionary disposal thus arguably fails to give sufficient recognition 
to the often predictable denial of offending or minimisation of culpability by 
young people in police interviews.  
6.14 Admissions and Gillick competency – a better test? 
The complexities of determining a young person’s competency to make 
informed decisions was considered by the House of Lords in Gillick (A.P.) 
(Respondent) v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority and the 
Department of Health and Social Security (Appellants) (England) [1983] 3 
ALL ER 402. Although this case concerned the separate issue of whether 
a person under the age of sixteen years was capable of understanding 
and consenting to contraceptive advice, young people in custody are 
arguably faced with more complex decision making processes, whilst 
ordinarily under the duress of the custody environment and often at an 
unsocial hour. 
Lord Scarman identified in Gillick the conflicting distinctions between 
statutory presumption of competency through age alone, and genuine 
sufficiency of understanding, and held that:  
‘The modern law governing…a child's capacity to make his own 
decisions was considered in R v D [1984] 2 All ER 449. The House 
must, in my view, be understood as having in that case accepted 
that, save where statute otherwise provides, a minor's capacity to 
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make his or her own decision depends on the minor having 
sufficient understanding and intelligence to make the decision and 
is not to be determined by reference to any judicially fixed age limit’ 
(paragraph 423). 
The court in Gillick ruled that the test for a young person’s competency to 
consent was: 
‘The child must be capable of making a reasonable assessment of 
the advantages and disadvantages of the treatment proposed, so 
the consent, if given, can be properly described as true consent…it 
is not enough that she should understand the nature of the advice 
being given: she must also have a sufficient maturity to understand 
what is involved’ (Lord Scarman, paragraph 424). 
If the word ‘treatment’ in the rigorous Gillick test was substituted with 
‘police caution’, ‘legal advice’ or ‘admission’, then arguably every young 
person in custody should be subject to a Gillick competency assessment 
before they participate in police interview. This would better ensure they 
have a sufficient understanding of the legal elements of the alleged 
offence and any defence they may have, and also satisfactorily 
understand the police caution, legal advice, diversionary processes and 
the likely consequences if they make an admission, provide an equivocal 
account, deny an offence or exercise their right to silence.  
The Gillick competency test is arguably a more suitable assessment for 
young people than the protections currently provided under PACE. It 
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would place a positive duty on the police, Appropriate Adults and legal 
advisors to rigorously ascertain whether a young person is capable of 
understanding the police caution and participate in the interview process. 
The presence of an Appropriate Adult is routinely deemed a suitable 
safeguard when a very young person does not adequately understand the 
complexities of the law and/or the police interview process; however, this 
is an often inadequate substitution given the identifiable divergences 
between age, maturity and competency, as well as the known 
inadequacies of Appropriate Adults (Littlechild, 1998; Pierpoint, 2000; 
Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2011). 
6.15 Admissions in Wales 
Post-devolution the Welsh Assembly implemented a number of its own 
distinct youth justice policies, which were considerably more welfare 
orientated than those operating under Home Office and Ministry of Justice 
initiatives (National Assembly Policy Unit, 2002; Welsh Assembly 
Government and Youth Justice Board, 2004). One initiative – the Swansea 
Bureau – reminiscent of earlier radical diversionary models (such as that 
which operated in Northampton), strives to proactively keep young people 
who offend away from all formal processes wherever possible (Haines, 
2010; Morgan, 2012).   
Even this proactively diversionary scheme, which operates on principles of 
minimum intervention or judicious non-intervention, has retained however 
the admission criterion, and young people only gained eligibility for the 
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diversionary processes operating in the Swansea Bureau if they satisfy 
three core criterion, the first being that: 
‘The young person admits they have committed the offence’ 
(Haines, et al, 2013:172). 
Given this, it is conceivable that some young people who would otherwise 
be suitable candidates for the Swansea Bureau are excluded at the very 
first hurdle because they do not make an admission. There is seemingly 
no recognition or interest by those operating or examining this scheme 
that the inclusion of the mandatory admission criterion may unduly exclude 
some young people who may have not made an admission for reasons 
outside of their control, such as inadequate legal advice, influence of the 
Appropriate Adult or insufficient knowledge of complex legal issues and 
diversionary procedures. Although this scheme is promoted as having a: 
“a child-rights approach, one where we treat children as children 
first and serve them by meeting their needs and very often 
supporting their families (Haines, et al, 2013:182), 
the inclusion of the mandatory admission criterion by the Bureau seems 
on the face it at odds with its benevolent intentions.  
6.16 Admissions and erroneous decision making  
Prior to the introduction of the rigid mandatory admission criterion in the 
CDA and Final Warning Scheme Guidance, challenges by way of judicial 
review of police and Crown Prosecution Service decisions to either issue 
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or refuse to issue a police caution highlighted instances of deficiencies in 
understanding by decision makers of both what constituted an admission, 
and its necessity in diversionary processes. These cases additionally 
illuminate the historical complexities of the admission criterion within 
diversionary processes. 
In R v The Commissioner of the Police for the Metropolis (1996) 8 Admin 
L.R. 6, a 12 year old boy (‘D’) had been arrested with his cousin on 
suspicion of theft of two relatively low value items and issued with a 
caution, despite categorically denying in his interview that he had been 
involved in the alleged offence. D accepted in his police interview that he 
was present when his cousin stole the items, and he knew at the time that 
the offence of theft was being committed by his cousin. However, he 
denied any involvement other than mere presence. 
The interviewing officer was of the firm view that as D was present he 
most likely acted as a ‘look-out’ and misconstrued D’s admission to 
presence with his cousin with an admission to a joint enterprise theft. 
Although the facts suggest there was no independent evidence that D was 
involved in the offence, and at no stage did he make any admission as 
such, the officer concluded the police interview with the declaration that: 
 ‘He’s told us he’s there when it happened and he’s a guilty party’. 
Not unsurprisingly, the court held that none of D’s answers could be 
reasonably considered a satisfactory admission to an offence and the 
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caution that had been issued to him was quashed. Evans suggests that 
this was ‘by no means an exceptional case’ (Evans, 1996:106) and a body 
of similar research also found that in one in five cases young people were 
being cautioned in the absence of a clear and reliable admission (Evans, 
1993; McConville and Hodgson, 1993; Moston and Stephenson, 1993).  
Although the requirement for a clear and reliable admission was in part 
introduced in order to protect the rights of young people, these cases and 
commentaries also suggest that in practice it has not acted as a 
safeguard, and is either ignored by some decision makers or a 
consequentially onerous burden.   
Similarly, the seminal case of R v Durham Constabulary and another ex 
parte R [2005] UKHL 21 illustrates the difficulties decision makers 
experience in determining whether a satisfactory admission has been 
made for the purposes of eligibility for a diversionary disposal. In R v 
Durham a 15 year- old boy, ‘R’, was interviewed under caution on 
suspicion of indecently assaulting fellow school pupils, and in his police 
interview accepted that some of the acts alleged had taken place, but 
believed these were acts no greater than ‘horseplay’ and no criminal 
offence had been committed.  
R’s answers in his police interview were admissions to acts which in law 
amounted to a sexual assault, and considered a clear and reliable 
admission by the police and Crown Prosecution Service who consequently 
issued R with a Final Warning.  This was despite R and his step-father 
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(acting as his Appropriate Adult) both believing that R had denied any 
criminality in the police interview, though paradoxically R’s step-father was 
initially supportive of the issuing of the Final Warning, until he later 
realised it would result in R being placed on a sex offenders register for 
two and a half years. 
The historical absence of any real interest in the admission criterion as a 
gateway to a diversionary disposal is perhaps reflected by the fact that the 
potentially persuasive ground for quashing of the Final Warning - that R 
had not made a clear and reliable admission as he believed he was 
denying the offence in his police interview - was not argued on his behalf. 
Those representing R had instead unsuccessfully argued that the CDA 
and Final Warning Scheme were a breach of his human rights.  
R v Durham has been the subject of considerable academic critique 
(Stone, 2003; Gillespie, 2005; Dingwall, 2006; Dingwall and Koffman, 
2006; Flacks, 2012) and is examined further in this thesis at Chapters 
Analysis of this case has primarily considered the human rights 
implications of the judgement, and not whether the Final Warning should 
not have been issued because the admission criterion had not been 
satisfied.   Had R sought to have the Final Warning quashed on the 
alternative ground that he had not made a clear and reliable admission as 
he believed his answers were a denial of any offending and any admission 
was unintended, his judicial review may have had a greater likelihood of 
success (as discussed further at Chapter 5.3). 
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In another reported case, R (on the application of O) v DPP [2010] EWHC 
804, the police were initially satisfied that O had made a satisfactory 
admission, however the CPS later decided that O had provided a technical 
defence to the offence of possession of a bladed article when he was 
interviewed by the police. A reading of the facts of this case suggest it is 
probable that O intended to admit the offence in order to receive a Final 
Warning, but he also sought, unsuccessfully, to minimise his own 
culpability. It also suggests that O’s mother, who acted as his Appropriate 
Adult, was confused by the diversionary processes. 
The failure by decision makers to properly assess whether a satisfactory 
admission had been made was also apparent in R. (on the application of 
M) v Leicestershire Constabulary [2009] EWHC 3640 a 13 year old (M) 
had challenged the decision to issue him with a Final Warning for the 
offence of Attempted Rape, contrary to section of the 1 Sexual Offences 
Act 2003, on the ground that he had not made a clear and reliable 
admission to all elements of the offence. M had been accused of engaging 
in unlawful sexual activity with a 13 year old girl whilst in her bedroom and 
submitted a written statement in his police interview accepting he did lie on 
top of the complainant whilst his penis was erect and the complainant was 
asleep, but because of his own sexual inexperience he was not sure 
whether there was penetrative activity, and he believed the complainant 
would not object to his actions. 
The CPS was satisfied that the written statement constituted a ‘clear and 
unambiguous admission to attempted rape’ and referred the file to the 
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police for a Final Warning to be administered. This was challenged by M 
though on the sole ground that he had not made a clear and reliable 
admission. 
Despite the court found that the admission criterion in the CDA had been 
‘amplified’ (paragraph 12) by the Final Warning Scheme Guidance, they 
quashed the Final Warning on the grounds that M’s account could not 
under any circumstances be reasonably considered a ‘clear and reliable 
admission of guilt’, as M did not admit that any penetrative activity took 
place, and he believed he was acting with presumed consent. This case 
highlights the complexity of applying the admission criterion to young 
people’s understanding of both the law and what they understand to be 
right and wrong, as well as the failures of decision makers to adequately 
understand the admission criterion as well.  
6.17 Admissions and arrest and detention 
The admission criterion presumes that young people exercise rational and 
considered choice when determining whether to admit an offence or not in 
a police interview, or indeed at any other stage of the investigation, and 
makes no allowance for the evidence that suggests ‘young people are 
often in a de-stabilised state as a result of detention’ (Littlechild, 1995; 
Littlechild, 1998:8), the ‘coercive power’ of arrest often causes them ‘alarm 
and dismay’ and can make them ‘psychologically vulnerable’ (Evans, 
1993:25-26; see also Gudjonsson and Clark, 1986). The pressures of 
arrest and detention in police custody may be a contributory factor when 
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some young people fail to make a satisfactory admission, and result in the 
unnecessary loss to them of an out of court disposal. 
The importance of arrest and detention in both facilitating and prohibiting 
admissions by young people, as well determining whether a satisfactory 
admission has been made, should not be underestimated. Formal out of 
court disposals account for more than a third of outcomes for young 
people who come to the attention of the police for the commission of an 
offence (Youth Justice Board, 2015), and: 
‘Whilst it continues to be the case that the “trial starts at the police 
station”, increasingly that is where the trial will effectively take place 
and the sentence imposed’ (Cape, 2006:v; Jackson 2001).  
Although there has been a recent significant decline in the arrests of 
young people (Youth Justice Board, 2014; Youth Justice Board, 2015), the 
perpetual cycles of policy changes suggest this is unlikely to be a 
permanent trend.   Statistics also continue to identify that young people 
are arrested at a disproportionately higher rate than adults (Youth Justice 
Board, 2014:18).  
Given that court processes (at present) are not relevant or applicable to a 
third of young people who are dealt with formally, a reconsideration of the 
arrest and detention of young people in order to secure an admission from 
them to facilitate diversion is necessary. There is no explicit legal 
requirement that any admission made to a constable for the purposes of 
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diversion must be made while under arrest and detained in custody, and it 
has previously been held that an admission made by a young person 
outside of a formal police interview is prima facie admissible evidence 
against them (R v M (A Juvenile) Unreported, The Times, August 23, 
1989).  
Nonetheless, the current default position is that the majority of young 
people, including those who express a willingness from the outset to 
cooperate with the police, are routinely subject to those processes, often 
in the absence evidence sufficient to merit an arrest in the first place 
(Evans, 1993). Additionally, arrest and detention is often initiated when 
there is no need to make an arrest in order to secure or preserve 
evidence, or the alleged offence is so minor that a formal prosecution is 
evidentially unlikely. 
Although detention in custody may be a salutary experience for some 
young people and on occasion used by the police as a ‘frightener’ or form 
of discretionary deterrence (Evans, 1993, Brookman & Pierpoint, 2003), 
research has found that during the detention and interview process a 
significant proportion of young people were visibly alarmed, dismayed, 
afraid, frightened or distressed, and cried at some point during their 
detention (Evans and Ferguson, 1991). A recent exploration of the 
experiences of young victims and witnesses in the criminal justice system 
found that further found that: 
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‘Young people are being left to flounder in an imperfect 
system…the way the interests of young people are considered 
must improve’ (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2012a:5), 
and there is no discernible reason why the experiences of young people 
treated as suspects and defendants within the same criminal justice 
processes are not dissimilar. 
Despite these disadvantageous variables, young people are still expected 
to articulate an admission whilst detained in custody which is either ‘a 
clear and reliable admission to all elements of the offence’ in order to 
receive a Youth Caution (Ministry of Justice and Youth Justice Board, 
2013h: para. 4.6) or make a ‘clear and unambiguous admission’ to receive 
a YCC (Ministry of Justice, 2013b:14.3).  
There is precedent that an admission made by an adult suspect outside of 
the custody environment and contrary to a PACE compliant interview can 
be adequate for the purpose of issuing a caution (R v Commissioner of 
Police of the Metropolis Ex P. Thompson [1997] 1 W.L.R. 1519; R v Chief 
Constable of Lancashire, Ex P. Atkinson (1998) 162 J.P; (R v Miller [1998] 
Crim.L.R. 209) and the court has consistently held that where a clear and 
unequivocal admission to an offence is made by an adult suspect, it is 
acceptable for the police to issue a caution, notwithstanding that the 
admission was not PACE compliant and would have been inadmissible in 
formal criminal proceedings. The CDA and LASPO however do not extend 
this same principle to young people, with the consequence that they are 
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routinely arrested, detained in custody and subjected to the pressures of a 
formal interview at a police station in order to provide them with the 
opportunity to make an admission. 
The necessity of arrest and detention in order to facilitate a police 
interview is questionable, and there is a police culture of routinely arresting 
suspects without sufficiently satisfying the grounds for arrest in Code G of 
PACE (Edwards, 2009). In Richardson v Chief Constable of West 
Midlands [2011] EWHC 773 the court held that the arrest of an adult 
suspect who voluntarily attended the police station and expressed from 
the outset a willingness to participate in a police interview, irrespective of 
what account he gave, was unlawful, as there had been no necessity in 
securing his detention. The police assertion that Richardson’s arrest had 
been a ‘practical and sensible’ decision was held to be unfounded.  
For those young people suspected of committing a low level offence, who 
also express from the outset a willingness to participate in a police 
interview - irrespective of whether they make an admission or not - their 
arrest and detention would ordinarily not satisfy the mandatory statutory 
criterion of necessity and proportionality, and are prima facie unlawful 
(Cape, 2011:2.11).  
Most police stations do not have a designated area to interview volunteers 
outside of the custody suite which has the necessary equipment to tape or 
video record a police interview, and they are ordinarily only available in 
custody suites. A decision to detain a young person in a custody suite for 
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an interview also ensures they receive all of the rights and safeguards 
afforded to suspects under PACE, especially the right to free legal advice.  
6.18 The police interview and admissions 
‘It has now become something of a truism to observe that, in most 
criminal cases, the crucial stage is the interview at the police 
station, for it is at that stage that a suspect's fate is as a rule sealed’ 
(Baldwin, 1993:326). 
The interrogation of young people in police interviews is the central 
gateway to eligibility for an out of court disposal, and is ordinarily the only 
forum for affording young people the opportunity to make a satisfactory 
admission (Quinn and Jackson, 2007). The police are trained to use 
psychologically manipulative interrogation tactics that may elicit unreliable 
answers from suspects (Gudjonsson, 2003), and the quality of answers a 
young person provides in a police interview must thus be considered in 
conjunction with the wider ‘interrogation context’ of their entire period of 
involvement with the police, including during arrest and conveyance to the 
police station, experience of detention in custody, demeanour of the 
police, nature and type of questions put in interview, the broader tone of 
the interview, and the competency of the Appropriate Adult and the legal 
representative, if present, (Evans and Ferguson, 1991; McConville, et, all, 
1991; Evans, 1993; Morgan and Stephenson, 1994).  
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Variables which further influence a young person’s decision making 
process during their period in police custody may include the nature and 
seriousness of the alleged offence, gender, age, strength of evidence or 
otherwise, antecedent history, duration of detention in custody, and 
existence of a co-suspect (Evans and Ferguson, 1991; Moston, et al, 
1992; Evans, 1993; Pleasance, et al, 2011; Skinns, 2009; Skinns, 2009a). 
Other relevant factors may also include a young person’s: 
‘memory, their communicative capacities, their social styles and 
orientation to adult questioners, and their susceptibility to 
suggestion’ (Lamb and Sim, 2013:134). 
Despite the importance of the interview process in securing an admission 
as a gateway to a diversionary outcome, there is a: 
‘marked lack of attention on the part of researchers to the conduct 
of police interview with juveniles’ (Evans, 1993:3),  
and  
‘young suspects …are all but invisible in the criminal justice 
literature’ (Brookman and Pierpoint, 2003:453).  
 
There are contradictory research findings as to whether a young person is 
more likely to make an admission than an adult, and more or less likely to 
make an admission in a police interview which takes place outside of the 
custody suite (Gudjonsson, 1984; Evans and Wilkinson, 1990; Evans and 
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Wilkinson, 1990a, Evans, 1993; Moston, et al, 1992, Pearse, et al, 1998). 
There is however: 
‘a large literature which illustrates that the police interview is not a 
disinterested search for the truth’ (Quinn and Jackson, 2007: 234; 
Baldwin, 1993), 
and the significance of police interview techniques when alleged 
admissions are scrutinised cannot be underestimated (Gudjonsson, 1992). 
The ability of a young person to make a satisfactory admission in a police 
interview must also be considered in the context of evidence which 
suggests police interviews with young people last on average for only 15 
minutes or less (Evans, 1993) and this may be an insufficient duration for 
a clear and reliable admission to be made.  
This is also arguably an insufficient duration for the caution to be 
adequately explained and efforts made to ensure that a young person 
understands it, as well as explain the roles of other participants such as 
the Appropriate Adult and legal advisor (if present). Surprisingly, despite 
the central importance of the police interview with young people, there is 
no identifiable recent study since Evans’ 1993 research of interview 
duration times for young people in England and Wales, and there is no 
collation of these statistics by the Youth Justice Board or other 
government body.  
The court has on occasion severely criticised the conduct of police when 
interviewing young people, and in R. (on the application of M) v 
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Leicestershire Constabulary [2009] EWHC 3640 (Admin)) the court was 
especially critical when quashing the Final Warning issued to M, as not 
only had he had not made a clear and reliable admission, he had been 
subjected to unduly aggressive and oppressive questioning during his 
police interview, despite the presence of a legal representative. 
The court in that case was particularly critical of the fact that the 
interviewing officer had set out a number of different propositions in one 
question, persisted with a series of leading questions and was not 
prepared to accept any of M’s answers as possibly truthful. When 
quashing the Final Warning the court reminded decision makers that the 
PACE Codes of Practice (Notes for Guidance 11C) recognised that young 
people may make unreliable admissions if put under pressure or asked 
questions in a confusing manner.  
Evans also similarly found in his research: 
‘examples of oppressive questioning…on occasion juveniles are 
harangued, belittled or directly and indirectly threatened that they 
will not be left alone until the police either obtain irrefutable 
evidence or the suspect confesses’ (Evans, 1993:46). 
It is an uncontroversial proposition that the quality of answers given by a 
young person is ordinarily subject to the quality of questions put to them, 
as well as the demeanour and conduct of the interviewing officer, or 
officers. A ‘clear and reliable’ or ‘clear and unambiguous’ admission is 
simply unlikely when questions put to a young person are ‘rambling, 
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repetitious, and insufficiently focused on the main issues’ (Evans, 1996: 
107).  
It also doubtful whether a formal police interview is even necessary for 
young people who are suspected of committing a low level offence. There 
is common law precedent that an admission for the purposes of a police 
caution must only be obtained during a formal police interview, and the 
court in Sharkey v Chief Constable of Merseyside [2004] EWHC 2784 at 
2784 held that although it was preferable that an admission for the 
purposes of a caution was obtained during a formal interview: 
‘If, for example, a solicitor indicated to the police that his client 
admitted the offence, it might, depending on the facts, be 
unnecessary to confirm the admission in a formal taped interview 
under caution’ (2784). 
The YCC admission criterion similarly does not require an admission 
during a police interview, and there are now both statutory and common 
law precedents which re-define the necessity of the police interview in 
some circumstances. If applied universally, this has considerable value in 
sparing young people from the rigours of a police interview, may prevent 
detention in police custody or at least lessen the duration.  
Despite the potential advantages of not interviewing young people who are 
alleged to have committed a low level offence whilst under caution and 
subject to a PACE compliant interview, any erosion of a young person’s 
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PACE rights should not be considered lightly, as there are inherent risks in 
any diminishment. Although: 
‘one cannot be assured that the police always comply with PACE’ 
(Brookman and Pierpoint, 2003:459), and ‘lapses still occur’ 
(Pleasance, et al, 2011:3),  
the dangers of questioning and interviewing of suspects outside of a police 
station are well known (Moston & Stephenson, 1993). As Kemp, et al 
warned: 
‘within this new context of pre-charge decision making, the need to 
ensure the legal rights of children are properly protected within the 
early stages of the criminal justice process [are] more urgent’ 
(Kemp, et al, 2011:29). 
There must however be a balance between the benefits and protections 
afforded by PACE, and the unnecessary arrest and detention of young 
people simply for the purpose of conducting a police interview. Further 
consideration should be given to processes which protect a young 
person’s rights but also afford them greater opportunities to make an 
admission, or have an opportunity to deny an alleged offence, as a 
volunteer outside of the custody environment. 
Additionally, as Skinns (2008:22) identifies, the extension of the ‘police 
family’ through the introduction of police civilian interviewing officers and 
outsourcing of custody staff to the commercial sector (Police Reform Act 
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2002 and Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005; Her Majesty’s 
Inspectorate of Constabulary, 2004), has resulted in a such a rapidly 
changing custody environment that it can be arguably characterised as 
‘Post PACE’. As such, the necessity for a formal PACE compliant interview 
should also be reconsidered.  
Police interviews were traditionally carried out by police constables. The 
introduction of civilian interviewing officers however has had a significant 
impact on police interviews with young people. Introduced as an efficiency 
initiative intended to reduce bureaucratic burdens and redeploy 
experienced officers to frontline duties (Skinns, 2009:60), the task of 
interviewing young people for less serious matters is now routinely 
delegated to civilian interviewers, and experienced police officers are 
considerably less likely to be involved at all in interviewing young people.  
6.19 Admissions and case summaries 
The decision to offer an out of court disposal to a young person is no 
longer made by the constable on the street, or by an interviewing officer or 
Custody Sergeant, and these decisions are invariably made by those who 
have not met the relevant young person. Decisions are primarily made by 
designated police youth offending officers, and on occasion the CPS 
(Crown Prosecution Service, 2015c) but can extend to a multi-agency 
decision making process which also includes representatives of the Youth 
Offending Team, mental health specialists, social workers, housing 
officers, school representatives and any other relevant agency. As such, 
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decision makers are ordinarily entirely reliant on the summary of interview 
provided by the police; however, decision makers routinely do not listen to 
tape recordings of interviews in order to verify the accuracy of the police 
case summary (Evans, 1993; Sanders, 1997). 
Despite the importance of ascertaining whether a ‘clear and reliable’ or 
‘clear and unambiguous’ admission has been made, there is evidence that 
these summaries are often unreliable and inaccurate, and fail to: 
‘convey adequately the gist of what had been said at an interview’ 
(Baldwin, 1992 5). 
Although a failure to make an admission can unnecessarily lose a young 
person the opportunity for an out of court disposal, there is research which 
suggested police cautions were sometimes issued even when a denial is 
made or an equivocal account given. Evans’ 1993 study of police 
interviews with juveniles found that 22% of case summaries which resulted 
in either a formal caution or informal warning recorded either a denial of 
the offence or an account which short of a full confession (Evans, 
1993b:86).  
There are no recent studies examining whether (or how many) young 
people are being issued with formal out of court disposals when the 
summary of their answers records either a denial or equivocal account, or 
erroneously records that an admission was made. Given this, in these 
circumstances a failure to make an admission may not necessarily be a 
barrier to an out of court disposal, though it is undesirable that out of court 
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disposals are issued in such circumstances – especially as a formal out of 
court disposal is in many senses commensurate with a conviction - and a 
young person who has denied an offence is denied the opportunity to 
challenge the evidence or put the Crown to proof. 
Recent challenges by adults concerning cautions issued to them in error 
highlight the dangers of relying on police summaries of alleged admissions 
in interview. In Caetano v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2013] 
EWHC 375 (Admin), an adult made an admission to slapping her partner 
twice in her police interview; however, this was in the context of 
considerable provocation and a history of suffering domestic violence at 
the hands of the ‘victim’, her partner.  
The court found that the police officer who prepared the summary of 
Caetano’s interview had overstated her account, and also, significantly, 
failed to adequately record the considerable mitigation presented by 
Caetano in her police interview. The caution was quashed as this 
inaccurate summary had resulted in the subsequently flawed decision of 
the Custody Sergeant to authorise a caution, having failed to adequately 
consider that it was not in the public interest for Caetano to receive a 
caution. 
Given the increasing use of street interviews by the police, challenging 
either the failure to receive a diversionary disposal on the grounds an 
adequate admission had not been made, or had been issued in error for a 
similar reason, is also problematic. The answers any person provides in a 
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police interview are subject to legal constructions by the police, and when 
an interview has not been tape recorded the police summary of interview 
is often the only record of what account was provided by a suspect (Lee, 
1981:77). The balance between sparing a young person the rigours of a 
formal police interview but accurately recording their answers and also 
ensuring their rights are protected is arguably far more complex than 
policy makers recognise. 
6.20 Complexities of the understanding diversionary processes 
Prior to the introduction of the enhanced admission criterion under the 
CDA, there was established common law precedent that a competent, 
well-educated adult may not fully understand the cautionary process; 
neither the CDA nor LASPO has made any allowance for the fact that a 
young person, especially the very young, may possess less competence 
or understanding than an adult. The Independent Commission on Youth 
Crime (2010) also identified inadequacies in information available to young 
people and their Appropriate Adults prior to a police interview concerning 
both the interview itself and criminal justice processes.  
In R v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1997] 1 W.L.R 1519 the 
court overturned a caution issued to an adult offender of ‘full age and 
capacity and not impaired by drink or drugs’ who accepted a caution whilst 
in custody, after reading and signing all relevant documentation. The adult 
successfully persuaded the court that he had not appreciated that by 
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signing the caution form he was admitting the commission of the offence, 
despite the form clearly setting this out. 
Similarly, in Farrell v Chief Constable of West Midlands [2007] EWCH 
3187 an adult, who admitted pushing another person off a chair after 
verbal provocation, successfully overturned a caution issued to her for the 
offence of common assault, on the grounds that although she had 
accepted the facts of the allegation, this was not an admission to any 
wrongdoing as she had believed she was acting lawfully as a 
consequence of the provocation.  The court in this case had no difficulty in 
finding that simply because Farrell admitted that she had pushed someone 
this was not commensurate with a clear and reliable admission, and when 
she accepted the caution she did understand the distinction between an 
admission of a fact and an admission of offending.  
Significantly, despite Farrell’s adult age and the fact that she was a 
university student, the court was also satisfied that she had not sufficiently 
understood the cautionary process when she accepted the caution.  
This case demonstrates that the consequences of accepting and 
understanding a formal police caution are not necessarily understood by 
competent adults, and that the information available to them prior to the 
acceptance of a caution can be insufficient. Stratton was an educated and 
competent adult who willingly signed a caution form which had been read 
to her prior to signing, and which stated: 
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‘I acknowledge I admit the offence(s) and agree to be cautioned. I 
understand that if, in the future, I should appear before a court and 
am found guilty of another offence, then details of this caution may 
be given to the court’ (paragraph 8). 
Despite the ostensible clarity of this document, the court quashed the 
caution on the grounds that it did not adequately explain that acceptance 
of a caution may also have to be disclosed in circumstances outside of 
any criminal proceedings, and had potentially wider adverse 
consequences for any future employment or travel. 
6.21 Legal advice and admissions 
Certain practices and procedures concerning young people differ for the 
purposes of detention in custody and a police interview (PACE and Codes 
of Practice C), and indeed throughout the whole of the criminal justice 
system. The CPS accordingly developed its own accredited youth 
specialist lawyers (Crown Prosecution Service, 2015d). Remarkably, there 
is no such accreditation for police station representatives or solicitors who 
advise young people in police custody or represent them at court, despite 
concerns that this specialisation is necessary (Goldson, 2013a:6). 
The quality of legal representation for young people, and also adults, has 
been the subject of considerable research, with often contradictory 
findings. Some research suggests defence solicitors are either ‘passive’ 
during the interview process, (Baldwin, 1994:73), ‘simply outmanoeuvred’ 
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by the police (McConville, et al, 1991:167), remain silent ‘when the 
situation seemed to cry out for them to intervene’ (Baldwin, 1992:29); and 
routinely submit to an ‘uncritical acceptance of the prosecution case’ 
(McConville, et al, 1991:167-169). Other research suggests law firms 
routinely deploy inexperienced staff for less serious matters (Baldwin, 
1992; Evans, 1993; McConville and Hodgson, 1993), which is indicative 
that young people who commit low level offences are likely to be in receipt 
of advice from those least experienced to provide it.  
Clarke, et al, 2011 found however that the presence of solicitors is 
systematically associated with a reduced likelihood that young people will 
make an admission during questioning, and it is arguable some young 
people ordinarily eligible for diversion are prosecuted due to legal advice 
to exercise their right to silence in a police interview.  
Skinns’ similarly found that: 
‘it is equally possible that the higher chance of receiving a caution is 
caused by the lack of a lawyer’ (Skinns, 2009a:408), 
however, any analysis must make allowance for the possibility that legal 
advisors are properly identifying those cases where there is insufficient 
evidence and as such advising suspects to exercise their right to silence, 
and a proportion of those unrepresented suspects who make an 
admission and receive a caution have done so when there was insufficient 
evidence.  
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Almost all scholars have acknowledged the need for further research or 
greater analysis of existing practices concerning the role of legal advisors 
when young people do not make an admission and lose eligibility for an 
out of court disposal, however reasons may include a legal advisor not 
understanding an admission is a pre-requisite for diversion, or 
alternatively, misjudging the strength of the police evidence and 
mistakenly believing that no admission should be made due to inadequate 
evidence for a charge to be authorised.  
There is however a considerable body of contradictory research which 
suggests there is a wide variance in: access to legal advice; the quality of 
legal advice provided; and the extent to which legal advisors on occasion 
facilitate admissions from young people in the absence of satisfactory 
evidence against them to support a realistic prospect of conviction, in 
order to benevolently spare them the rigours of formal court process 
(Steer, 1970; Evans, 1993; McConville and Hodgson, 1993; Evans, 1994; 
Morgan and Stephenson,1994; McConville et al, 1993; Brown, 1997; 
Sanders, 1997; Kemp et al, 2011). Other research suggests young people 
themselves may make admissions in the absence of evidence for similar 
reasons (Sanders, 1998; Hine, 2007). 
There is also published guidance that legal advisors should advise a 
young person to exercise their right to silence for the sole reason they 
believe the young person is not mature enough to cope with a police 
interview (Ashford et al 2006:7.213), and this advice appears to give no 
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consideration to how this may preclude diversion. Quinn and Jackson’s 
study (2007) also identified the police perception that certain firms in 
Northern Ireland had a policy of always advising suspects to exercise their 
right to silence. 
The introduction of a fixed-fee system for legal advisors, which notably 
abolished payment of waiting time at the police station, resulting in legal 
advisors only eligible for payment when the police are ready to interview a 
suspect. This jeopardises the likelihood that legal advice will be given at 
an early stage in a suspect’s period of detention as legal advisors are 
unlikely to attend until the interview stage (Kemp and Balmer, 2008; 
Skinns, 2009a; Skinns, 2011). 
The recent implementation of a fixed fee payment structure for legal 
advice at the police station may however be advantageous for young 
people who commit low level offences, as: 
‘Police station cases are now on a fixed fee basis: providing a 
perverse incentive to lawyers to deal with quick, straightforward 
cases rather than more complicated and time consuming cases 
(Spiro and Bird, 2010: xiii), 
and there is no financial incentive for experienced lawyers to be utilised for 
more serious cases. 
Others suggest that there is historically a paucity of talent amongst 
criminal solicitors, as: 
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‘the great majority of practising lawyers prefer the fields of 
corporation law…not only do these fields generally bring far greater 
financial rewards; there is also the deplorable, but undeniable 
tendency to regard criminal law practice as carrying less social and 
professional prestige’ (Friedman, 1959:165). 
The inadequacy of legal advice concerning cautioning was highlighted in 
Caetano v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2013] EWHC 375 
(Admin), where a highly educated adult suspect, but suffering from a 
history of domestic violence, mental health difficulties, and a language 
barrier as a consequence of English being her second language, accepted 
a police caution despite clear evidence that she had been the victim of 
domestic violence during the alleged incident, and the alleged victim, her 
partner, was not supportive of a prosecution. Caetano was represented 
throughout her police interview by the Duty Solicitor, who failed throughout 
the whole process to ‘intervene in any helpful way’ and gave advice to 
Caetano to accept a caution – this was held by some to be ‘indefensible’ 
(Leigh, 2013:269-270).  
This case prompted commentators to highlight the perceived 
‘shortcomings’ of legal advisors to ensure their client understands the 
significance of a caution (Leigh, 2013: 272) and the need for solicitors and 
accredited legal representatives to: 
‘give robust advice and have a good knowledge of the 
consequences of a caution...this is a further reminder of the 
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importance of ensuring that representation at the police station 
enjoys proper levels of quality and experience’ (Ellis and Biggs, 
2013:9).  
A majority of police and civilian interviewers who participated in this 
research also held the view that the primary reason young people did not 
make an admission and unnecessarily lost the benefit of an out of court 
disposal was because of inadequate legal advice (Chapter 7.6). More 
experienced police officers were less likely however to hold this view 
though, and a majority of legal advisors felt that the primary cause was 
instead the inadequate pre-interview disclosure provided to them (Chapter 
7.7). 
What is incontrovertible though is that legal advice is a crucial determinant 
of the outcome for young people (Lamb and Sim, 2013), especially as the 
police interview is often the only opportunity to, when appropriate, admit 
an offence and gain eligibility for diversion. Any negative aspects of poor 
legal advice are no doubt outweighed by the known benefits of good legal 
advice and representation for young people in police custody (Brookman 
and Pierpoint, 2003; Cape, 2004; Skinns, 2009), and the complexities of 
advising young people should not be underestimated. 
Determining whether to advise a young person to make an admission 
must also be considered in the context of the adversarial nature of the 
custody environment; the often anti-social hours in which legal advisors 
are expected to attend and advise; and a culture of suspicion that pre-
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interview disclosure provided to them by the police is inadequate or 
unreliable. Legal advisors are also tasked with advising and obtaining 
instructions from often very young people with whom they have had no 
prior involvement with, and  may have complex behavioural or intellectual 
difficulties; have had no previous experience of detention in custody; are 
distressed by the custody experience; are subject to the adversarial nature 
of the interview process; and are accompanied by hostile or distressed 
Appropriate Adults; (Evans, 1993; Department of Health, 2009; Talbot, 
2010; Coleman et al, 2011).  
6.22 Inadequate pre-interview disclosure and the ‘no comment’ interview 
An often overlooked impediment to diversion is legal advice to a young 
person to answer ‘no comment’ in their police interview, as a consequence 
of inadequate disclosure of evidence prior to an interview by police, or 
during other stages in the police investigation. The court has repeatedly 
disapproved of police tactics to withhold disclosure to legal advisors, and 
held that an acceptance of a caution is inextricably linked to informed legal 
advice (R v DPP Ex p. Lee [1999] 2 ALL E.R. 737; Wildman v DPP [2001] 
EWHC ADMIN 14; DPP v Ara [2002] EWHC Admin 493).  
There is a body of research which suggests defence legal representatives 
are consistently critical of the case information they receive from the police 
in order to advise their client prior to an interview (Bucke, et al, 2000), with 
one legal representative claiming: 
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‘one person’s disclosure could be written on the back of a postage 
stamp. Other people will give you reasonable disclosure’ (Quinn 
and Jackson, 2007:240). 
Legal advisors are also warned by one eminent criminal defence expert 
that:  
‘Any information that the officer gives concerning evidence against 
the suspect should be treated cautiously for a number of reasons. 
In some cases the information may be exaggerated in order to 
encourage the suspect to confess’ (Cape, 2011:4.58). 
Consequently, some defence legal representatives deploy the ‘highly risky’ 
strategy of advising a young person not to say anything until more 
evidence is disclosed (Quinn and Jackson, 2007:240), and jeopardise an 
out of court disposal.  
This scepticism is borne out given the guidance in Blackstone’s 2014 
Handbook for Policing Students, where officers are advised when planning 
an interview to consider: 
‘What is the evidence? What evidence should be disclosed 
immediately? What evidence shall be withheld (at least for the time 
being)? When will this evidence be disclosed in the interview 
process? Can withholding this evidence be justified?’ (Bryant and 
Bryant, 2014:497). 
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Evans (1993) and Quinn and Jackson (2007) further identified the need to 
recognise that the interactions between the parties prior to a police 
interview are relevant to what account, if any, a young person will give in 
their police interview, with the police ordinarily dominating what 
information is provided to a young person, their legal representative or 
Appropriate Adult.  
In June 2014 significant changes to the PACE Codes of Practice C and H 
were implemented in order to comply with the provisions of EU Directive 
2012/13/EU, which mandated that a suspect and their legal advisor are 
entitled to disclosure of adequate information prior to a police interview 
about the nature of the case against them, unless this disclosure might 
prejudice the investigation.  
Although:  
‘there is likely to be significant debate about the information which 
might prejudice a criminal investigation’ (Edwards, 2014:17), 
these amendments to PACE may go some way to vitiate the risk that 
young people lose the benefit of a diversionary disposal for the sole 
reason that they exercised their right to silence as a consequence of 
inadequate pre-interview disclosure. Although it is perhaps ‘good for 
children to own up when they have done wrong’ (Lady Hale, R v Durham 
Constabulary and another [2005] UKHL 21), they should not be subjected 
to any formal criminal sanction when there is insufficient evidence against 
them for a realistic prospect of conviction. 
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The Law Society for England and Wales, having also identified the need 
for improved pre-interview police disclosure, recommended that: 
‘Whilst we acknowledge that there can be tactical advantages for 
the interviewer in withholding certain information from a suspect 
before interview, it is also undeniably true that poor or inadequate 
disclosure frequently leads to “no comment” interviews. In cases 
where the evidence is strong, especially in the form of CCTV 
evidence, early and full disclosure to the suspect is more likely to 
lead to admissions being made and guilty pleas following. 
There should therefore be a greater emphasis on the police making 
fuller disclosure of their case prior to interview, in order to shorten 
the interview process and to illicit more admissions and guilty pleas. 
Again, this would not require further legislation but is rather a 
training issue for the police’ (Law Society for England and Wales, 
2014: paragraph 14). 
Despite the recommendations of the Law Society and the recent PACE 
amendments, LASPO and the YCC Guidelines (Ministry of Justice, 2013b) 
still presume that young people always have the benefit of adequate 
information concerning the evidence against them prior to their police 
interview - or alternatively assumes that if an offence has been committed 
then an admission should be made - and young people are always able to 
make informed decisions as to whether to make an admission to the 
police. Improving the quality of pre-interview disclosure will arguably 
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increase the likelihood that young people do not lose the opportunity to be 
considered for an out of court disposal for the sole reason that their legal 
advisor advised then to exercise their right to silence as they were not able 
to assess the strength of the evidence. 
6.23 Admissions and inducement 
There is however understandable reluctance by the police to discuss the 
possibility of diversion prior to an interview with a legal representative, 
Appropriate Adult or young person, as to do so raises the spectre of an 
allegation of inducement. There are significant anomalies between 
statutory guidance, common law, and the practicalities of implementing a 
Youth Caution, which place the police in an invidious position concerning a 
likely outcome prior to a police interview. 
Paragraph 4.8 of the 2013 Guidance states that: 
‘Young people and their parents/carers or other Appropriate Adults 
should have access to information about the options available, 
including Youth Cautions, so that they can make an informed 
decision before the question as to whether they admit the offence is 
put to them’ (Ministry of Justice, 2013h). 
The courts however have strictly adhered to the principle that any 
admission on which the police rely must be made by a suspect before a 
decision to caution is made (R (Thompson) v The Commissioner of the 
Metropolitan Police [1997] W.L.R. 1519). Indeed, the Police Student 
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Handbook gives a ‘major warning’ (Bryant and Bryant, 2014:497) that an 
officer should never disclose an opinion on the likely outcome for a 
suspect prior to interview and this warning is applicable to all suspects in 
custody, including youths. The police thus face genuine difficulties 
complying with Paragraph 4.8, as to do so can expose them to allegations 
that they are improperly attempting to induce an admission.  
Although it is entirely proper that an admission should not be induced 
under any circumstances, equally however, a young person and their 
Appropriate Adult are entitled to information at the earliest possible 
opportunity concerning the consequences if an admission is not made in a 
police interview. The fear of unfounded allegations of inducement is 
arguably material barrier to police providing useful and objective pre-
interview information, and it is regrettable that LASPO and the YCC 
guidance do not provide further practical support to the police concerning 
the professional predicament they are often confronted with. 
The primary research findings provide some corroboration for this view, 
with over half of civilian interviews and a third of less experienced police 
officers finding it difficult to provide an adequate explanation about the 
need to make an admission to gain eligibility for an out of court disposal, 
but not commensurately induce an admission (Chapter 7.8). It is also of 
significance that legal representatives expressed sympathy for the police 
concerning the complexity of explaining diversionary procedures without 
inducing an admission, and a majority recognised the police were unfairly 
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exposed to false allegations of inducement when explaining diversionary 
processes (Chapter 7.8). 
6.24 Admissions and Appropriate Adults 
PACE and the accompanying Codes of Practice introduced the role of the 
Appropriate Adult, however the ambiguous definition of this role, and 
concerns that parents are routinely incapable of adequately performing it, 
have been the subject of considerable criticism (Evans, 1993; Littlechild, 
1998; Pierpoint 1999; Pierpoint, 2000; Pierpoint, 2006; Williams, 2000; 
Thomson et al, 2007; Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2011). It is 
conceivable that these inadequacies are a contributory factor when young 
people inexplicably fail to make an admission and unnecessarily lose the 
opportunity for a diversionary disposal. 
The literature review suggested that parents acting as an Appropriate 
Adult are often unsure of their role, routinely make no contribution at all 
during police interviews, are incapable through their own vulnerabilities to 
fulfil their role, are not necessarily supportive of their child, and are 
occasionally even overtly hostile to them. Parents also routinely perceive 
their role is to assist the police and not their child, and have reported 
feelings of fear and disorientation by the custody experience, despite not 
technically being detained themselves (Evans, 1993; Dixon et al, 1990; 
Brown, 1997; Kemp et al, 2011).  
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The primary research undertaken for this thesis disclosed considerable 
divergence between the views of police officers/civilian interviewers and 
legal representatives as to who is best placed to act as an Appropriate 
Adult, and the competency and suitability of parents to perform this role. 
Police/civilian interviewers were considerably more positive about parents 
acting as Appropriate Adults, and believed that an admission was more 
likely if a parent was present - unless that parent had their own antecedent 
history which made a ‘no comment’ interview more likely. A majority of 
legal advisors however were contrarily highly critical of the ability of 
parents to competently act as Appropriate Adults, felt parents unduly 
influenced the answers a young person gave in their police interview, and 
held that YOS/Social Services were the most capable alternative to 
perform this role (Chapter 7.12 and Figure 2). 
Although a parent should not be asked to act an Appropriate Adult if they 
are estranged from the young person being interviewed (H and M v DPP 
[1998] Crim LR 653, QBD), the court has upheld decisions to permit a 
parent to act as an Appropriate Adult against the express wishes of a 
young person in custody (DPP v Blake [1989] 1 W.L.R. 432). Though 
Code C Note for Guidance 1B of PACE has sought to remedy this, a 
young person still must ‘expressly and specifically object’ to their parent 
acting as their Appropriate Adult, and: 
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‘this will obviously be a difficult decision for a juvenile to make as it 
may provoke further repercussions after the juvenile’s release from 
custody’ (Ashford, et al, 2006:7.104), 
and in practice many young people are unlikely to make such requests. 
The fear some young people may have of admitting an offence in the 
presence of their parent should not be underestimated. This is especially 
relevant to those young people who inexplicably fail to make an admission 
in the face of strong evidence against them, and when diversion is 
seemingly in their best interests. The distress and anxiety that parents 
acting as Appropriate Adults have been found to experience when their 
child is in police custody or is being interviewed by the police (Evans, 
1993; Medford et al, 2003; Ashford, et al, 2006:144) may be a contributory 
factor. It is also salient that parents retain the right to use lawful force as a 
measure of discipline (the law of ‘reasonable chastisement’ - Section 58 
Children Act 2004 and Section 39 Criminal Justice Act 1988) yet are still 
considered suitably placed to act as an Appropriate Adult to support their 
child who is in police custody for alleged offending, and are liable to 
parental censure as well.  
The 2002 Final Warning Scheme Guidance (Home Office, 2002:9.14) 
extended the role of the Appropriate Adult beyond detention and interview 
at the police station, to include mandatory presence when reprimands and 
Final Warnings were issued, and the 2013 Guidance is almost identical 
(para 9.13). There is no assistance however in either Guidance which sets 
  
 Cushing, K., 2016, Chapter Six 
244 
 
out what participation, if any, a parent may have in exploring the possibility 
of diversion with the police prior to an interview or at any stage thereafter. 
 Williams (2000) argues persuasively that the supportive role of the parent 
as an Appropriate Adult which was established by PACE was later 
compromised by the CDA, which re-defined the parent as an authority 
figure in order to enhance the seriousness of reprimands and Final 
Warnings, and parents were expected to successfully undertake these 
contradictory roles. The role of the Appropriate Adult under LASPO and 
the YCC Guidance appears identical and equally relevant to Williams’ 
critique. 
The introduction of Parenting Orders in s.8 of the CDA (Stone, 2003), 
which places a parent under a court order for up to 12 months with the 
possibility of criminal sanctions for non-compliance, further compromises 
the supportive role of the parent as an Appropriate Adult at the police 
station. A parent may have a direct personal interest in any police 
investigation, which is in conflict with their role to protect the interests of 
their child as an Appropriate Adult (Burney and Gelsthorpe, 2008). This 
raises the possibility that the answers given in police interviews may on 
occasion reflect the best interest of the parent, and not the young person, 
and young people may be making admissions in the absence of sufficient 
evidence in order to secure an out of court disposal, so that their parent is 
not exposed to the risks of an order of the court against them, such as 
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Compensation Orders, Fines, Victim Impact Surcharges, Parenting Orders 
and associated sanctions. 
6.25 Race, admissions and diversion 
It is well recognised that historically BME youths are less likely to receive a 
formal out of court disposal than their white counterparts, and also enter 
the criminal justice system at a disproportionately higher rate (Landau and 
Nathan, 1983; Fitzgerald, 1993; Smith, 1997; Feilzer and Hood, 2004; 
May, et al, 2010; Young, 2010; Office for Criminal Justice Reform, 2010; 
Independent Commission on Youth Crime and Anti-Social Behaviour, 
2010; Youth Justice Board, 2010; Smith, 2014. 
Despite the recent fall in the proportion of out of court disposals issued as 
a direct alternative to formal prosecutions, BME adults and juveniles are 
still: 
‘less likely to receive an out of court disposal for an indictable 
offence, and more likely to be proceeded against at magistrates’ 
court, than all other ethnic groups (Ministry of Justice, 2013f:13),  
and  
‘In 2011 per 1000 population aged ten or older, there was a higher 
rate of Black First Time Entrants (8.2) compared with White (3.6), 
Asian (4.3) and Other (4.4) FTEs’ (Ministry of Justice, 2013f:62).  
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The mandatory admission criterion necessitates that all young people 
must constructively engage with the police in order to gain eligibility for an 
out of court disposal, and this engagement ordinarily takes place during a 
police interview. There is however evidence which suggests BME (black 
minority ethnic) young people, predominantly males, are less likely than 
their white counterparts to make an admission to the police. The 
admission criterion is arguably a central contributor to the disproportionate 
entry of some young BME people into the formal criminal justice system, 
yet grossly recognised as such. 
Most studies analysing the disproportionate entry of BME people into the 
youth justice system found no evidence of a greater offending propensity 
or any evidence of overt racism in decision-making processes (Hood, 
1992; Mhalanga, 1997: Smith, 1997; Barclay, et al, 2005; Bishop, et al, 
2010). Reasons are instead variously believed to include the 
consequential ‘multiplier effect’ (Lord Justice Taylor quoted in Goldson and 
Chigwada-Bailey, 1999:63) of interrelated social and criminal justice 
factors (Ashford et al, 2006:1.29) such as:  
i. social and educational exclusion;  
ii. feelings of victimisation, powerlessness, a belief by BME youths 
that they are treated less favourably than white people and the 
same standard of procedural fairness is not administered to 
them; 
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iii. pervasive targeted policing of perceived crime ‘hotspots’ areas 
which have a greater number of BME residents;  
iv. police racial hostility;  
v. disproportionate use of ‘sus’ laws and PACE ‘stop and search’ 
powers and arrests; 
vi. reduced likelihood of requests for legal advice being met; 
vii. disproportionate police and CPS decisions to prosecute weak 
cases (Jefferson and Walker, 1993; McPherson, 1999; 
Yolander, et al, 2000; Bowling and Phillips, 2002; Cox, 2002; 
Antonopoulos, 2003; Ball, 2004; Barclay, et al, 2005; Well, 
2007; May, et al, 2010; Independent Commission on Youth 
Crime and Anti-Social Behaviour, 2010).  
One recent study (May, et al 2010) attempted to identify discriminatory 
and differential treatment in the youth justice system. Although the authors 
found that BME youths were less likely to receive a caution than their 
white counterparts, and they measured extensive factors such as offence 
seriousness, age and antecedents, their model does not appear to have 
factored into their analysis those young people who would technically 
been eligible for a reprimand or Final Warning, but were charged and put 
before the court because they failed to make an admission. The absence 
of any data which records admissions may account for this omission. 
Although by 1990 the Home Office had acknowledged that young BME 
people were less likely to receive a police caution than their white 
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counterparts (Home Office, 1990), as far back as the 1980s, grass root 
movements such as the Sheffield Black Justice Project had established a 
‘help on arrest scheme’ to support and advise young BME people in police 
custody, having identified locally the failure of this cohort to make 
admissions as the primary reason for their early entry into the criminal 
justice system (Woodhill and Senior, 1993).  
Phillips and Brown (1998) and The Commission for Racial Equality (1992) 
also identified that differences in prosecution rates between youth racial 
groups were influenced not solely by the nature and seriousness of the 
offence or evidence available to support a realistic prospect of conviction, 
but also in part by admission rates; and the failure of BME youths to make 
admissions in police interviews was a contributing factor in their 
overrepresentation in the criminal justice system. 
Explanations as to why young BME people are less likely than white 
youths to make admissions in police interviews are complex. However, the 
relationship between young black people and the police is known to be 
characterised by feelings on the part of the former of victimisation, police 
racism, powerlessness, and a belief that they are treated less favourably 
than white people (Scarman, 1981; McPherson, 1999; Dingwall and 
Harding, 1998; Bowling and Phillips, 2006; Gervais, 2008; Youth Justice 
Board, 2010).  
The routine practice of arrest, detention in custody and police interview 
under caution as a means of securing an admission, in combination with 
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perceptions of racist mistreatment during these processes, may further 
explain in part why young BME people are less likely than other groups to 
engage with police during the interview stage and make an admission 
(Wilson, 2006).  
Although there has been greater effort to monitor and record race and 
outcomes in the criminal justice system (House of Commons Home Affairs 
Committee, 2007; Ministry of Justice, 2013f), there is a lamentable 
absence of data and statistical analysis concerning how many young black 
people are forfeiting eligibility for an out of court disposal for the sole 
reason that they failed to make an admission. It is thus not known whether 
this differential is no more than a disparity between young BME people 
and their white counterparts outside of discriminatory practices, or the 
mandatory admission criterion is in fact part of an inherently discriminatory 
process.  
Forms of discrimination within criminal justice processes fall within at least 
6 identifiable types, namely categorical, statistical, interactional, situational 
and institutionalised (see Reiner, 2010:160-162). The admission criterion 
arguably falls within the latter two categories, as a consequence of a 
universally framed policy and procedure which is unwittingly discriminatory 
(Scarman, 1981:2.2.2; Reiner, 2010).  This distinction is critical for any 
future policy initiatives concerning whether an admission should remain a 
necessary pre-requisite to a diversionary disposal (Bishop, et al, 2010; 
Bilchick, 1999). 
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Although the Youth Justice Board mandated that by 2005: 
‘All YOTs should have an action plan in place to ensure that any 
difference between the ethnic composition of offenders in all pre-
court and post-court disposals and the ethnic composition of the 
local community is reduced year on year’ (Youth Justice Board, 
2010:29), 
this has seemingly failed to extend to any data collection of admission 
rates of white, BME and other ethnic young people to assess these known 
differentials, or resulted in the implementation of any action plans. The 
Youth Justice Board’s accomplishments concerning reducing the 
disproportionate out of court disposal outcomes between white and BME 
youths has been ‘limited’ in breadth (Smith 2014a:151). Recent statistics 
suggest this differential may in fact have worsened (Youth Justice Board, 
2015:28) and this target has seemingly been removed (Youth Justice 
Board, 2014b). 
The absence of reliable data concerning how many young BME people 
are refused an out of court disposal for the exclusive reason that they 
failed to make an admission is also arguably contrary to statutory 
obligations imposed on other public bodies, including the police and 
Crown Prosecution Service, to undertake ethnic monitoring of procedures 
and outcomes in accordance with s.95 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991. It 
is possibly also inconsistent with anti-discrimination principles set out in 
sections 9 and 13 of the Equality Act 2010 and obligations imposed by the 
  
 Cushing, K., 2016, Chapter Six 
251 
 
Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) to identify to monitor the 
law on equality and human rights (EHRC, 2014:6.1.1). 
Despite the known variances in the cautioning rates between young BME 
people and other racial groups and some attempts at progressive reform, 
these disparities continue (May, et al, 2010; Smith, 2014) and there has 
been inadequate consideration as to whether the mandatory admission 
criterion is inexorably disadvantageous to black youths. This is especially 
salient given the Home Office continues to claim, perhaps disingenuously, 
that it cannot account for the overrepresentation of young BME people in 
the criminal justice system because: 
 ‘The complexity of the relationship between race, ethnicity and 
crime and the lack of reliable data, we are unable to say with 
confidence whether people are being treated differently by the 
system because of their ethnic groups or why disproportionality 
occurs’ (House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2007:29). 
Despite the absence of a comprehensive body of statistical data, there is 
still sufficient material available to positively assert that the mandatory 
admission criterion is a significant contributor the disproportionate and 
unnecessary entry into the formal criminal justice system of young BME 
people. This thesis seeks to highlight the need however for inclusion of 
this cohort in wider statistical collation, as well as the desirability of further 
research and exploration as to whether the admission criterion is an 
inherently discriminatory statutory requirement. 
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Consideration should also be given to whether there is benefit in extending 
the radically different YCC criterion, which does not require any admission 
by a young person in a formal police interview, to Youth Cautions. 
Although an admission is still required for the issuing of a Youth Caution, 
there is no requirement that it be made in a police interview at all, and it 
necessary only at the point of issue (Ministry of Justice, 2013b).  
By vitiating the need for a young person to participate in a police interview, 
the YCC criterion significantly lessens the level of engagement usually 
necessary in order to secure eligibility for an out of court disposal. This 
reduces the potential for disadvantage for young BME people given the 
known complexities between BME youths and the police, and their 
traditional unwillingness to participate in a police interview or make an 
admission.  
The primary research undertaken for this thesis with relevant professionals 
concerning admissions and race found that very few police officers and 
civilian interviewers believed that race was of relevance concerning 
whether a young person made an admission. This was significantly less 
than legal representative responses, of whom approximately half felt that 
race was sometimes an issue (Chapter 7.11), with BME youths less likely 
to make an admission than their white peers. A very small number of 
respondents also identified Asian girls as occasionally reluctant to make 
an admission for cultural reasons commensurate with ‘izzat’ and notions of 
family honour (Chapter 7.11). 
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6.26 Admissions and the fear of ‘grassing’ 
Young people, irrespective of race, are far more likely than adults to report 
negative attitudes towards the police (Hurst and Frank, 2000) and can 
throughout adolescence have a conflictual relationship with the police and 
other authority figures (Hinds, 2007; Hinds, 2008). The admission criterion 
compels engagement with the police if diversion is to be secured, and 
affords no recognition for how difficult this may be for many young people 
simply as an ordinary consequence of their adolescence. 
It can also be the perception of many young people that answering police 
questions in an interview, or any other positive engagement with the 
police, exposes them to allegations of being a ‘grass’ (Evans et al, 1996) 
or a ‘snitch; (Clayman and Skinns, 2011), and: 
‘not grassing is a way of protecting the collective loyalties upon 
which youthful strategies for safety rest’ (Loader, 1996:74). 
Research which examined the issue of ‘grassing’ on an inner city housing 
estate in the 1990s found that a powerful ‘moral code’ and ’neighbourhood 
dogma’ created the ‘no grass rule’ (Evans et al, 1996). Fear of being 
labelled a ‘grass’ was has further been found to carry risks both physically 
and socially as it jeopardises the networks of trust embedded on the 
estate (Yates, 2006) and another study found this fear was particularly 
acute amongst young people (Cohen, 1981).  
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This fear of ‘grassing’ may be further compounded given the evidence that 
adolescent friendships and peer influence are a key determinant in 
adolescent offending (Smith and Ecob, 2013; Beier, 2014), and it is likely 
that a young person who has offended, irrespective of their ethnicity, has 
not offended on his or her own but with others of a similar age (Sharp, et 
al, 2005; Smith and Bradshaw 2005) and young people are more often 
than adults faced with the fear that any admission they make may 
inculpate another. This may explain why on occasion explain a reluctance 
to make an admission to secure an out of court disposal which would 
ordinarily be advantageous. 
 Other factors which contributed to the reluctance of young people to 
positively engage with the police, or to ‘snitch or not to snitch’, included 
wider social influences including those of family, elders or ‘olders’ within 
their community and peer group, contemporary music (Clayman and 
Skinns, 2012:460), and previous negative experience of informal and 
contact with the police (Hinds, 2008) 
Although positive engagement between the police and young people 
should be encouraged, LASPO fails to recognise that: 
‘The relationship between adolescents’ offending and the 
delinquent behaviour of their peer group is one of the best 
established facts in criminology’ (Akers, 2014:73; see also Akers, 
1998; Warr, 2007), 
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and some young people may fail to make an admission due to their 
conflictual relationship with the police as authority figures, other cultural 
fears that making admissions exposes them to labelling as a ‘grass’, or 
‘snitch’, and the fear that an admission will implicate a co-suspect.  
It is plausible that the admission criterion as a precondition for diversion is 
in practical terms too onerous for some young people, and may account 
for why some young people inexplicably fail to make an admission. An 
expansion of the YCC criterion may be of additional benefit to young 
people who offend and who wish to secure a formal out of court disposal, 
but do not wish to name co-suspects or be considered a grass if they 
make an admission. Unlike a traditional police interview where it is likely 
that questioning will seek to secure the identity of other offenders, the 
YCC criterion does not require an admission in a police interview and 
ostensibly only requires an admission as an administrative paper exercise, 
thus significantly reducing engagement with the police and the associated 
risk of this engagement. 
May, et al, 2010 additionally found that there was an increasingly 
adversarial style of police engagement with young people, which was 
resulting in hostile and adverse responses from this cohort towards the 
police. The Report of the Independent Police Commission found evidence 
of adversarial approaches to policing, which: 
‘seem[s] almost purpose-built to exacerbate young people’s sense 
of disaffection by demonstrating their powerlessness and inability to 
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command respect from authority’ (Report of the Independent Police 
Commission, 2012:48), 
and that: 
‘the deteriorating relationship between the police and young people, 
and those from ethnic minorities must be improved (2012:48). 
The removal of the need for an admission in a formal police interview 
lessens to some extent the adversarial nature of police/youth engagement, 
and may better improve these relationships. It may also reduce the 
number of young people unnecessarily losing eligibility for an out of court 
disposal for the sole reason that they did not make an admission because 
of their negative perception of and relationship with the police. 
6.27 Admissions and restorative justice 
The CDA and Final Warning Scheme and its successor, LASPO, both 
promote and encourage the incorporation of ‘restorative processes’ into 
the youth justice system (Home Office, 2002:9.22; Ministry of Justice, 
2010b;78). Out of court disposals are thus expected to incorporate these 
processes wherever possible (Evans and Puech, 2001; Van Ness, et al, 
2001; Braithwaite, 2003; Ministry of Justice, 2010b), though there is ‘post-
code lottery’ concerning how restorative justice operates throughout 
England and Wales (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2012:17).  
There is no statutory definition of what a restorative process should be, 
however there is ordinarily a core assumption that for restorative justice to 
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be successful, an offender is either before, during or at the conclusion of 
these processes willing to admit to some wrongdoing, either explicitly or 
implicitly, or take responsibility for their actions, or acknowledge the 
adverse consequences of their offending on the victim and wider 
community (Zehr, 2002; Johnstone, 2012: Zehr and Toews, 2004; 
Newbury, 2011).  
For the purposes of determining whether a restorative process may be a 
suitable alternative to a formal sanction such as a Youth Caution or YCC, 
there is no statutory definition of what admission, acknowledgement, or 
recognition of wrongdoing is necessary from a young person. The 
absence of this statutory definition arguably affords decision makers 
greater flexibility in pursuing a restorative disposal, as they are not 
constrained by the rigid statutory definitions under LASPO and the YCC 
Guidelines.  
This does however expose restorative processes to unregulated sub-
judicial decision making, where discriminatory biases may go 
unsupervised or regulated (von Hirsch, et al, 2003; Eliarts and Dumortier, 
2003; Padfield, et al, 2012), though some research into the procedural 
fairness of restorative conferencing found it operated to a high standard 
and had a high level of victim and offender satisfaction with procedural 
fairness (Crawford and Newburn, 2003; Barnes, et al, 2015; Scheuerman 
and Keith, 2015; see also Johnstone, 2011:25-27). Proponents of 
restorative justice also argue that community centred resolutions 
intentionally eschew state regulation and processes: 
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‘in order to empower communities to resolve their own disputes and 
keep their own order’ (Johnstone, 2012:115), 
and though this empowerment is inevitably highly discretionary, this is not 
inevitably commensurate procedural unfairness (Schiff, 2007). 
ACPO established national guidelines to assist police forces in introducing 
and managing restorative justice processes, and set out a number of 
mandatory minimum standards. Significantly, it rejected the traditional 
requirement that an offender make an admission, and instead requires the 
considerably less complex, and arguably less onerous criterion that:  
 ‘the offender must take responsibility’ (ACPOa, 2012: 2.1). 
Other jurisdictions which formalised restorative diversionary processes 
have responded to the almost inevitable variance of facts between victims 
and young people accused of offending by removing the need for any 
formal admission to be made in order for a Youth Conference to take 
place. In New Zealand, for example, which shunned the punitive turn in 
youth justice in England and Wales during the same period (Lynch, 2012), 
introduced the uniquely progressive diversionary Family Group 
Conference (FGC).  
Premised on indigenous Maori justice traditions (Daly and Immarigeon, 
1998; Maxwell and Morris, 2010) FGCs do not require an admission 
before a young person suspected of committing an offence can 
participate, and there is the simpler requirement that by the conclusion of 
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the FGC a young person ‘accept(s) responsibility for their behaviour’ 
(Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act, 1989: Section 4(f)(i)).  
The considerable value of this lower test is that it recognises that young 
people as a consequence simply of their young age often minimise their 
culpability, and this is not necessarily commensurate with a wilful attempt 
to deceive. It is often only after a young person has engaged in restorative 
processes that they satisfactorily understand and are able to acknowledge 
their culpability or remorse (Scheuerman and Keith, 2015). However, the 
admission criterion under the CDA and now LASPO requires a clear and 
reliable admission to all elements of the offence at a very early stage in 
proceedings. Despite promoting restorative processes, the current 
statutory criterion gives no weight to these dynamics and is in conflict with 
the central purpose of restorative justice, which is to: 
‘engage with offenders to try and bring home the consequences of 
their actions and [to give them] an appreciation of the impact they 
have had on the victim(s) of their offences’ (Dignan, 1999:48). 
The risk of re-victimisation however during restorative processes should 
not be unrecognised, and given: 
‘the worrying statistic that one in five victims left the… [restorative 
justice conference] upset by what the offender and the offender’s 
supporters had said’ (Green, 2007; see also Dignan, 2005; 
Newbury, 2011), 
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it is perhaps not unreasonable that an offender accepts a victim’s version 
of facts by making a satisfactory admission to all elements of the offence 
prior to any restorative engagement with the victim, and in this sense the 
statutory regime perhaps best protects victims from restorative processes 
where an offender has accepted only partial culpability. 
Restorative processes however do not always afford young people a more 
flexible opportunity to take responsibility for their behaviour. An 
assessment of restorative processes in Northern Ireland, which introduced 
Youth Conferencing as a diversionary model under the Justice (Northern 
Ireland Act) 2002, highlights the complexities of requiring a satisfactory 
admission for the purposes of a Youth Conference, and the possibility that 
they perversely require a higher standard of admission from a young 
person that the Youth Court.  
Though the Evaluation was predominantly positive, it identified a number 
of Youth Conferences which were terminated due to the failure of young 
people to make a satisfactory admission (Northern Ireland Office, 2006:63) 
and cites the unsuccessful Youth Conference of one young person, 
Ainslee (not his real name) who had allegedly committed the offence of 
common assault by beating, contrary to section 39 of the Criminal Justice 
Act 1998. 
It was alleged during the conference that the victim claimed Ainslee had 
kicked them three times and spat in their face. At the conference, which 
(remarkably) took place almost a year after the incident, Ainslee accepted 
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he kicked the complainant once, but vigorously denied the other alleged 
violent acts. When it was put to Ainslee that he already signed a document 
accepting the prosecution version of the facts, he maintained he believed 
he had signed the document on the understanding that he was admitting 
that he had kicked the victim only once.  The Youth Conference was 
eventually terminated as Ainslee withdrew his consent to participate 
further after he was continually challenged about his culpability. 
The Evaluation endeavoured to explain the complicated status of disputed 
admissions and concluded that for a successful Youth Conference: 
‘While in legal terms it is not necessary for the young person to 
share participant’s views on the surrounding facts…the young 
person must consent to the legal elements that make up the 
offence’ (Northern Ireland Office, 2006:64). 
This explanation highlights the complicated relationship between a 
satisfactory admission and satisfactory engagement for the purposes of 
diversion by way of a Youth Conference. Ainslee’s acceptance of one kick 
was in law an admission to the offence of common assault by beating, and 
he was willing to participate in a restorative meeting over a year after the 
offence. There was no dispute at all concerning the legal elements of this 
offence and the divergence was simply concerning how many kicks he 
had inflicted and whether he spat at the victim.  
On a practical level, had Ainslee simply been charged with the offence and 
put before the Youth Court from the start, his admission to one kick would 
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have most likely resulted in Ainslee entering a guilty plea, and the Youth 
Court would have proceeded to consider whether a Newton Hearing (a 
hearing of fact to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced 
on the complainant or defendant’s version) was necessary.  
Given the broad sentencing powers of the Youth Court, it is likely the 
Youth Court would not have required a Newton Hearing, and would have 
proceeded to sentence Ainslee on his own version of the facts. Given this, 
the Youth Conference arguably required a higher standard of admission 
from Ainslee than the Youth Court. This particular Youth Conference 
appeared to be highly adversarial and seemingly little different from a 
voluntary police interview, with the co-ordinator and police officer insisting 
Ainslee was not giving a truthful account and he should admit that the 
victim’s account was the certain truth. 
The fact that Ainslee was prohibited from having legal representation 
during this seemingly adversarial process raises the question as to 
whether there was an acceptable equality of arms, and additionally 
whether the Youth Conference was compliant with acceptable standards 
of procedural fairness and due process (Article 6, ECHR). Given this, the 
PACE and statutory diversionary procedures in England and Wales may 
arguably better ensure the equality of arms for young people than some 
alternative restorative processes.  
Similar other research found that: 
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‘A number of the conferencing outcomes were less than positive… 
In some of these cases, the conferencing experience might have 
simply had no impact at all. In others, however, the young person’s 
self-reported conferencing experiences were so negative that they 
might have exacerbated…problems through either labelling or 
provoking defiance…several interviewees…felt that they were 
being expected to accept complete blame and responsibility for the 
crime…This insistence that the offender be held entirely 
responsible for criminal conflicts appears to further their sense of 
resentment and anger’ (Maruna, et al, 2007:3). 
Although restorative justice processes in New Zealand have been ‘lauded’ 
as a model of best practice (Lynch, 2008:215), and this thesis has 
examined only a very small number of unsuccessful Youth Conferences, 
they do still highlight the complexities of requiring an admission from 
young people outside of a rigid statutory criterion, and the tensions 
between the aspirations and the reality of restorative justice (Newbury, 
2011) may be better resolved by reconsidering what standard of 
admission or recognition of guilt is required, and at what stage of the 
process. 
6.28 Admissions and other jurisdictions 
The diversion of young people who offend from formal prosecution is 
enacted in domestic legislation of most common law and western 
jurisdictions, however not all require a young person who has offended to 
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make a clear and reliable admission to all elements of the offence at the 
earliest opportunity.  
Canada and the Republic of Ireland do not require a clear and reliable 
admission but an alternative and less rigorous ‘acceptance of 
responsibility’ from a young person in order to gain eligibility for an out of 
court disposal, (Section 10(2)(e) Youth Criminal Justice Act 2002, Canada; 
Section 18 Children Act 2000, Ireland). This test, similar to the criterion 
used in the New Zealand Family Conference model, is considerably more 
accommodating of the known complexities and variances in how and 
when young people begin to understand right from wrong (Fortin, 
2009:686) than the requirement in England and Wales that a young 
person makes a clear and reliable admission to all elements of the 
offence, and also demonstrates early frankness. LASPO however requires 
an admission from a young person irrespective of the gravity of the 
offence, and young people risk losing an out of court disposal if they fail to 
make an admission for petty and minor offences.  
An overwhelming majority of respondents who participated in the primary 
research for this thesis expressed enthusiasm for a less rigid admission 
criterion similar to the Canadian model (Chapter 7.17) and considered it 
an appropriate substitute for the existing statutory admission criterion. 
Analysis of current diversionary practices operating by the police and 
civilian interviewer respondents also suggests they routinely substitute the 
rigid statutory admission criterion with a more flexible and discretionary 
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model which similarly seeks only an expression of remorse or contrition 
(Chapter 8.6).  
6.29 The advantages of the admission criterion 
Abandoning entirely the admission criterion as a gateway to diversion 
would be controversial. It has traditionally been the prevalent view that it 
‘good for children to own up when they have done wrong’ (Lady Hale, R v 
Durham Constabulary and another ex parte R [2005] UKHL 21, and 
reoffending is less likely when a young person understands or 
acknowledges their wrongdoing through ‘shame management’, or the 
invocation of moral regret (Braithwaite and Braithwaite, 2001; Harris, 
2006). 
Imposing certain obligations on young people, such as requiring them to 
admit to wrongdoing, is also considered by some to enhance their 
‘autonomy and citizenship’ (Hollingsworth, 2012:255) and is an important 
‘temporal aspect of responsibility’ within criminal justice processes 
(Honore, 1999; Cane, 2002; Hollingsworth, 2007:194).   
In practical terms, the absence of an admission criterion risks obfuscating 
and slowing decision making processes concerning whether a young 
person is eligible for an out of court disposal, as unless a denial is made in 
a police interview, decision makers will not know whether a young person 
is willing to accept an out of court disposal.  This is contrary to recurrent 
policy initiatives to expedite youth justice processes (Home Office, 2006a; 
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Ministry of Justice, 2013:2.3). Removing the need for an admission by a 
young person may in certain cases also burden the police with 
unnecessary evidence gathering, such as obtaining additional witness 
statements, CCTV or forensic evidence, as there must still be sufficient 
evidence for a realistic prospect of a conviction for an out of court disposal 
to be issued, and in many cases it is primarily an early admission which 
satisfies this evidential prerequisite.  
Any package of intervention attached to a diversionary disposal may also 
be difficult to successfully implement in the absence of a young person 
accepting some wrongdoing. Similarly, a failure or refusal to admit an 
offence may be in conflict with the principles of restorative justice, where a 
core tenet is an offender is willing to admit wrongdoing, either explicitly or 
implicitly (Zehr, 2002; Newbury, 2011). This is particularly important given 
restorative justice is intended to be an important feature of diversion for 
young people in suitable cases (Ministry of Justice, 2010a:67) and is 
incorporated into statutory guidance for Youth Cautions and YCCs 
(Ministry of Justice, 2013h:9.16; Ministry of Justice, 2013b Code for Youth 
Conditional Cautions:12.2). 
It is also conceivably an expansion of the YCC criterion, which does not 
require an admission in a police interview, may encourage greater use of 
‘no comment’ answers by young people, and a precedent against 
constructive engagement between young people and the police is 
established.  
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6.30 Admissions and Street Bail  
Section 4 of Criminal Justice Act 2003 (as amended ss.30A to 30D of 
PACE) extended the existing practice of ‘street bail’ which empowers 
police to bail a suspect immediately after arrest to attend a police station 
at a later date. These statutory provisions confer substantial discretion to 
police officers to deal with young people who commit low level offences in 
this manner, and most of this cohort would likely satisfy this criterion given 
the unlikelihood that there is any immediacy in securing their detention. 
The extension of street bail provisions was envisaged as having 
considerable advantages for parents intending to act as Appropriate 
Adults, affording them the opportunity to prepare and seek early legal 
advice should they wish to do so. It was also anticipated that greater use 
of police bail would increase the number of interviews taking place at a 
more suitable time for young people, who are often disadvantaged when 
interviewed during unsociable hours (Thomas & Hucklesby, 2003).  The 
police and civilian respondents who participated in the primary research 
for this thesis were overwhelmingly in favour of greater use of street bail, 
on the grounds that it had the potential to keep greater numbers of young 
people out of the custody suite and also improve the likelihood of a 
diversionary disposal (Chapter 7.13). 
Criticisms of street bail were considerable however (McPherson, 1999; 
Sanders and Young, 2002; Bowling and Phillips, 2006; Cape and 
Richards, 2010), including fears it would be used where there was little or 
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no evidence as an instrument of police authority; used discriminately to the 
detriment of minority ethnic groups, comparable with police use of stop 
and search powers; erode protections afforded to suspects through PACE 
and the role of the Custody Sergeant in reviewing grounds of an arrest; 
have a net widening effect where but for street bail provisions suspects 
would otherwise not have been arrested at all; and have an unsatisfactory 
absence of safeguards to ensure that young people who were subject to 
street bail would inform their parent of guardian of their arrest. Hucklesby 
(2004), in a scathing critique of extending street bail provisions, argued it 
ill thought out and misconceived, and a potential reduction in bureaucracy 
at the expense of the safeguards of a suspect’s rights. More recently, 
Cape has argued that all use of street bail is neither proportionate or 
necessary, and consideration should be given to its abolishment (Cape, 
2016). 
The majority of legal representatives who participated in the research were 
supportive in principle of street bail, but were concerned that this unduly 
increased police discretionary powers, and could prevent access to legal 
advice and assistance (Chapter 7.13). 
Although these are all legitimate concerns, they perhaps fail to give 
adequate weight to the benefits of street bail in suitable circumstances for 
young people. If it is to remain the practice that most youths have only one 
opportunity to make an admission, that being whilst under arrest, detained 
in custody and interviewed under caution, then the requirement for ‘early 
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frankness’ is perhaps best met by allowing them an opportunity prior to 
detention, when appropriate, to seek legal advice, prepare for an 
interview, negotiate if possible for an interview to take place at a 
reasonable time and be best placed to make an informed decision as to 
what account, if any, to give when interviewed. 
This is especially salient given research has consistently found that 
suspects are more likely to waive their right to legal advice because of 
concerns that it will extend their period of detention (Phillips and Brown 
1998; Skinns, 2009; Skinns, 2009a). Additionally, there is the inevitable 
momentum in any criminal investigation once a suspect is booked into 
custody, and although street bail by its nature involves a suspect being 
bailed to attend a police station at a subsequent date, it offers some 
opportunity for alternative courses of action. As Field found in his study of 
the decision making process: 
‘Although the general view was that there was still discretion for an 
experienced patrol officer to take a young person home to their 
parents even where an offence had been clearly committed if it was 
considered too minor to warrant official action…officers felt that the 
‘informal caution’ was now rarely if ever an option once the young 
person had reached the custody suite’ (Field, 2008:181). 
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7.0 CHAPTER SEVEN: THEMATIC ANALYSIS AND THE VIEWS OF 
STAKEHOLDERS IN CONTEXT OF THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
7.1 What existing knowledge is there concerning the admission criterion 
within diversionary practices? 
Despite the admission criterion being a central tenet of diversionary 
processes in England and Wales, the original analysis of existing literature 
identified that there was seemingly almost no academic or government-led 
research which examined this issue. There is also currently no statistical 
collation or analysis by the police, Youth Justice Board, or any other 
interested body as to how many young people make admissions to the police 
- either in a formal or a contemporaneous police interview. Additionally, there 
is no collation of any statistics as to whether young people lose eligibility for a 
diversionary disposal for the sole reason that they do not make an admission, 
and if so how often this happens and for what reasons. 
This is consistent with the paucity of other research concerning young 
peoples’ overall experiences of diversionary processes, including their 
understanding of diversionary procedures, and the relevance or otherwise of 
their experience of arrest, detention and interview in police custody, quality of 
legal advice they receive, the increasing use of interviews outside of the 
custody suite and the resultant diminution of young peoples’ protections 
under PACE during diversionary processes (Sanders, et al, 1989; Bridges 
and Sanders, 1990; Brookman and Pierpoint, 2003; Skinns, 2009a, 2009b; 
Pleasance, et al, 2011). 
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7.2 Is there any need to study the admission criterion within youth justice 
diversionary processes? 
Although it has long been enshrined in English law that not every 
misdemeanour must be formally sanctioned within the parameters of the 
formal criminal justice system (Sharpe, et al, 1980; Ashworth, 1998; Dingwall 
and Harding, 1998), from the early twentieth century it is apparent that minor 
transgressions committed by young people became progressively formalised 
(Steer, 1970). Concomitantly, but seemingly without rationale or debate, the 
admission criterion developed within diversionary youth justice practices as a 
mandatory pre-requisite for a diversionary disposal, even for low level 
offences or where it was in a young person’s best interests to spare them the 
rigours of a formal prosecution and appearance at the Youth Court.  
The significance of the mandatory admission criterion as a gateway or barrier 
to an out of court disposal has been grossly neglected, especially as the 
relationship between net-widening and the mandatory admission criterion is 
arguably co-existent. Many diversionary initiatives throughout the nineteenth 
and twentieth century increasingly encompassed not only young people who 
committed a recognised criminal offence, but also those who fell within the 
reach of these measures as a consequence of other moral or social 
transgressions (Muncie, 2000), or for their care their and protection (Cox and 
Shore, 2002), or because young people often occupy more public space than 
adults and are thus usually the prime focus of police order-maintenance 
initiatives (Lee, 1981). An admission was increasingly also expected from 
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these cohorts to some form of wrongdoing in order avoid more formal 
processes. 
The increasingly pernicious concept of the juvenile delinquent and the 
necessity of formal measures to assuage societal anxiety about their 
misconduct (Pearson, 1983; Dingwall and Harding, 1998) have further drawn 
young people into the criminal justice system. At the same, these measures 
increasingly sought to secure from young people some form of admission, 
either for practical reasons in order to ensure that an offence was made out 
in law, or to invoke instead some form of moral regret in young people 
(Braithwaite and Braithwaite, 2001; Harris, 2006; Scheuerman and Keith, 
2015). 
Given these considerations, the fact that at present a young person can only 
avoid a formal charge and prosecution in the Youth Court if they make a 
clear and reliable admission makes the admission criterion arguably one of 
the most important features of diversionary youth justice, and the need for 
further research considerable. 
Additionally, primary research undertaken with relevant professionals for this 
thesis further found that all respondents held the view that the admission 
criterion was sometimes an unnecessary barrier to a diversionary outcome, 
but there was little consensus as to why (Chapter 8.1). 
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7.3 Case law 
The literature review and secondary analysis examined the considerable 
body of case law where young people have failed to make an admission - or 
failed to make a satisfactory admission - and for that sole reason lost a 
diversionary disposal which they later unsuccessfully tried to secure through 
an appeal or judicial review (R. v DPP Ex p. B [1993] 1 All E.R.; R. (on the 
application of F) v Crown Prosecution Service and Chief Constable of 
Merseyside Police [2003] EWHC] 3266; R. (on the application of O) v DPP 
[2010] EWHC 804).  
These young people all committed either low level offences or offences which 
were at one stage considered suitable for diversion within the diversionary 
gravity matrix, did not have prohibitive antecedents, were willing to engage in 
an interventionist package attached to a formal diversionary disposal, and 
there were no discernible reasons why their best interests were met by 
charging them and putting them before the Youth Court rather than issuing 
them with an out of court disposal. R. v Durham Constabulary and another ex 
parte R [2005] UKHL 21) can be distinguished from these cases as that 
youth wished to argue that the Final Warning he was issued with should be 
quashed, and he did not want another interview in order to make an 
admission. 
What analysis of these cases fails to assist with however is whether these 
young people decided of their own volition not to make an admission, or 
whether their Appropriate Adult or legal advisor was in fact the primary 
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decision maker. These cases also do not assist concerning whether these 
young people ever understood the likely outcome if they did not make an 
admission, and their standard of capacity. The admission criterion and 
associated guidance has never made any allowance for the likelihood or 
possibility that young people may not in fact be the primary decision maker, 
or they may not sufficiently understand diversionary processes. The statutory 
regime holds young people entirely accountable for what account is given.  
These cases also highlight the fact that the opportunities available to young 
people to make an admission are often very narrow, with only one police 
interview available to them, often at an unsocial hour. The circumstances in 
which these admissions are sought are also often whilst subject to the rigours 
of arrest, detention in police custody, and the stresses of a PACE interview. 
The views of stakeholders were therefor sought to explore these issues 
further. 
7.4 Why has the admission criterion been neglected? 
The lack of interest in the admission criterion is remarkable, especially given 
that that the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, which set out a radical agenda 
and was one of the most critiqued legislative initiatives of the entire New 
Labour period, not only formalised in statute the existing pre-requisite that a 
young person had to make an admission in order to gain eligibility for an out 
of court disposal, but it also enhanced the standard required.  
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Although the net-widening effect of some diversionary measures has been 
the subject of considerable critique (Pratt, 1986; Home Office, 1985; 
Bateman, 2002; Gelsthorpe and Padfield, 2003; Office of Criminal Justice 
Reform, 2010; Ministry of Justice, 2014), the practical gateways to a 
diversionary disposal have historically been neglected. 
The absence of any real interest in the admission criterion was perhaps a 
consequence of a combination of factors, including the confusion between 
informal and formal cautioning, the fact that cautioning was traditionally a 
highly discretionary processes which operated in the absence of any material 
supervision or control, and that it also operated with considerable disparity of 
use throughout each regional police force (Osborough, 1965; Evans and 
Wilkinson, 1990; Bateman, 2002; Kemp and Gelsthorpe, 2003).  
Additionally, the fact that the police caution and other diversionary measures 
have been subject to contradictory policy initiatives favouring  either radical 
benevolence (Longford Committee, 1964; Cohen, 1985; Davis et al, 1989) or 
institutionalised intolerance (Muncie, 1999) together with the absence of any 
period of sustained consensus or constancy of processes (Bernard, 1992) 
perhaps obscured the fact that the admission criterion had become almost by 
accident an established feature of diversionary youth justice. 
Furthermore, recognition of the significance of the admission criterion may 
have been subsumed not only by the incessant development of alternate 
diversionary processes, but also as a consequence of the blurred notion of 
what diversion was or was intended to achieve. There has never been a 
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cogent or definitive definition of diversion (Kelly, 2014), and throughout the 
innumerable periods of ‘near permanent reform’ has been an increasingly 
nebulous concept (Goldson, 2010:155) without any coherent theoretical basis 
(Tutt and Giller, 1983).   
An understanding of the significance of the admission criterion was also 
arguably lost within the competing interests of the magistracy and the police, 
with the magistracy recurrently claiming that the police caution for young 
people usurped their primary jurisdiction, lacked sufficient independent 
scrutiny and monitoring, and had insufficient powers of punishment and 
restitution (Steer, 1970:18; Parker, et al, 1989; House of Commons Justice 
Committee, 2013).  
The police caution also became inextricably associated with the hyper-
politicisation of youth crime (Audit Commission, 1996), vitriol concerning the 
perceived failures of repeat cautioning of recidivist young offenders (Ball, 
1995:198), perceptions of a ‘parenting deficit’ (Goldson and Jamieson, 
2002:82) and previously tolerated adolescent nuisance behaviour which 
became increasingly classified as ‘anti-social behaviour’ (McLaughlin, et al, 
2001).  
The plethora of additional out of court disposals since 2005 (although 
subsequently reduced and simplified by the Conservative-led Coalition 
Government) resulted in confused standards and practices as to whether an 
admission was necessary by a young person in order to gain eligibility for an 
out of court disposal, and if so what form it should take. 
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7.5 Questionnaire and interview responses 
As outlined at paragraphs 3.5 - 3.7 in this thesis, participants were invited in 
the questionnaire and interviews to consider a series of research questions. 
These sought to identify whether they accepted or rejected the primary 
research question, namely whether some young people are not admitting an 
offence when it is seemingly in their best interests to do so and unnecessarily 
forfeiting eligibility for an out of court disposal, if so for what reasons, and are 
there any alternative criterion or amendments to existing practices which may 
better facilitate young people gaining access to diversionary outcomes. 
Remarkably, all of the possible reasons which were suggested in the 
questionnaires (Appendixes 3 and 4) were recognised by at least one 
participant from both groups, and only two other reasons not identified from 
the literature review suggested as reasons by the respondents. There was 
considerable variance however between police and legal representatives as 
to why young people do not make admissions and unnecessarily lose the 
benefit of an out of court disposal, and further variance between experienced 
and less experienced officers and civilian interviewers. 
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Figure 1 Respondent's views as to why some young people 
unnecessarily fail to make an admission 
7.6 Legal Advice and admissions 
A large majority of police officers and civilian interviewers - more than three 
quarters - held the view that the main reason young people did not make an 
admission and unnecessarily lost the opportunity to be considered for an out 
of court disposal was as a consequence of legal advice. In subsequent 
interviews however a distinct divergence in the views of experienced and 
inexperienced police officers, and civilian interviewers was apparent 
concerning why this happened. 
More than two thirds of less experienced police officers and civilian 
interviewers believed that some legal representatives practised a blanket 
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policy of always advising their clients, even young people eligible for a 
diversionary disposal, to answer ‘no comment’ in police interviews.  
One civilian interviewer said in their interview: 
‘I just know it’s going to be no comment when x or x or x comes down 
to represent them, or it’s someone from x [firm of local solicitors], even 
when we want to caution. It’s always such a shame’ (CI4). 
Police officers with 5 or more years’ experience however were less critical of 
this practice than civilian interviewers and less experienced police officers, 
and recognised it as appropriate advice on some occasions. They cited 
examples of good solicitors ‘playing the long game’ - although the young 
person they advised to exercise their right to silence lost the opportunity for a 
diversionary disposal, these solicitors were usually able to secure an 
acquittal later on, and advice to answer ‘no comment’ in fact achieved the 
best possible outcome for a young person. 
Examples of these instances were when the prosecution evidence was 
reliant on witness evidence only, and not CCTV or forensic evidence, and 
competent solicitors were often able to assess at the police station stage of 
proceedings whether witnesses would likely later withdraw their support for a 
prosecution, and the case would consequently have to be discontinued, and 
it was at that stage in a young person’s best interests not to make any 
admission. 
Experienced police officers were also more likely than less experienced 
officers and civilian interviewers to believe that when there was patently 
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sufficient evidence for a realistic prospect of conviction, the majority of legal 
advisors sought to secure a diversionary disposal for young people. They 
also recognised that legal advisors sometimes advised young people to 
make an admission when the evidence was perhaps border-line, in order to 
benevolently spare them the ordeal of an appearance in the Youth Court. 
This is commensurate with other research undertaken by Skinns (2011). 
Although experienced police officers were aware of the perception that some 
legal advisors always advise suspects to exercise their right to silence, they 
generally held the view that although this did happen, this usually only 
applied to adult suspects or young people who were ineligible for a 
diversionary disposal anyway due to either the seriousness of the offence or 
existing antecedents. With one exception, experienced police officers did not 
accept that the primary reason young people routinely lost the benefit of a 
diversionary disposal was due to legal advice to answer ‘no comment’, and 
all believed there was no single reason, but rather a number of causes. 
A majority of experienced officers held the view that the two primary reasons 
that young people did not make an admission when it was in their best 
interests to do so was (i) the difficulty the police had in explaining 
diversionary procedures without being accused of improperly inducing an 
admission, and (ii) the lack of knowledge amongst young people and their 
parents or other family member who acted as Appropriate Adults that an 
admission is a mandatory criterion to a diversionary disposal. 
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Experienced police officers were also considerably more sympathetic than 
civilian interviewers concerning the difficulties legal advisors were often 
confronted with when advising young people at the police station, with one 
officer of more than 10 years’ experience stating: 
‘I really feel for some of these briefs, they’re here advising these kids 
at all hours, the parents are often a nightmare, some officers are 
openly hostile to them, and it can’t be easy (EP7). 
Civilian interviewers were however considerably more critical of legal 
representatives than both experienced and less experienced police officers, 
with this latter cohort generally expressing views which were both positive 
and negative views in almost equal measure, effectively balancing them out. 
Civilian interviewers though often described an adverse and antagonistic 
relationship with legal advisors. They were also more critical of the quality of 
legal advice usually given, and expressed frustration that legal advice often 
led to young people not making an admission and forfeiting an out of court 
disposal. Their criticisms of legal advisors in giving such advice included: 
• laziness; 
• recklessly gambling that there was not sufficient evidence;  
• throwing up as many hurdles as possible; and 
• playing a game. 
Less experienced police officers and civilian interviewers were also mostly of 
the view that when a young person exercised their right to silence it was 
usually as a consequence of legal advice, and not of the young person’s own 
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volition or any other wider factors. Interestingly, more experienced officers 
stated that they believed sometimes young people rejected legal advice to 
admit an offence in a police interview, and made their own decision to 
answer ‘no comment’. They also believed that when an Appropriate Adult 
had a criminal record they were often the actual decision maker as to what 
account, if any, the young person should give, and they often insisted that the 
young person did not make any admissions in a police interview and went ‘no 
comment’. 
Significantly, most experienced police officers held the view that legal advice 
at the police station usually contributed to a positive outcome for a young 
person, however fewer than half of less experienced police officers and 
civilian interviewers held this view. Similarly, most experienced officers 
believed that legal advisors usually had sufficient knowledge about 
diversionary procedures. This is contrary to other research which suggests 
legal representatives are often passive or uncritical of the prosecution case at 
the police station (McConville, et al, 1991). There was however a wide range 
of responses from the other cohorts both agreeing and disagreeing with this 
proposition, with no clear consensus. 
This is partially consistent with other research which has found wide variance 
in the standard and competence of legal advisors (Steer, 1970; Evans, 1993; 
McConville and Hodgson, 1993; McConville et al, 1993; Evans, 1994; 
Morgan and Stephenson, 1994; Brown, 1997; Sanders, 1997; Sanders, 
1998; Hine, 2007; Skinns, 2009a, Skinns 2009b, Kemp et al, 2011). 
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Despite the views of some of the respondents about the deficient knowledge 
base of legal advisors, almost all police officers - experienced and less 
experienced - expressed a preference that young people were represented 
by a legal advisor when interviewed in custody, citing reasons such as: 
• ‘it makes it much easier, as the brief can do a lot of the explaining 
before the interview’ (EPO3) 
• ‘the interview is usually quicker as they have already explained the 
caution already’ (JPO7) 
• ‘it will protect me from any false allegations against me’ (JPO1) 
• ‘they usually keep the AA [Appropriate Adult] under control’ (EPO1). 
Almost two-thirds of civilian interviewers however expressed a preference 
that legal representatives did not attend the police station and advise young 
people in custody as: 
• ‘you have to wait too long for them to get here, and the kids are kept at 
the police station for longer than is necessary’ (CI3) 
• ‘they often turn young offenders against the police’(CI2) 
• ‘they want to take control’(CI5) 
• ‘they can be unnecessarily hostile’ (CI1). 
A majority of all respondents however did believe that when young people 
were not represented by the Duty Solicitor, and had requested representation 
from a named firm of solicitors, they were usually represented by accredited 
legal representatives rather than solicitors, and more experienced solicitors 
were only likely to attend the police station when they were the designated 
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Duty Solicitor. This is consistent with other research which suggests law firms 
routinely deploy inexperienced staff for less serious matters (Baldwin, 1992; 
Evans, 1993; McConville and Hodgson, 1993), 
Less than a third of legal advisors however were of the view that legal advice 
was the main reason why some young people who were eligible for diversion 
did not make an admission and unnecessarily lost a diversionary disposal. 
When they did recognise that this did happen, they overwhelmingly said this 
was primarily due to either: 
i. a lack of sufficient pre-interview disclosure, and they had no option 
but to advise a young person to answer ‘no comment’ as they 
could not at the time assess whether there was enough evidence 
for a realistic prospect of conviction, or; 
ii. an initial belief that the prosecution evidence was weak, but it was 
in fact sufficient for a realistic prospect of conviction.  
Not one legal advisor, perhaps not unsurprisingly, accepted they advised 
young people to answer ‘no comment’ due to laziness, to inflate a fee or to 
manipulate any processes. They also rejected the suggestion of a culture of 
a blanket policy of advising ‘no comment’ interviews.  
A majority of legal representatives expressed frustration in their interviews 
that the police were often unfairly critical of their advice to young people to 
exercise their right to silence. One typical example provided was when a 
young person was arrested for simple possession of a prohibited drug, but 
admitted to their legal advisor that they had in fact been supplying drugs. In 
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those instances, although a ‘no comment’ interview would result in the loss of 
a caution, it was preferable to being charged with the more serious offence 
and it was good advice – despite the police believing a diversionary disposal 
had been lost unnecessarily. 
All legal advisors rejected in the questionnaire and interview other research 
findings that young people who commit low level offences are more likely to 
be represented by an accredited police station representative or less 
experienced solicitor (Baldwin, 1992; Evans, 1993; McConville and Hodgson, 
1993). All respondents said that their firm had a rota for ‘own client’ police 
station call-outs which determined who was dispatched to the police station, 
and this was never determined by the gravity of the offence or age of the 
suspect.  They also said that most young people who commit low level 
offences and have no recorded antecedents usually requested the Duty 
Solicitor rather than a named solicitor or firm of solicitors, and consequently 
would be represented by an experienced solicitor.  
One unexpected result of the questionnaire however was that only two thirds 
of legal representatives believed that legal advice always contributed to a 
positive outcome for young people. In post-questionnaire interviews this was 
accounted for by the following reasons: 
• a lack of specialist knowledge amongst solicitors and accredited police 
station representatives about youth justice in general, and especially 
diversionary procedures – over half said that it was time consuming 
keeping up with the continual changes in this area of the law, and they 
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were aware of other practitioners whose specialist knowledge was 
probably inadequate; 
• exhaustion – many described onerous working conditions and 
excessively long working hours - which occasionally adversely 
affected the quality of their advice and representation at the police 
station; 
• occasional failure to make proper enquiry about any existing 
antecedents and eligibility for an out of court disposal at the police 
station; 
• professional obligations sometimes override what was in the best 
interests of a young person and they could not advise a young person 
to give a false account to the police, even it resulted in a less positive 
outcome.  
This last example would partly explain Skinns’ finding that young people have 
a higher chance of receiving an out of court disposal if unrepresented 
(Skinns, 2009a). Other research did however identify that some young 
people are making admissions in the absence of sufficient evidence and 
when there is no realistic prospect of conviction (Evans, 1993; Dixon et al, 
1990; Brown, 1997; Kemp et al, 2011), and had they not made an admission 
it was unlikely there would have been any sanction at all. Given this, the 
issuing of an out of court disposal should not always be assumed to be a 
positive outcome, and although the presence of legal advisors may 
sometimes lessen the likelihood of receiving a caution or other out of court 
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disposals, it may also may improve the likelihood of a decision to take No 
Further Action. 
The need for youth specialist legal representatives for young people who 
offend was evidenced during the interviews with legal representatives, as 
most appeared to have only a very basic knowledge of non-statutory informal 
out of court disposals, typically Youth Restorative Disposals and Community 
Resolutions. This may however not be unsurprising given these disposals are 
usually issued outside of the police station and ordinarily do not involve legal 
advisors, and at the time of the interviews the new provisions under LASPO 
had only just been implemented, and they were considerably less 
prescriptive concerning informal resolutions than the CDA. 
7.7 Inadequate pre-interview disclosure 
In contrast to the majority police view that legal advice was the primary 
reason young people did not make admissions and unnecessarily forfeited 
eligibility for an out of court disposal, more than three quarters of legal 
representatives expressed the view that inadequate pre-interview disclosure 
was the primary reason. An overwhelming majority of legal advisors felt that 
pre-interview disclosure was often inadequate or unreliable, and they 
routinely had to request and negotiate for access to an acceptable standard 
of pre-interview disclosure - even in circumstances where a low level offence 
had been committed and it was likely that a young person would receive an 
out of court disposal if they made an admission.  
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Interestingly, over two thirds of the police questionnaire responses said that 
the pre-interview disclosure they issued was an even mixture of written and 
verbal disclosure, whereas an almost identical number of legal advisors said 
it was predominantly written only. In follow-up interviews it did become 
apparent that more experienced police officers were likely to give far greater 
disclosure – both verbal and written – as well as show any CCTV footage or 
witness statements. The standard of pre-interview disclosure provided was 
however alleged by legal advisors to vary considerably - and more often than 
the police recognised - and was a highly discretionary police practice. 
Almost all legal advisors stated that adequate pre-interview disclosure and 
constructive dialogue concerning the possibility of a diversionary outcome 
was more likely to take place when experienced police officers were involved 
in the interview process - this is consistent with the majority views expressed 
by experienced officers. Many leg indicated that it was particularly difficult to 
obtain sufficient information about the strength of the prosecution evidence or 
the likelihood of a diversionary outcome when civilian interviewers were 
involved.  
As one legal advisor said: 
‘some [civilian interviewers] are often really antagonistic, they want to 
control all of the processes really tightly, and don’t want to engage 
with us at all. They want everything done on tape in the interview’ 
(ES1). 
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When the issue of inadequate pre-interview disclosure was put to the police 
and civilian interviewers in the interviews, their responses revealed a distinct 
divergence of opinion amongst them, and correlated with the legal advisor 
view that the quality of pre-interview disclosure a young person was likely to 
receive was dependent on the experience of the person interviewing them. 
More experienced officers accepted inadequate pre-interview disclosure may 
be a contributory factor, and indicated most of their early training had focused 
on the dangers of providing full disclosure and the need to control legal 
advisors and the interview. They did not recall any training concerning how to 
engage with legal representatives, young people or their Appropriate Adults 
about the possibility of a diversionary disposal. 
All experienced officers said as they had gained more experience they 
became more confident providing fuller pre-interview disclosure, and also 
more confident engaging in constructive pre-interview dialogue with legal 
representatives. They also said this experience enabled them to identify legal 
representatives who were unlikely to intentionally misconstrue any pre-
interview discussions about diversion. 
This experienced cohort also expressed a more pragmatic view about pre-
interview disclosure and dialogue with legal representatives concerning 
diversionary disposals. As one officer of the rank of Sergeant stated: 
‘I’m happy to chat to the defence and give them what they need. If I 
can get a confession then I don’t have to put together a file for court, 
and it’s much less of a hassle’ (EPO7). 
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This Sergeant however indicated that he/she now rarely interviewed young 
people who commit low level offences and this was primarily undertaken by 
civilian interviewers and junior police officers, which is a significant finding for 
this research, as young people were found to be more likely to be interviewed 
by less experienced police officers and civilian interviewers. 
Interviews with civilian interviewers corroborated the views expressed by 
legal representatives, and they accepted they were unlikely to provide full 
pre-interview disclosure or engage in any dialogue prior to an interview about 
the possibility of a diversionary disposal. Their responses revealed that their 
main goal was to control the interview process, they were reluctant to provide 
comprehensive pre-interview disclosure as they were concerned this would 
afford a suspect the opportunity to construct a defence, and preventing this 
was considered by most civilian interviewers as more important than securing 
an admission. 
Civilian interviewers revealed they were - irrespective of experience - also 
reluctant engage in pre-interview discussion about a diversionary disposal, 
and felt most comfortable engaging only during an interview, where all 
discussions were tape or video recorded.   
As one designated case interviewer stated: 
‘it’s my interview, and that’s where I’ll tell them what the evidence is. I 
want it on tape, on record, so that there’s no dispute (CI5).’ 
Given that a young person suspected of committing a low level offence was 
more likely to be interviewed by a civilian interviewer than an experienced 
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officer, this finding is of significance. It suggests that young people 
interviewed by civilian interviewers are likely to receive only partial pre-
interview disclosure, legal representatives are likely to be suspicious of the 
reliability of any disclosure from them, and there is unlikely to be any 
constructive engagement between civilian interviewers and legal 
representatives about a diversionary outcome. These factors may be a 
significant contributor to instances when a young person unnecessarily loses 
the opportunity for a caution. 
7.8 Police fears of inducement and difficulties explaining diversionary 
processes  
In response to the questionnaire more than a third of less experienced 
officers and over half of civilian interviewers said they ‘always’ felt unable to 
explain diversionary processes because they did not want to be accused of 
inducing an admission, and more than half of both these cohorts said they 
often found it difficult because it was a complicated procedure to explain to a 
young person.  
A small minority of less experienced officers and more than a quarter of 
civilian interviewers also said they never engaged in pre-interview 
discussions about diversion with young people, Appropriate Adults or legal 
advisors. These findings are remarkable given the policy guidance that 
diversionary procedures should be explained prior to an interview (Ministry of 
Justice, 2013f:4.8) 
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The confidence of police and civilian interviewers to adequately explain 
diversionary processes to young people was also notably divergent, and 
again commensurate with experience. Experienced officers expressed 
noticeably greater confidence in discussing the possibility of a diversionary 
disposal prior to an interview than less experienced officers and civilian 
interviewers. 
When asked in both the questionnaire and interview about any procedural 
changes which may better facilitate admissions and a diversionary outcome, 
the most common suggestion from police and civilian interviewers – including 
experienced officers – was that a pro-forma document should be generated 
which set out in plain and easily understood language the criterion and 
procedures for a young person to gain eligibility for an out of court disposal. 
Many of these respondents suggested in the interviews that it was a common 
expectation amongst lay people that eligibility for an out of court disposal was 
only dependent on age and gravity of the offence, with very few people 
aware of the mandatory admission criterion. 
Interestingly, almost all of the legal representatives expressed some 
sympathy for police and civilian interviewers concerning the complexity of 
explaining diversionary procedures without inducing an admission, and 
recognised the police were unfairly exposed to false allegations of 
inducement when attempting to explain prior to an interview diversionary 
processes. Additionally, there was no suggestion by any legal representative 
that they had experienced a police officer or civilian interviewers knowingly 
  Cushing, K., 2016, Chapter Seven 
293 
 
withholding information about diversionary procedures in order to improperly 
prevent a young person receiving an out of court disposal. 
Some legal representatives who also acted as Youth Court Duty Solicitors 
did however disclose a number of incidents where they believed that if 
diversionary procedures had been properly or better explained to young 
people who did not have the benefit of legal advice or representation, it would 
have most likely resulted in an admission and out of court disposal.  
7.9 The interviewing officer is not the decision maker – a barrier to 
admissions and diversion 
The interviews revealed that the interviewing officer was ordinarily not the 
decision maker concerning the eventual outcome for a young person who 
committed a low level offence, and they often played no part at all in that 
process. Decisions were instead usually made 2-3 weeks after the interview 
outside of the custody suite by a police officer or civilian employee seconded 
to an internal Youth Offending Team, and occasionally by a Case Director or 
the CPS.  
More than half of police respondents and a third of legal representatives 
suggested in interviews that this process made constructive pre-interview 
discussions concerning the possibility of a diversionary disposal difficult, and 
resulted in some young people unnecessarily losing the benefit of a 
diversionary disposal. 
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These responses were outside of the possible reasons suggested in the 
questionnaires, and had also not been identified in the literature review. One 
officer explained why he considered this process problematic, and said: 
‘I always say I don’t know when they [legal advisor or Appropriate 
Adult] ask about the possibility of a caution, and tell them I’m the 
interviewer, not the decision maker. No one will decide anyway before 
the interview even if I asked them, as this is the protocol…the Custody 
Sergeant should be able to decide and the lawyers talk to them 
directly’ (JPO5). 
An experienced solicitor similarly explained: 
‘in the days when the Custody Sergeant’s made the decisions at the 
police station there was usually a good discussion with them, and I felt 
far more confident advising kids to confess, as I had the guarantee 
that they would not get charged. I don’t even bother to ask now as 
there is no point. If Custody Sergeants were given this role back, I’m 
sure more kids would be advised to confess as it’s less of a gamble’ 
(ES1). 
When asked in the interviews what change or changes would better enable 
young people to make an admission and gain eligibility for diversion from the 
criminal justice system, almost three quarters of police and civilian 
interviewers said that decision making for low level offences committed by 
youths should be returned to the Custody Sergeant, and made as soon as 
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practicable after the police interview – ideally while the young person was still 
at the police station.  
There was a consensus amongst these respondents that this would not only 
expedite the decision making process, which was considered too long and 
bureaucratic, but would also increase the number of young people making 
admissions as legal advisors would be more likely to advise young people to 
make admissions if they could offer an assurance that there would be a 
diversionary disposal.  
Legal advisors similarly expressed a strong preference for decision making to 
be returned to Custody Sergeants, with more than half suggesting it would 
increase their ability to influence the decision making process, and 
consequently increase the numbers of young people receiving an out of court 
disposal. Many said that access to the decision maker was difficult as they 
were usually based at another police station, and decision makers were 
reluctant to engage in any dialogue with them prior to a determination. 
Funding problems were also cited by some legal advisors, who said unless a 
parent was in a position to fund private advice and representation, they were 
unlikely likely to make written representations or telephone calls to a decision 
maker to persuade them that an out of court disposal should be issued. 
7.10 Reluctance to implicate a co-suspect and fear of being a ‘grass’ 
The reluctance of young people to implicate a co-suspect was identified by 
both the police and legal representatives in the questionnaire as the second 
most likely reason why a young person does not make an admission and 
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unnecessarily loses the opportunity to receive an out of court disposal. This 
is an important finding given the existence of other research which suggests 
young people are far more likely than adults to offend with at least one other 
(Sharpe, et al, 2005; Smith and Bradshaw 2005) and it is the perception of 
many young people that answering police questions in an interview, or any 
other positive engagement with the police, exposes them to allegations of 
being a ‘grass’ (Evans et al, 1996) or a ‘snitch; (Clayman and Skinns, 2011). 
A number of police officers and legal representatives described similar 
instances when groups of young people had been arrested for ‘TWOC’ 
(Taking a motor vehicle Without Consent, contrary to section 12 of the Theft 
Act 1968), and all answered ‘no comment’ as none were willing to identify 
who the actual driver was. This was despite legal advice that forensic 
evidence would most likely establish who the driver was, and any passenger 
who made an admission would most likely receive an out of court disposal for 
the lesser offence of being carried in a stolen motor vehicle. Similarly, 
respondents described instances where young people had been involved in 
group violence or acts of criminal damage, and those young people with an 
easily identifiable lesser role who could have secured themselves a 
diversionary disposal refused to name or implicate the other offenders, and 
were consequently charged with the substantive offence. 
There is no discernible evidence however that these contributory factors 
have been considered by policy makers when mandating under the 
numerous statutory diversionary regimes that young people must make a 
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satisfactory admission in order to gain eligibility for an out of court disposal. 
There is additionally no identifiable research examining how these factors 
influence admission rates and case disposal by any academic, professional 
or interested agency. 
7.11 Cultural reasons and adolescent wilfulness 
Cultural reasons were ranked on average by legal advisors in the 
questionnaire as the fourth most likely reason young people unnecessarily 
fail to make an admission and forfeit eligibility for an out of court disposal. 
This was a broad category however which incorporated sub-themes of social, 
ethnic and gender. Less than a quarter of police and civilian interviewers 
however identified any cultural issues as a reason. 
The interviews sought to identify what any cultural reasons may be, and 
responses included:  
• a fear of being seen as a ‘grass’; 
• the ethos on certain local estates which discouraged engagement with 
the police under any circumstances; 
• a belief gained from the ‘street’ that it is best to ‘go no comment’ in 
every police interview; 
• race/ethnicity. 
Although fewer police and civilian interviewers considered this to be a factor 
than legal representatives, it is relevant that as a consequence of legal 
privilege they are ordinarily excluded entirely from the decision making 
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process concerning what answers, if any, a young person should give in their 
police interview. Given this, the views of legal representatives may arguably 
have more weight than police officers and civilian interviewers concerning 
these factors. 
A number of legal representatives described in the interviews examples 
where they had advised young people (mostly those aged 14-17 years) in the 
strongest of terms that there was sufficient evidence for a realistic prospect of 
conviction and an admission should be made to secure an out of court 
disposal, but this had been rejected by the young person because they held 
the firm and unshakeable view that ‘no comment’ answers should always be 
given.  
These discussions were in private and the subject of legal privilege, and 
many legal advisors said the police were most likely to have assumed that 
the ‘no comment’ answers were a consequence of legal advice. These 
scenarios were however described as being more likely when an Appropriate 
Adult had a lengthy criminal record, or the young person lived on one of the 
local estates which had high levels of socio-economic deprivation, or as a 
consequence of other cultural factors such as ethnicity.  
Some of these answers may however suggest that the option of ‘cultural 
reason’ in the questionnaire was too broad, as answers in the interviews 
disclosed that that having a parent with a criminal record or residence in a 
deprived neighbourhood was perhaps more of a demographic factor than a 
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cultural, although some respondents maintained that distinct behaviours 
could be ascribed to certain residential communities. 
Although most police officers believed that ‘no comment’ interviews were 
usually as a consequence of legal advice to a young person to exercise their 
right to silence, there was some recognition from civilian interviewers and 
police officers that there was also a culture of ‘no comment’ interviews 
amongst some young people. These occasions were usually considered to 
be a consequence of young people who had a parent with antecedents, or 
they resided in certain estates with higher than average levels of crime and 
social deprivation.  
The questionnaires and follow-up interviews also sought to examine whether 
the ethnic or racial profile of young people was ever considered to be a 
contributory factor when young people do not make an admission and 
unnecessarily forfeit an out of court disposal. There was little recognition from 
the police that this was ever a factor, with only a very small minority of 
respondents indicating they had experienced this scenario. Contrarily, just 
over half of legal advisors said they had experienced at least once young 
BME people rejecting their advice to make an admission knowing that this 
would forfeit a diversionary disposal. They believed the reasons for this were 
primarily associated with an adverse perception of the police and a refusal to 
engage with them. 
There was considerable variance amongst legal advisors though as to how 
often this happened, with almost equal numbers indicating they had either 
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experienced this only occasionally and this was not their routine experience, 
or they had witnessed this more much frequently when they had worked in 
other cities with a higher BME population. It was significant however that just 
under half of legal advisors said they had never experienced this at all and 
discounted it entirely as a possible factor. Given this, in areas with low BME 
populations this issue may be of less significance, and the research cohort 
for this thesis was not sufficiently broad for this issue to be examined 
adequately. 
Interestingly, one civilian interviewer, three police officers and one legal 
advisor described a separate cultural issue which had not been identified in 
the literature and questionnaire responses, and which may further explain 
why some young people do not make an admission when there is seemingly 
no advantage to them in not doing so. They all described separate instances 
when young girls from the Asian community suspected of committing low 
level offences denied any wrongdoing in their police interviews – often in the 
face of overwhelming evidence and putting forward illogical and nonsensical 
explanations – when their father acted as their Appropriate Adult.   
These respondents suspected that an admission may have resulted in 
severe disciplinary consequences at a later date from either family or 
community, and as such these girls were more likely to assert their 
innocence rather than make an admission and gain a diversionary disposal. 
None of the respondents who raised this issue described any of these girls 
ever articulating any fear or objecting to their father acting as their 
Appropriate Adult.  
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These responses led to further a literature review concerning offending by 
Asian girls in England and Wales, and these responses appear 
commensurate with other research which found that key dynamics of Asian 
culture often impose on girls a uniquely high standard of moral regulation and 
cultural responsibility, and any criminality by them transgresses dynamics of 
family honour (‘izzat’) and shame (‘sharam’) (Toor, 2009). Given that an 
admission to an offence – even a minor offence - may thus result in 
significant cultural marginalisation and/or disproportionately punitive 
punishment, it should perhaps not be unsurprising that this cohort has been 
identified by some respondents as less likely to make an admission than 
others. There is no other identifiable research however which explores this 
possibility. 
Adolescent wilfulness was also accepted by some respondents as 
occasionally a reason why some young people either exercised their right to 
silence or lied about their offending, though this was considered more likely 
by the police than legal representatives. Many civilian interviewers and police 
respondents described instances when young people behaved belligerently 
whilst in custody and during the interview process, and refused to engage 
constructively. It became apparent during the interviews however that these 
accounts were mostly representative of 14-17 year olds in police custody, 
and was less of an issue with 10-13 years-olds - who were instead described 
as more likely to be emotional rather than uncooperative. 
This younger group was also described by some respondents from all 
research cohorts as more likely to lie about their offending than older youths, 
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and more likely to give an account which although acknowledged some 
wrongdoing, substantially minimised their own culpability. This is consistent 
with the body of other research which identified young people engaging in 
‘cognitive distortions’ or ‘non-veridical beliefs’ (Palmer, 2004:102) as a 
psychological defence mechanism. This has also been variously described 
as: 
• ‘shame displacement’ (Scheuerman and Keith, 2015); 
• ‘tempering’, ‘reduced graduation’, ‘heteroglassic distancing’, ‘ideational 
perspective’ (Zappavigna, 2007); 
• ‘neutralisation theory’ (Sykes and Matza, 1957); and 
• ‘egocentric bias’ (Lickona, 1983).  
7.12 Appropriate Adults 
There was considerable divergence between the police/civilian interviewers 
and legal representatives concerning who was best placed to act as an 
Appropriate Adult, and whether this influenced in any way whether a young 
person made an admission. 
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Figure 2 Respondents’ perceptions of who is best to perform the role of 
the Appropriate Adult 
Significantly, far more legal representatives than police and civilian 
interviewers expressed in the questionnaires the belief that Appropriate 
Adults who were co-ordinated and provided by YOS/Social Services were 
better able to perform this role, however a majority of police and civilian 
interviewers believed that parents were the most suited to perform this role.  
There was a majority response from legal representatives in follow-up 
interviews that when a parent was an Appropriate Adult they often tried to 
influence what account their child should give, and young people rarely made 
their own decision as to what, if anything, to say in their police interview.  
A majority of legal representatives also asserted that if a parent had never 
been in a police interview before, they often encouraged their child to make 
an admission in order to appear co-operative and a good citizen, and they 
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were not capable of adequately assessing whether there was sufficient 
evidence in the first place. Conversely, if the parent had a number of 
antecedents they were more likely to tell their child to answer ‘no comment’.  
Legal advisors were also considerably more likely than the police and civilian 
interviewers to feel that parents were routinely not capable of adequately 
performing the role of Appropriate Adult, and often found the experience 
distressing. This is commensurate with other research findings that parents 
often perceive their role is to assist the police and not their child, and have 
reported feelings of fear and disorientation by the custody experience, 
despite not technically being detained themselves (Evans, 1993; Dixon et al, 
1990; Brown, 1997; Kemp et al, 2011). 
With the exception of the issue concerning Appropriate Adults for Asian girls 
(which was raised by a small number of respondents), the police were 
considerably more positive about parents acting as Appropriate Adults than 
legal advisors in their survey responses. In follow-up interviews it became 
apparent that the police were primarily positive about parents or other family 
members acting as Appropriate Adults only when they were of good 
character or had very old/unrelated antecedents, otherwise they preferred 
YOS/Social Services to undertake this role. 
A majority of police respondents however felt that parents were faster at 
attending the police station than YOS/Social Services, who were perceived 
as taking too long to attend and delayed the interview and detention process. 
Just under half of less experienced officers and civilian interviewers also said 
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they found some YOS officers who acted as Appropriate Adults hostile and 
anti-police.  
Legal advisors however expressed an overwhelmingly strong view that 
YOS/Social Services were more capable of performing the role of 
Appropriate Adult than parents, said they usually provided additional and 
helpful explanations concerning legal jargon and procedural matters, and 
were often able to make their own valuable assessment of the evidence and 
whether a young person should make an admission or exercise their right to 
silence. They also described YOS/Social Service officers who acted as 
Appropriate Adults as confident in facilitating some type of diversionary 
outcome with the police, and would often take on responsibility for this task 
post interview and make subsequent representations to decision makers 
after the legal advisor had ceased involvement. 
Many legal advisors also said that young people appeared calmer and better 
behaved during their detention and police interview when they were assisted 
by YOS/Social Services rather than their parent, and when YOS/Social 
Services were present the police were more courteous to young people, but 
also, significantly, to legal advisors. A common theme was that legal advisors 
found their own experiences more positive when a representative of 
YOS/Social Services acted as an Appropriate Adult rather than a parent – 
though it was not apparent whether this had any impact on admission rates. 
A majority of legal advisors however agreed with the police view that 
YOS/Social Services were unduly slow at attending the police station, and 
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were often responsible for delays in interviewing and releasing a young 
person from the police station. Many said that for minor offences and also 
when a young person was not known to YOS the delays waiting for their 
attendance were often so considerable that the police eventually had to bail a 
young person from custody without an interview, to return at a later date. 
These views are commensurate with other findings which were critical of the 
excessive detention of young people in custody as a consequence of waiting 
for a YOS arranged Appropriate Adult (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 
2011; Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, 2015). 
It had been anticipated that more respondents may have expressed a 
positive view concerning trained volunteers acting as Appropriate Adults.  In 
follow-up interviews it became apparent however that in this region there 
were very few trained volunteers, and most respondents had no or minimal 
experience of them. The positive responses to them in the questionnaires 
were found to be theoretical only.  
7.13 Pressures of arrest and detention 
This research has focused on a narrow cohort – young people who commit a 
low level offence, there is sufficient evidence for a realistic prospect of 
conviction, they have no or few antecedents, and if an admission is made 
they ordinarily would be eligible for an out of court disposal. In these 
circumstances, there should usually be no necessity to arrest or detain these 
young people in custody, as there is unlikely to be any no immediacy or 
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necessity in securing their detention, and the majority should be dealt with as 
volunteers outside of the custody suite. 
This research found that according to all of the respondents, about half of all 
young people who eventually receive a Youth Caution or YCC are usually 
arrested and interviewed in the custody suite. The remainder are usually 
interviewed as a volunteer at the police station in a room outside of the 
custody suite, though about a tenth are interviewed either 
contemporaneously or later at home.   
An understanding of these processes within the context of why some young 
people do not make an admission would add considerable depth to current 
knowledge, given that:  
‘Whilst it continues to be the case that the “trial starts at the police 
station”, increasingly that is where the trial will effectively take place 
and the sentence imposed’ (Cape, 2006: v; Jackson 2001). 
Responses from the questionnaires and interviews disclosed that when a 
YRD or Community Resolution was issued, only around a tenth of young 
people were arrested and subjected to a PACE interview in the custody suite, 
and it was unlikely that a formal PACE interview took place at all. Informal 
questioning instead usually either took place at the police station but outside 
of the custody suite, contemporaneously, or at home.  
Although there is a substantial body of research which has found that young 
people subjected to the processes of arrest, detention in police custody and a 
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formal PACE interview often experience considerable fear and distress 
(Evans, 1993; Brookman & Pierpoint, 2003; Evans and Ferguson, 1991), 
when a young person makes an admission under these conditions research 
and case law has primarily focused on the separate issue of whether this was 
a false confession due to these pressures (Gudjonsson, 1984, 1992, 2003). 
There is no known research which explores the alternative scenario, namely 
that they did not make an admission when it was seemingly in their best 
interests to do so, and if not why. 
Follow-up interviews with police officers and legal representatives suggest 
that there were remarkably divergent police practices concerning whether a 
young person who was suspected of committing a low level offence would be 
arrested or interviewed in the custody suite, and police officers had wide and 
seemingly unsupervised discretion as to how they processed these young 
people. The experience of police officers also made no identifiable difference 
to whether an arrest would take before a police interview, or where the 
interview would take place. 
Some police officers expressed a strong view that they would usually arrest 
any suspect, irrespective of age, and process them according to PACE 
procedures in the custody suite – this was considered more time efficient as 
the interview could be delegated to a civilian interviewer and they could 
return to more important duties, and it also ensured all procedures were 
properly recorded. Some of these officers felt that this process was also an 
efficient way of ensuring the rights of young people were protected – as 
unlike a contemporaneous interview they were guaranteed the right to free 
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legal advice - and processing a young person through the custody suite was 
also an additional safeguard against unfounded complaints against 
themselves or colleagues. 
Other police officers however said that how they proceeded in these 
circumstances was usually dependent on the age of the young person, and 
they were less likely to arrest a young person aged between 10-13 years who 
had committed a low level offence, and would endeavour to interview them 
either contemporaneously, at home, or at the police station but outside of the 
custody suite. These officers either felt that the custody suite was not an 
appropriate place for these young children, or they had no opinion but 
understood that Custody Sergeants’ wanted all efforts made not to bring very 
young people into the custody suite unless absolutely necessary. These 
officers said however that they were more likely to arrest 14-17 year-olds and 
process them through the custody suite as if they were an adult. 
Civilian interviewers play no part in the arrest process and were exclusively 
based at the police station with the primary task of interviewing suspects, and 
said they usually interviewed young people aged 10-13 years either in the 
custody suite or in a side room, and these young people often attended via 
prior arrangement with their parent, or family member as their Appropriate 
Adult. Civilian interviewers mostly said they had a preference for interviewing 
this cohort outside of the custody suite and had established a tape/DVD 
recording facility in a side room for that purpose. When an interview did take 
place in the custody suite, it was usually because a young person had 
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requested legal representation and it was easier to facilitate this if they were 
taken there, as they understood the Duty Solicitor scheme did not apply to 
volunteers interviewed outside of the custody suite.  
The act of entering the custody suite however usually resulted in many young 
people being arrested, despite often having attended the police station via 
prior arrangement as a volunteer, and with no discernible necessity in 
securing their detention. The civilian interviewers indicated that they 
understood this was the routine procedure when any suspect was 
interviewed in the custody suite and was necessary to generate a custody 
record, facilitate access to the Duty Solicitor Scheme, and also ensure that all 
procedures were carried out correctly whilst the young person was in the 
custody suite. This is an erroneous understanding of the law by this cohort 
(Edwards, 2009; Richardson v Chief Constable of West Midlands [2011] 
EWHC 773).  
One of the most interesting findings from the interviews exploring this issue 
was that a majority of police and civilian respondents said that those young 
people who were not arrested or interviewed at the police station were more 
likely to receive an informal disposal, such as an admonishment, or an 
informal but recordable disposal - at that time a Youth Restorative Disposal 
(YRD) and then amended to Community Resolutions.  
On the face of it, these findings suggest that the act of arresting a young 
person, irrespective of their age or the gravity of the offence, is the primary 
factor which propels them towards more formal procedures – and subjects 
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them to the rigid and mandatory admission criterion. However, it is of 
significance that YRDs and Community Resolutions are intended for very 
minor offences and as such an arrest is unlikely to have taken place, which 
suggests offence gravity may be the primary determinant as to whether a 
young person is subject to the statutory admission criterion or not, and more 
or less likely to receive an informal disposal. The effect of an arrest arguably 
still acts as a trajectory towards a more formal or punitive outcome in certain 
cases however. 
The fact that the majority of legal advisors had little or no knowledge of YRDs 
or Community Resolutions is indicative that when legal advisors are involved 
a young person is less likely to receive an informal disposal. However, this 
may not necessarily be as a direct consequence of their lack of knowledge 
about these procedures, but rather because YRDs and Community 
Resolutions are often issued outside of the police station and without the 
involvement of legal advisors at any stage in those processes at all. 
The significant finding for the purposes of this research is that the rigid and 
arguably onerous admission criterion does not apply to YRDs and 
Community Resolutions, and the respondents advised the usual 
requirements for eligibility were an acceptable standard of general remorse 
and a willingness to engage in any suitable restorative process. 
Consequently, if a young person could avoid arrest they appeared to have a 
greater chance of circumventing the admission criterion, and thus more likely 
to receive an informal disposal.  
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This research also sought to identify whether detention in police custody and 
a formal PACE interview influenced whether a young person made an 
admission or not. The majority of all police officers and civilian interviewers 
accepted that detention in police custody and a PACE interview could often 
be a frightening experience for those aged 10-13 years, but less so for 14-17 
years who were described as appearing to cope sufficiently.  
None of the police officers or civilian interviewers accepted other research 
findings that police used these processes as a ‘frightener’ (Brookman & 
Pierpoint, 2003), although some accepted that these processes were 
inevitably salutary. All respondents said when low level offences were 
committed by young people they tried to ensure the processes were as 
expeditious and sensitive as possible. Less than a tenth of these 
respondents accepted the proposition in the questionnaire that the stresses 
of detention in police custody and a PACE interview may adversely affect the 
answers a young person gives in their police interview or prevent them from 
making an admission. 
A third of legal representative questionnaire responses did however accept 
that although the police did not intentionally use detention in custody as a 
‘frightener’, some young people did not make admissions because they were 
too distressed or scared. In follow-up interviews though most legal 
representatives said that police and civilian interviewers usually treated 
young people who had committed low level offences with sensitivity, kept the 
interviews very brief - often no more than 20 minutes on average - and 
usually asked age-appropriate questions. Legal advisors were however 
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considerably more critical of detention and interview processes for young 
people aged 16 and 17 years, as well as younger youths who were recidivist 
offenders, and any youth suspected of committing a serious offence. 
Four legal advisors said in follow-up interviews that another determinant of 
police treatment was often the attitude and demeanour of a young person, 
and young people who committed low level offences who were ostensibly 
eligible for an out of court disposal were more likely to be subjected to a more 
hostile and robust interview if they were behaving belligerently. Young people 
who were generally uncooperative or truculent during their arrest, detention 
or police interview were also considered by legal advisors as more likely to lie 
about their offending and deny any wrongdoing and consequently risk losing 
an out of court disposal.  
An overwhelming majority of all police and civilian interviewer respondents 
were positive about the benefits of street bail - police powers to bail a 
suspect immediately after arrest to attend a police station at a later date – 
and believed this had the potential to keep young people out of the custody 
suite initially, and improve the likelihood of an out of court disposal being 
issued. For policy reasons however this Police Force Region has not 
sanctioned the use of any of the street bail provisions under section 4 of 
Criminal Justice Act 2003 (as amended ss.30A to 30D of PACE), and it was 
rarely used.  
In follow-up interviews many legal advisors said that although they were 
supportive in principle of street bail, they were concerned that this unduly 
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increased the already wide discretionary powers available to the police, and 
may adversely prevent access to legal advice and assistance. One legal 
representative was especially critical, and of the firm view that the only way a 
young person’s rights could be properly protected was in the custody suite. 
These views are commensurate with a subsequent publication from an 
eminent defence lawyer/academic which argues for the abolishment of street 
bail (Cape, 2016). 
7.14 The age of a young person and their ability to articulate an admission 
Analysis of current literature and case law (as discussed throughout Chapter 
Six) suggests that the standard of admission required from a young person 
has become increasingly onerous, with the expectation that young people 
make a clear and reliable or clear and unambiguous admission to all 
elements of the offence. This onerous criterion applies equally to all young 
people, with no distinction concerning the cognitive maturation which takes 
place between 10 and 17 years of age. 
This research sought to explore the views of professionals involved in the 
interview and diversionary processes concerning whether age impacted on a 
young person’s ability to understand and articulate an admission. No 
respondents answered that young people from either cohort were ‘always’ 
able to understand the legal elements of an offence or articulate a 
satisfactory admission. Over half however said in follow-up interviews 
however that this response would have been the same for adult suspects. 
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Over two thirds of police and civilian interviewers said that 10-13 year olds 
were ‘usually’ able to understand legal elements and articulate a satisfactory 
admission, a fifth said ‘rarely’ and a small minority said they did not know. 
None felt that 10-13 year olds were ‘never’ able to, but there was recognition 
that they were more reliant on better explanations and simpler questioning. 
There was no identifiable distinction in these responses between 
experienced and less experienced officers or civilian interviewers.  
These responses were broadly similar in relation to 14-17 year olds, with 
more than three quarters answering ‘usually’, and a small majority answering 
‘rarely’, or did not know. None of the respondents said ‘never’. When asked 
however whether there was any discernible distinction between 13 year olds 
and 14 year olds, all respondents indicated there was likely to be very little.  
The questionnaire responses from legal representatives however diverged 
considerably from those of the police and civilian interviewers, with a quarter 
saying that 10-13 year olds ‘never’ understood the legal elements of an 
offence and cannot articulate a satisfactory admission, and the remaining 
three quarters saying this cohort could only ‘rarely’ do this. In relation to 14-
17 year olds, just over half said they could ‘usually’, one quarter said ‘rarely’ 
and another quarter said never.  
In follow-up interviews many legal representatives said it was artificial to 
attempt to distinguish these factors through age alone, as there were many 
other variables, including maturity, life experience, and any previous 
experience of a police interview. Somewhat surprisingly, not one respondent 
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from any cohort voluntarily suggested mental health issues as an additional 
factor, though most accepted this was a probable factor when asked in the 
interviews. 
A small number of police officers and civilian interviewers - about a tenth -
frequently misunderstood the question ‘are young people able to adequately 
understand the legal elements of the offence they are alleged to have 
committed’ and substituted or confused it with an entirely different 
proposition, namely ‘do young people know right from wrong’. These 
respondents were seemingly disinterested whether a young person 
understood legal definitions or whether they were able to articulate a 
satisfactory admission, and held the very firm view that young people almost 
always knew whether they had been naughty or not, and the real issue was 
whether they were prepared to admit to this.  
Police officers with five or more years’ experience however were far more 
likely to acknowledge that young people sometimes found making a 
satisfactory admission difficult as a consequence of their insufficient 
knowledge or understanding of the legal elements of an offence, and their 
inability to articulate a clear and reliable admission. One officer {EPO5] said 
that the legal issue of joint enterprise was especially difficult for young people 
to understand, and they sometimes did not make a satisfactory admission 
when their role in a group offence was peripheral, as they did not understand 
they may also be guilty of the substantive offence. 
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An overwhelming majority – almost four fifths - of police and civilian 
interviewers however said they tried to interpret the answers young people 
gave in their police interviews as generously as possible, and to make 
allowance for the fact that young people – especially very young - cannot be 
expected to understand complex legal issues. Over four fifths also said that 
when a young person who had committed a low level offence made a general 
admission of some wrongdoing, appeared contrite and was willing to accept 
a diversionary outcome, they would either ‘turn a blind eye’, ‘ignore’ or 
‘generously interpret’ any answers which were technically exculpatory. Legal 
advisors similarly said they would not usually make representations against a 
diversionary disposal in these circumstances, and would only do so if a 
positive defence or denial was raised.  
These responses suggest that decision makers may be routinely 
disregarding the onerous standard of admission required from young people 
in order to facilitate as many diversionary disposals as possible, and often 
substitute the statutory admission criterion with a more flexible criterion. The 
lesser criterion requires only that some wrongdoing is acknowledged, some 
remorse is shown and there is a willingness to engage in a diversionary 
disposal. Although this is ostensibly a benevolent interpretation of the 
statutory criterion, it is also a highly discretionary practice which may not be 
exercised equitably, and prioritises the demeanour of a young person over 
the statutory admission criterion. This is a significant finding for the purposes 
of this research. 
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7.15 The Youth Conditional Caution criterion 
The secondary analysis of the literature identified a significant anomaly 
between the admission criterion for Youth Cautions, which requires a clear 
and reliable admission before a decision is made as to whether a young 
person is eligible for this disposal, and YCCs. This latter provision does not 
require an admission to be made during a formal police interview under 
caution, or to be made prior to the determination that a YCC can be a 
suitable disposal. By vitiating the traditional need for a ‘clear and reliable 
admission’, and for a young person to demonstrate ‘early frankness’, the 
YCC criterion is arguably the most radical revision to youth justice 
diversionary practices since the formalisation of police cautioning in the 
1970s. Very little literature seems to recognise this however. 
The YCC scheme was in its pilot stage when the questionnaire and follow-up 
interviews were completed, and there were notable differences between the 
draft Code for YCCs which the questionnaire referred to, and the final Code 
implemented in 2013 ((Ministry of Justice, 2013b). The first draft of the Code 
suggested that no admission was necessary, however the final draft included 
an admission criterion but only at the point of issue. The findings from the 
questionnaire and follow-up interviews must thus be considered in this 
context, and that the research questions no longer reflect the current law. 
It was also apparent during follow-up interviews with legal representatives 
that less than a fifth had an understanding or knowledge of what YCCs were, 
and the remainder were only familiar with Adult Conditional Cautions and had 
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assumed YCCs were identical. This can perhaps be accounted for given 
YCCs were only then in the early stages of implementation, and also the 
acknowledgement from many legal representatives their excessive work load 
made maintaining an adequate professional knowledge in youth justice 
practice and procedure difficult. 
When YCCs were explained to legal representatives in the follow-up 
interviews, almost all responded that in principle this regime should be 
extended to Youth Cautions. The validity of these responses must however 
be considered in the wider context of a deficit of knowledge and experience 
of YCCs and youth justice procedures generally. 
All civilian interviewers and police officers were however familiar with the 
YCC protocols and the changes to the admission regime, although none 
expressed confidence that they knew them well or to a satisfactory standard, 
as this was the primary task of decision makers and not interviewing officers. 
Almost all indicated however that YCCs were seemingly having little effect on 
any local practice, as decision makers were not comfortable offering a YCC 
unless an admission had been made in a police interview, and none were 
aware of any occasion where one had been offered in the absence of an 
admission in a police interview. 
Just over half of civilian interviewers and police officers indicated that they 
thought extending the YCC protocols to other diversionary practices was a 
good idea and about a third said they found this objectionable either because 
it would be impracticable to implement or because a suspect, even a youth, 
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should make an admission at the earliest opportunity. The remainder were 
undecided. 
This research was thus untimely for an examination of the practical 
application of YCCs, as the YCC regime was only a pilot scheme and at the 
very early stages of implementation. The only real findings which can be 
drawn are that legal representatives and the police were mostly positive 
about the YCC protocol replacing the admission criterion for Youth Cautions, 
however a minority of police officers had objections on either ideological or 
practical grounds.  
7.16 Opportunities to make an admission 
This research found that police and civilian case interviewers were 
overwhelmingly positive about the diversion of young people who commit low 
level offences from court by way of both formal and informal measures. They 
were also overwhelmingly willing to offer young people a further interview 
post-charge to make an admission, which is contrary to case law which 
encourages police forces not to do so in order to facilitate ‘early frankness’ 
(R. (on the application of F) v Crown Prosecution Service and Chief 
Constable of Merseyside Police [2003] EWHC 3266). Only two police 
responses were overtly negative about diversionary outcomes, with those 
officers of the view that out of court disposals often lacked sufficient rigour or 
punishment, failed to adequately compensate victims or acknowledge their 
suffering, and were outside of public consensus concerning how youth crime 
should be dealt with. 
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One surprising finding was that civilian case interviewers were more willing 
than police officers to offer more than one interview so that an admission 
could be made and a diversionary disposal secured, even post-charge. 
Almost all civilian interviewers said they would ‘always’ offer a second 
interview post charge. One civilian interviewer said: 
‘I’d like to think I would always give young kids a second chance’ 
(CI4), 
and another said: 
 ‘Ultimately, we’re here to help them (CI1)’. 
These answers were on the face of it inconsistent with the other research 
findings that the practices of civilian case interviewers may in fact hinder a 
diversionary outcome, given their reluctance to provide adequate pre-
interview disclosure and engage in pre-interview discussions with legal 
representatives about the possibility of diversion (as discussed at paragraph 
7.7). During the interview process it was apparent that most civilian 
interviewers did not recognise the inconsistency between some of their 
practices and their positive views of diversion.   
Not one police officer answered that they would ‘always’ agree to offer 
second interview for a young person who had initially denied an offence, 
however two thirds said that they would ‘usually’ agree to a second interview 
if there was a ‘good reason’. In follow-up interviews these reasons were held 
to be: 
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• the young person had genuinely not realised they needed to make an 
admission to receive an out of court disposal; 
• the young person had received poor legal advice or had been unduly 
influenced by their Appropriate Adult; 
• the young person had displayed subsequent genuine remorse; 
• the CPS advised them to offer a second interview or the case would 
be discontinued on public interest grounds. 
When questioned further concerning whether it would make any difference 
whether a young person had answered ‘no comment’, lied about their 
offending or put forward an inadequate admission in their first interview, the 
majority of police officers said this would make little difference. The primary 
reasons they would not offer a re-interview were when a young person had 
been especially belligerent or unpleasant during their detention or interview, 
or because they believed they had answered ‘no comment’ in order to ‘play 
the system’ and wait to see if there was enough evidence before they made 
an admission. 
Almost a third of police officers however said they would ‘never’ offer a 
second interview post-charge, and these responses were all from officers 
with less than 5 years’ experience. Their reasons included: 
• this would establish a precedent that young people could play the 
system; 
• it was a waste of police resources; 
• those who make an early admission should always benefit the most; 
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• annoyance as a full file had most likely been prepared for court, and 
this was a time consuming process. 
Legal advisors consistently expressed frustration that decisions to offer a re-
interview post-charge were variable and inconsistent. Almost all said they 
had experienced requests for re-interviews refused for reasons which they 
found either illogical or unduly harsh, but on other occasions they were very 
easy to facilitate.  None said they had sought to appeal or judicially review 
any of the decisions they considered illogical because it was an onerous and 
complex task, and they believed usually had little prospect of success.  
7.17 Views of stakeholders as to whether the admission criterion is 
necessary 
All respondents were asked in their interviews whether an admission was 
necessary in order for a young person who has committed a low level offence 
to secure a diversionary disposal (question 11 of both interview schedules). 
This same question was also asked in the questionnaire (question 28 police 
and question 43 legal advisors). An overwhelming majority - more than three 
quarters - of police and civilian interviewers held the view that some form of 
admission should be made, but significantly, felt that the type of admission 
required should be broadened, and include an acceptable demonstration of 
remorse or contrition, or a general acceptance of wrongdoing. The 
advantages of retaining some form of admission criterion were cited as 
primarily its practical advantages during the diversionary process, for 
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example it is suggestive of a young person’s willingness to participate in any 
diversionary package, and likely success of a restorative initiative. 
Legal advisor responses were almost equally divided however between 
abolishing the admission criterion entirely on the grounds that it is too 
onerous and often unnecessary, and alternatively retaining it but broadening 
the range and types of admission required. These latter views were virtually 
identical to the majority police responses, and it is a significant finding that 
these respondents were supportive of practice operating in Canada, The 
Republic of Ireland and New Zealand, namely a standard of admission which 
only requires a general ‘acceptance of responsibility’. It is also significant that 
these respondents were critical of the current statutory admission criterion 
currently in operation under LASPO (Chapter 6.28). 
7.18 Need for further research?  
Analysis of the development of the admission criterion within diversionary 
practices identified the absence of any known research concerning the 
historical and current admission criterion, as well as a dearth of statistical 
evidence concerning how many young people unnecessarily lose the benefit 
of an out of court disposal for the sole reason that they do not make an 
admission.  
There is additionally almost no research or evidence as to how often this 
happens and for what reason. Although the research undertaken for this 
thesis identified that the admission criterion was considered too onerous and 
unnecessary by a majority of respondents, and did result in lost opportunities 
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for diversionary outcomes, it was also – and contrarily – often ignored, with 
decision makers focusing instead on other highly discretionary factors, 
primarily the demeanour of a young person during their police interview. Of 
potential significance was also the absence of any comment or apparent 
concern by any of the respondents as to whether the admission criterion is 
compliant with statutory welfare and human rights considerations (Chapters 5 
and 6.12).  
There is arguably potential for other quantitative research which could 
determine how many young people who commit low level offences 
unnecessarily lose the benefit of an out of court disposal for the sole reason 
that they fail to make an admission, and for what reasons. Much of this data 
(as discussed at Chapter 3.9) - custody records, police interview tapes, 
witness statements and court records - could conceivably be collated from 
information adduced by the police, YOS, the CPS and Her Majesty’s Court 
Service (the Youth Court).  
There are also identifiable opportunities for other probative qualitative 
research - primarily by way of interviews with young people and their 
Appropriate Adult about their experiences in custody and their police 
interview, and why they did not make an admission. This would most likely 
add considerable erudition to these research findings, any other quantitative 
data which could be gathered, and well as to wider knowledge in this field. 
Interviews with those who act as Appropriate Adults would also be likely to 
add similar value.  For ethical reasons (as set out at Chapter 3.8) it was not 
possible to undertake this quantitative research.
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8.0 CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION 
8.1 Summary of primary research findings 
Analysis of the views of police officers, civilian interviewers and legal 
advisors from the questionnaires and interviews, within the parameters of 
reflective action research and framework analysis (as discussed at Chapters 
3.2 and 3.7) identified a number of significant thematic trends.  
These trends must be considered however within the broader context that the 
research cohort was a small number from only one county, and there is a 
substantial body of evidence that disparate diversionary practices operate 
throughout England and Wales (Bateman, 2002; Goldson, 2010). The 
thematic trends from this research may not be reflective therefore of 
practices in other regions of England and Wales, or even other regions within 
this one county.  
Given however the absence of any other similar research, these findings are 
arguably still probative and contribute further knowledge to this little 
researched and understood area of youth justice. 
Identifiable thematic trends include: 
(i) Almost all respondents were of the view that some young people do 
unnecessarily lose the benefit of a diversionary disposal because they 
unnecessarily fail to make an admission. 
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(ii) Less experienced police and civilian interviewers primarily believe this to 
be because of inadequate legal advice. 
(iii) More experienced police officers however believe this to be because of 
the difficulties the police have in explaining diversionary procedures without 
inducing an admission, as well as a consequence of a lack of awareness by 
most people of the importance of the admission criterion. 
(iv) Legal advisors believe that inadequate pre-interview disclosure is the 
primary cause, and this is a highly variable, unregulated and discretionary 
practice. 
(v) Young people who commit low level offences are more likely to be 
interviewed by civilian interviewers and less experienced police officers, and 
these two cohorts are less willing or able than experienced police officers to 
provide comprehensive pre-interview disclosure or engage in constructive 
dialogue about the possibility of diversion before an interview. Civilian 
interviewers were also especially hostile toward engagement with legal 
advisors. 
(vi) A significant majority of all police officers and civilian interviewers had a 
positive view about the benefits of diversion for young people who commit 
low level offences, and many are willing to offer more than one opportunity 
for an admission to be made, despite case law discouraging this practice. 
(vii) A significant majority of all respondents believed that there should be 
some form of admission or recognition of guilt by a young person, but the 
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current statutory admission criterion should be substituted with a less 
rigorous criterion. The most common suggested alternative was that a young 
person demonstrates an adequate acceptance of responsibility, similar to the 
models operating in Canada, The Republic of Ireland and New Zealand. 
(viii) A significant majority of all respondents believed that more admissions 
and diversionary outcomes would be facilitated if decision making was 
returned to Custody Sergeants. 
(ix) A significant number of all respondents believed there needs to be 
improved guidance for the police so that they can explain the importance of 
the admission criterion without risking inducing an admission. 
(x) Legal representatives require more support in maintaining a satisfactory 
standard of knowledge concerning youth justice diversionary practices, but 
they are overwhelmingly in favour of diversionary outcomes. 
(xi) Police officers and civilian interviewers often favourably interpret the 
answers young people give in their police interviews as a satisfactory 
admission if the young person demonstrates an appropriately co-operative 
and remorseful demeanour. Although ostensibly benevolent, this is an 
unregulated, discretionary and sub-judicial practice which is potentially highly 
discriminatory.  
8.2 Historical Perspective 
Notwithstanding the almost continual ‘circular motions’ (Goldson, 2013a:3) 
concerning diversionary practices, at present there is general consensus that 
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diversion is a desirable outcome for young people with no or few antecedents 
who commit low level offences, and this disposal now accounts for over a 
third of outcomes for detected youth offending (Youth Justice Board, 2015). 
Given this, it is arguably timely that the admission criterion is examined as an 
impediment to diversion. 
Despite the fact that out of court disposals have always been a central tenet 
of youth justice practice and procedure, the development of the mandatory 
admission criterion within diversionary processes has largely been 
overlooked by academics, professionals and the judiciary. This thesis has 
sought to identify the gaps in current academic and professional knowledge 
concerning whether some young people unnecessarily lose the opportunity to 
receive an out of court disposal because of this criterion, and if so, for what 
reasons. 
Original secondary analysis of existing white and grey literature, policy 
documents and case law, supplemented by original primary research, 
endeavoured to identify why, how and when the admission criterion became 
central to diversionary processes, what standard of admission is currently 
expected of young people who offend, whether the mandatory admission 
criterion is a necessary, proportionate or reasonable pre-requisite for young 
people who commit low level offences, how is the admission criterion 
understood and implemented by relevant professionals, and what 
amendments or alternatives may better enable the diversion of young people 
who offend from formal processes. 
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Chapter Four examined the development of the police caution and the notion 
that trivial and minor offences committed by young people has not always 
necessitated a prosecution, and this is an historical feature of criminal justice 
processes in England and Wales (Sharpe, et al, 1980) until the late twentieth 
century. Alternatives to formal procedures developed spontaneously and at 
different times throughout England and Wales (Dingwall and Harding, 1998), 
and regional police forces developed of their own volition the practice of 
informal and formal police cautioning, though this was often in conflict with 
the efforts of the magistracy to retain jurisdiction over young people who 
offend, and was not immediately embraced by all forces (Tutt and Giller, 
1983).  
This highly discretionary sub-judicial practice became by the early twentieth 
century a conventional but non-statutory police function (Emsley 1983), and 
considered by most (but not all) as an enlightened and pragmatic model of 
police practice, which improved recidivism, reduced congestion in the Youth 
Court, introduced compassion into often harsh processes, and despite the 
absence of supervision or other statutory safeguards was believed to be 
generally used wisely (Lord Bingham in R. v Durham Constabulary and 
another ex parte R [2005] UKHL 21). 
This practice was never universally supported however, and critics argued it 
criminalised many youthful behaviours which ordinarily would have been 
dealt with informally, regional variations in its use were often unacceptably 
high, it usurped the proper role of the magistracy, allowed repeat offenders to 
act with impunity, and was too highly discretionary and improperly permitted 
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excessive police control over young street populations (Bottoms, et al, 1970; 
Goldson, 2000; Bateman, 2002). The absence of clarity as to what diversion 
means within youth justice practices (Kelly, 2014) and the often unintended 
net-widening consequences of some interventionist diversionary measures 
(Bateman, 2002, Ministry of Justice, 2010a) was also a contributory factor 
when it cyclically fell out favour (Goldson, 2002).  
Despite its extensive use by the 1950s, and efforts by the Home Office 
thereafter to impose uniform standards and practices (Home Office,1968; 
Home Office, 1970; Home Office, 1976; Home Office, 1978; Home Office, 
1980; Home Office, 1985), the police caution remained a discretionary police 
practice until the 1990s, when youth cautioning fell spectacularly out of 
favour and a period of populist punitiveness began (Evans and Puech, 2001).  
Throughout however the oscillations of support and hostility for the police 
caution, the original secondary analysis in Chapter Four found that the 
admission criterion remained a central tenet of this practice, and it has almost 
always been customary in England and Wales that young people make some 
form of admission in order to be considered eligible for an out of court 
disposal. 
8.3 Is the mandatory admission criterion for the purpose of diversion 
evidence based? 
There is an absence of evidence as to why an admission became central to 
cautionary practices, and why it eventually became so important that it 
usurped other statutory and international obligations which prioritise a young 
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person’s best interests. Although the principle that it is generally good for 
young people to own up when they have done wrong (Lady Hale, R v 
Durham Constabulary and another ex parte R [2005] UKHL 21) is on the face 
of it uncontroversial, this thesis suggests that the admission criterion 
arguably embodies an additional desire to induce shame management and 
moral regret in young people (Braithwaite and Braithwaite, 2001). 
This is in tension with a body of other evidence that suggests young people - 
as a consequence of no more than ordinary adolescent behaviour - often 
minimise their own culpability during police interviews or restorative 
processes, and engage in ‘shame displacement’ (Scheuerman and Keith, 
2015), ‘tempering’, ‘reduced graduation’, ‘heteroglassic distancing’, 
‘ideational perspective’ (Zappavigna, 2007), ‘neutralisation’ (Sykes and 
Matza, 1957) and ‘egocentric bias’ (Lickona, 1983).   
Requiring a young person to make some form of admission to the police in 
order to secure an out of court disposal also fails to recognise the additional 
cultural and societal pressures they are often subjected to. Young people are 
more likely than adults to report negative attitudes toward the police and 
others in authority (Hurst and Frank, 2000), and consequently less willing to 
engage with them. They are further subjected to greater fears of ‘grassing’ if 
they make any admission as they are more likely than adults to have 
offended with another, and are more exposed than adults to the ‘no grass 
rule’ and powerful moral code which exists in many high crime estates 
(Yates, 2006). 
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Although further research is necessary, there is the possibility that the 
admission criterion is inherently discriminatory. There is evidence which 
suggests young BME youths are less likely than their white counterparts to 
receive an out of court disposal (Landau and Nathan, 1983; YJB, 2010), and 
although this is arguably as a consequence of the ‘multiplier effect’ of many 
interrelated factors (Goldson and Chigwada-Bailey, 1999:63), there is 
evidence that some young BME youths are reluctant to make an admission, 
and consequently forfeit eligibility for an out of court disposal (Woodhill and 
Senior, 1993). Despite this evidence, the current statutory regime mandates 
that an admission must be made by all young people, and it should be further 
reconsidered as a potentially situational and institutionally racist practice, 
given it is a universally framed procedure which is perhaps unwittingly 
discriminatory (Scarman, 1981). 
The research undertaken for this thesis also identified that young Asian girls 
may be less likely than their white peers to make an admission, as their 
offending may transgress cultural dynamics of family honour (‘izzat’) and 
shame (‘sharam’) (Toor, 2009). There is no other identifiable research 
however concerning this issue and at present a considerable knowledge gap. 
8.4 The circumstances in which admissions are obtained should be 
reconsidered 
The circumstances in which admissions are sought from young people with 
no or few antecedents who have committed a low level offence are arguably 
restrictive and unnecessary, and may be a contributory factor in instances 
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when young people fail to make an admission when it is in their best interests 
to do so. The routine practice of arrest, detention in police custody and a 
formal police interview, often at unsocial hours, makes no allowance for the 
fact that many young people are often in a de-stabilised state as a result of 
their detention (Littlechild, 1995; Littlechild, 1998:8), and the ‘coercive power’ 
of arrest often induces ‘alarm and dismay’ and may make them 
‘psychologically vulnerable’ (Evans, 1993:25-26; see also Gudjonsson and 
Clark, 1986). Despite this evidence, the statutory regime assumes all young 
people are able to make a rational and measured decision as to what 
account, if any, to give to the police, whilst subjected to these pressures. 
The opportunities available to young people to make an admission are highly 
restrictive, and the court has endorsed expediency at the expense of the 
welfare principle (R. (on the application of F) v Crown Prosecution Service 
and Chief Constable of Merseyside Police [2003] EWHC 3266). The 
information available to young people and their Appropriate Adult before a 
police interview concerning the importance of making admission if diversion 
is to be secured is inadequate, and in tension with conflicting common law 
principles prohibiting decision making before an admission is made (R 
(Thompson) v The Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police [1997] W.L.R. 
1519).  
Police training also discourages pre-interview engagement concerning both 
disclosure of the evidence and possible outcomes if an admission is made 
(Bryant and Bryant, 2014), and this research found that the fear of unfounded 
allegations of inducement is often a material barrier to civilian interviewers 
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and less experienced police officers providing useful and objective pre-
interview information.  
8.5 Inadequate pre-interview disclosure is a significant cause of unnecessary 
‘no comment’ interviews  
The research undertaken with relevant professionals also found that 
inadequate pre-interview disclosure is considered by a majority of legal 
representatives as the primary reason young people exercise their right to 
silence and unnecessarily jeopardise or lose a diversionary disposal. There 
was no finding in this research that police and civilian interviewers were 
wilfully withholding information about the evidence in order to prevent or 
obstruct a diversionary outcome, however civilian interviewers and less 
experienced police officers were found during the interviews to lack 
confidence in providing adequate pre-interview disclosure. They were also 
prioritising interview strategy and maintaining control of the interview process 
above engagement concerning possible outcomes. Given these findings, 
there is a need to reconsider additional police training concerning improved 
pre-interview disclosure processes. 
8.6 The mandatory admission criterion is onerous and in conflict with 
competing international and statutory obligations 
Chapter Five examined the admission criterion within the context of human 
rights obligations, and argues that the mandatory admission criterion, which 
was rigidly prescribed in the CDA and continues under LASPO, is in tension 
with the United Kingdom’s obligations to ensure domestic legislation is 
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compatible with international human rights instruments (Muncie, 2010; 
Hollingsworth, 2012). These various instruments impose on decision makers 
a duty to have regard during all stages of the decision making process to the 
welfare of a young person, and what outcome it is their best interests (The 
‘Beijing Rules’ 1985; United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
1989). The statutory admission criterion appears inconsistent with these 
international human rights obligations  
Chapter Six examined the admission criterion in an historical and procedural 
context, and argues that the nature and standard of admission required from 
young people who offend developed in an ad hoc and customary manner 
(Steer, 1970), but became by 1985 a rigorous criterion, with a young person 
expected to not only admit all or some of the facts but also to ‘recognise his 
guilt’ (Home Office, 1985:1). The admission criterion under the CDA then 
became ill-defined, (Home Office, 2002:4.12) and unnecessarily amplified (R. 
(on the application of M) v Leicestershire Constabulary [2009] EWHC 3640). 
The standard of admission required during alternative restorative processes 
in England and Wales was also explored in this chapter, and this revealed 
that a significantly less restrictive test was in operation, and required a young 
person to simply demonstrate a general acceptance of responsibility 
(ACPOa, 2012:2.1). This was consistent with the more flexible standard of 
admission operating in some other jurisdictions, such as Canada and The 
Republic of Ireland, which only require an ‘acceptance of responsibility’ 
(section 10(2)(e) Youth Criminal Justice Act 2002, Canada; Section 18 
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Children Act 2000, Ireland). The New Zealand FGC model also recognises 
that it is often only upon completion of restorative processes that a young 
person begins to understand their own culpability and the impact of their 
offending (Lynch, 2012). The standard of admission being operated in 
Northern Ireland’s Youth Conferencing was however found to be highly 
onerous (Maruna, et al, 2007) and perhaps more rigorous than that required 
under the CDA and LASPO. 
Chapter Six also analysed a number of reported appeal cases which 
underlined how the admission criterion resulted in lost opportunities for 
diversionary disposals (R. v DPP Ex p. B [1993] 1 All E.R.; R. (on the 
application of F) v Crown Prosecution Service and Chief Constable of 
Merseyside Police [2003] EWHC] 3266; R. (on the application of O) v DPP 
[2010] EWHC 804), and argues that the decision to prosecute in those cases 
was perhaps unnecessary. This thesis also argues that the unsuccessful 
appeal in the seminal case of R. v Durham Constabulary and Another ex 
parte R [2005] UKHL 21 may have been different if the appellant had sought 
to argue that the Final Warning issued to him should have been quashed 
because he believed he had never made a satisfactory admission, rather 
than seek to have it quashed on a separate human rights argument.   
The research undertaken for this thesis corroborated an earlier finding that 
formal cautions are sometimes issued in the absence of any clear admission 
being made (YJB, 2004:7). Analysis of the respondents’ views suggests that 
police and civilian interviewers often favourably interpret the answers young 
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people make in their police interviews as a satisfactory admission if a young 
person has demonstrated an appropriately co-operative and remorseful 
demeanour. Although this may on the face of it be a benevolent practice 
intended to divert as many young people as possible, it is also highly 
discretionary and exposes the admission criterion within diversionary 
processes to discriminatory, inconsistent and unregulated practices. 
8.7 Legal advisors – the case for specialist youth justice accreditation? 
The literature review and case law analysis suggests that the role of the legal 
advisor within diversionary processes is highly variable, with contradictory 
findings as to the quality and consistency of advice and representation 
(Baldwin, 1994; McConville, et al, 1991; Skinns, 2009; Caetano v 
Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2013] EWHC 375 (admin)).  The 
research undertaken for this thesis also found that a majority of civilian 
interviewers and less experienced police officers held a strong belief that 
poor legal advice was the primary reason young people unnecessarily lose 
the benefit of an out of court disposal. 
The questionnaire and interview findings however suggest that legal 
representatives care deeply about the outcomes for the young people they 
represent, and there is insufficient recognition that the advice they give is 
often a consequence of perceived inadequate information about the 
evidence, and the circumstances in which they represent young people is 
challenging, especially as civilian interviewers and inexperienced officers are 
reluctant to engage with them. 
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One of the most unexpected findings from this research however was that 
not all of the legal advisors who participated believed that that legal advice 
always positively contributes to a young person’s outcome when in police 
custody. During the interviews it became apparent that some legal advisors 
were not fully up to date with recent youth justice legislative changes due to 
their considerable work pressures, and required additional support to be able 
to do so. Given this and the other research findings discussed at Chapters 
6.21 and 7.7, there is arguably merit in introducing mandatory youth justice 
accreditation for legal representatives, and may improve diversionary 
outcomes. 
Research with legal advisors also found that an overwhelming majority 
believed that inadequate pre-interview disclosure was a primary cause of ‘no 
comment’ interviews and unnecessarily resulted in lost opportunities for 
diversion, as they were reluctant to advise a young person to make an 
admission until they could be satisfied that there was a realistic prospect of 
conviction. Given these findings, improvements to the quality of pre-interview 
disclosure could be efficiently made through training initiatives, and may 
significantly increase the number of young people making admissions and 
gaining eligibility for an out of court disposal.  
8.9 The practical benefits of the admission criterion 
Although this thesis has sought to explore whether the admission criterion is 
onerous and unnecessary, the literature review identified a number of its 
practical benefits within diversionary processes, and they should not be 
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underestimated or unacknowledged. A majority of police officers also held 
the view that it was an important aspect of diversionary processes. An 
admission often satisfies the evidential requirement that there is a realistic 
prospect of conviction, simplifies and expedites decision making processes, 
and facilitates resource efficiencies. Re-offending is also generally 
considered less likely when a young person understands or acknowledges 
their wrongdoing (Newbury, 2011). It is also considered by some to enhance 
their autonomy and citizenship (Hollingsworth, 2012) and an important 
temporal aspect of responsibility (Honore, 1999; Cane, 2002).  
It must also be acknowledged that the introduction of the rigorous standards 
of admissions in (Home Office, 1994; Home Office, 1999) was in part 
intended to protect the rights of young people by ensuring that decision 
makers apply a high standard of scrutiny to the answers young people 
provide (Moston and Stephenson, 1993), as well as impose better uniformity 
of practice. Additionally, this thesis recognises that a failure or refusal to 
make an admission can on occasion result in a decision to take No Further 
Action against a young person, or contribute to a subsequent acquittal at trial, 
and a young person’s interests are sometimes best served by not making an 
admission at all.  
8.9 Alternatives and amendments to existing practices 
A majority of respondents held the view that some form of admission was 
necessary from a young person during the diversionary processes, mostly for 
practical reasons, but the nature and type of admission should be broadened. 
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The Canadian, Republic of Ireland and New Zealand models, which requires 
simply a general ‘acceptance of responsibility’ were considered the most 
suitable.  
This research identified that there is an absence of any data concerning to 
what extent young people unnecessarily lose a diversionary disposal for the 
sole reason that they do not make an admission. While further research is 
necessary to demonstrate the extent that this occurs, this does not preclude 
the introduction of a range of measures which can lessen the impediments of 
the admission criterion. This thesis additionally sought to identify suitable 
alternatives to the current statutory admission criterion, and found a number 
of feasible options - it is hoped this thesis generates further interest in 
exploring these alternatives. 
The YCC criterion is arguably one of the most radical departures in 
diversionary youth justice practices since the formalisation of the police 
caution over a century ago. It does not require an admission to be made at 
the outset or in a police interview, and can instead be made at the point of 
issue, potentially facilitating the offer of an out of court disposal at an early 
stage in the decision making process. This may be a more suitable 
alternative than the current Youth Caution regime and particularly 
advantageous to young people who are unwilling to engage with the police in 
a formal police interview. It is of significance however that a majority of 
respondents felt that it was a very complicated process and were not 
embracing it with any real enthusiasm. 
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Alternatively, within the existing statutory regime under LASPO, the standard 
of admission could be substituted with the less rigorous pre-condition 
currently operating in other jurisdictions such as Canada, New Zealand and 
The Republic of Ireland, which requires only an ‘acceptance of responsibility’ 
for the alleged offence.  This research found that despite the statutory 
requirement that a clear and reliable admission should be made, decision 
makers are on occasion substituting this rigid test in any event with the lesser 
test being operated in those other jurisdictions, and young people are often 
gaining eligibility for an out court disposal as long as they acknowledge some 
wrongdoing and display a suitably contrite demeanour. It was also the 
preferred alternative of all respondents. Given this, there is seemingly little 
disadvantage in formally adopting this criterion, which is operating unofficially 
in any event. 
It is acknowledged however that this research was undertaken with a very 
small research sample, and given the known regional variations in cautioning 
practices, it may be that other regions are strictly applying the statutory test, 
as R (F) v CPS and Chief Constable of Merseyside [2003] EWHC 3266 
suggests. 
Another alternative model could be the expansion of the non-statutory Youth 
Restorative Disposals Guidance (Ministry of Justice, 2011a), which entirely 
reverses the admission criterion, and instead mandates that a young person 
is eligible for a YRD if they have:  
  Cushing, K., 2016, Chapter Eight 
343 
 
‘not denied outright involvement for the behaviour amounting to an 
offence or harm’ (Ministry of Justice, 2012:4.1). 
This more flexible test not only moderates the standard of admission 
required, but vitiates the need for young people to understand and articulate 
complex legal matters, as the criterion focuses instead on recognising 
behaviour and harm caused. Adopting this model could however have the 
adverse consequence of inadvertently widening once again the net of young 
people who fall within the criminal justice system unnecessarily, as it extends 
the criminal law to broader concepts of ‘harm’ caused, and this does not 
necessarily equate on every occasion to an actual criminal offence, and 
which does not always have to attract a recordable sanction.  
A more radical alternative to the existing statutory diversionary regime would 
be to abolish entirely the admission criterion as a mandatory gateway to an 
out of court disposal, and substitute it with a presumption that a young 
person is suitable for a diversionary disposal if they have committed a low 
level offence under a Gravity Factor Matrix, they have no or few relevant 
antecedents, have not put forward a denial or defence at any stage, and are 
willing to accept and engage in a formal and recordable diversionary 
disposal. This has the potential to end the disadvantageous position 
experienced by many BME youths already identified in current literature, and 
also to the Asian girls this research identified who may possibly be subject to 
the pressures of ‘izzat’. It also neutralises the consequences of any 
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reluctance to implicate a co-suspect or engage constructively with those in 
authority. 
In addition to changes to the current statutory regime, this thesis invites 
further debate concerning the need for ‘early frankness’ from young people in 
order to gain eligibility for a diversionary outcome, as well as a review of the 
number of opportunities available to make an admission (R (on the 
application of F) v Crown Prosecution Service and Chief Constable of Police 
[2003] EWHC 3266). Although expediency is usually desirable within criminal 
justice processes, young people are usually permitted only one opportunity to 
make an admission - often whilst subject to the pressures of arrest and 
interview - and requiring early frankness may be at the expense of other 
welfare and human rights obligations. 
This thesis seeks to invite further interest and research on the suitability of all 
of these alternative criterion and regimes, to further fill the substantial 
knowledge gap concerning the admission criterion within current diversionary 
processes. However, the literature review collated a significant body of 
research which identified the historically adverse and often inadvertent ‘net-
widening’ effects of many ostensibly welfare orientated diversionary 
measures (Pratt, 1986; Goldson, 2000; Bateman, 2002; Office of Criminal 
Justice Reform, 2010; Ministry of Justice, 2014), and this was a recurrent 
theme throughout this thesis. Although this thesis seeks to invite further 
consideration of alternatives to the existing statutory admission criterion so 
that a greater number of young people can gain eligibility for a diversionary 
  Cushing, K., 2016, Chapter Eight 
345 
 
disposal, it should not be at the expense of any inadvertent ‘net-widening’ 
these changes may result in.  
This thesis has sought to contribute to existing academic and professional 
knowledge in the field of diversionary youth justice, and encourage greater 
academic and professional interest in the importance of the admission 
criterion as both a gateway and barrier to these processes. 
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Appendix 1 Police Interview Request  
University Square 
Luton 
Bedfordshire 
LU1 3JU 
 
8th July 2013 
 
Dear Police Officer, 
I am a solicitor with the Crown Prosecution Service and also currently 
undertaking a Professional Doctorate in Youth Justice at the University of 
Bedfordshire, and would be most grateful if you considered completing the 
attached questionnaire which forms part of my research. The approval of 
Deputy Chief Constable [redacted] at [redacted] has been authorised for you 
to assist me with this research and complete the questionnaire. 
The purpose of the Doctorate is to research the mandatory requirement that 
a young person must make an admission before diversion from formal court 
proceedings by way of a reprimand, Final Warning, Youth Caution or other 
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out of court disposal can be considered. I am examining specific instances 
where a young person has lost the opportunity for diversion for the sole 
reason that they failed to make an admission, but either later requested a 
second police interview so that an admission could be made, or pleaded 
guilty at court.  
Separate to these cases studies, I am hoping to obtain your views as a police 
officer who interviews young people, as to the reasons why some young 
people may unnecessarily lose the opportunity for diversion by failing to 
make an admission. Your thoughts as to any procedural improvements or 
statutory changes which may better facilitate diversion in these types of 
cases would also be of real interest.  
Separate questionnaires shall be sent to, decision makers (Evidential Review 
Officers and CPS Prosecutors), YOS officers and defence solicitors, however 
I hope that your answers to the questionnaire will increase the quality and 
depth of this research, as well as provide a valuable perspective from a 
professional in this field. 
The questionnaire will not require you to provide your name, shoulder 
number or any other personal information which would result in your 
identification or that of Thames Valley Police, and all responses shall be used 
only for the purposes of my thesis, and/or a paper which may be published in 
an academic journal, and/or a poster, and/or any lectures I may give either to 
students, academics or professionals. This research has been approved by 
the University of Bedfordshire ethics committee and is being supervised by 
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Dr Tim Bateman and Professor John Pitts. Dr Bateman can be contacted on 
01234-400400 or at tim.bateman@beds.ac.uk at first instance if you have 
any questions, suggestions or complaints concerning this questionnaire or 
the research in general. 
Finally, as my research involves case studies within the Thames Valley and I 
am currently a prosecutor with the CPS, I am unable to interview any relevant 
young people or any person who acted as an appropriate adult, as there 
would be a conflict of interest. I have arranged however for an independent 
third party to do so on my behalf and if you are aware of any young person or 
person who acted as appropriate adult who may be willing to assist this 
research, could you kindly let me know or forward any other questions you 
may have to me at karen.cushing@beds.ac.uk. 
I am most grateful for your kind assistance and look forward to receiving the 
completed questionnaire either by post in the pre-paid envelope which is 
attached, or by personal return. 
With many thanks, 
Karen Cushing 
Senior Crown Prosecutor and 
Professional Doctorate Student 
University of Bedfordshire
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Appendix 2 Defence Interview Request  
 University Square 
Luton 
Bedfordshire 
LU1 3JU 
 
08 May 2013 
Dear Defence Solicitor, 
I am currently undertaking a Professional Doctorate in Youth Justice at the 
University of Bedfordshire and would be most grateful if you considered 
completing the attached questionnaire, which forms part of my research for 
the Doctorate. 
I am researching the mandatory requirement that a young person must 
make an admission to an offence before diversion from formal court 
proceedings can be considered, and examining instances where a young 
person has not been diverted for the sole reason that they failed to make an 
admission; but subsequently requested a second police interview so that an 
admission could be made, or pleaded guilty at court.  
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Separate to these cases studies, I am hoping to obtain your views as a 
defence solicitor who advises young people in police custody and 
represents them at court, as to the reasons why some young people may 
unnecessarily lose the opportunity for diversion by failing to make an 
admission. Your thoughts as to any procedural improvements or statutory 
changes which may better facilitate diversion in these types of cases would 
also be of real interest.  
Separate questionnaires shall be sent to police officers, decision makers 
(Evidential Review Officers and CPS Prosecutors) and YOS officers, 
however I hope that your answers to the questionnaire will increase the 
quality and depth of this research, as well as provide balance so that all 
relevant professionals have contributed. 
The questionnaire will not require you to provide your name or any other 
personal information which would result in your identification, and all 
responses shall be used only for the purposes of my thesis, and/or a paper 
which may be published in an academic journal, and/or a poster, and/or any 
lectures I may give either to students, academics or professionals. This 
research has been approved by the University of Bedfordshire ethics 
committee and is being supervised by Dr Tim Bateman and Professor John 
Pitts. Dr Bateman can be contacted on 01234-400400 or at 
tim.bateman@beds.ac.uk at first instance if you have any questions, 
suggestions or complaints concerning this questionnaire or the research in 
general. 
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Finally, as my research involves case studies within the Thames Valley and 
I am currently a prosecutor with the CPS, I am unable to interview any 
relevant young people or any person who acted as an appropriate adult, as 
there would be a conflict of interest. I have arranged however for an 
independent third party to do so on my behalf and if you are aware of any 
young person or person who acted as appropriate adult who may be willing 
to assist this research, could you kindly let me know at 
karen.cushing@beds.ac.uk. Any other queries can also be forwarded to me 
at this email address. 
I am most grateful for your kind assistance and look forward to receiving the 
completed questionnaire either by post in the pre-paid envelope which is 
attached, or by personal return. 
With many thanks, 
 
Karen Cushing 
Professional Doctorate Student 
University of Bedfordshire 
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Appendix 3 Police Questionnaire 
 
Police Officer Questionnaire 
1. Young people who have committed a low level offence on occasion 
lose the benefit of an out of court disposal because they have not 
made a satisfactory admission. 
Please number the following reasons from 1 (most common) to 12 
(least common) as to why you believe this happens. 
 Legal advice to answer ‘no comment’ 
 Cultural – the young person believes they should always answer ‘no 
comment’ or deny the offence no matter what 
 Adolescent wilfulness 
 Does not want to implicate a co-suspect 
 Fear of parental admonishment if they admit to offending when their 
parent is acting as their Appropriate Adult 
 Misunderstanding as to the law – the young person believed they 
were making an admission but in fact they were technically asserting 
a defence (for example admitted being in possession of a bladed 
article but said they had a reasonable excuse for having it, which is a 
defence in law) 
 Influence of Appropriate Adult 
 Pressures of arrest and detention in custody and a lack of opportunity 
to consider what to say in interview 
 Difficulties the police have in explaining prior to an interview that an 
admission is needed, as to do so is to be exposed to an allegation 
that an admission is being induced 
 Some young people’s negative perception of the police and inability 
to engage 
 Other – please 
state…………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………... 
2. Research suggests that black youths are subjected to cultural 
pressures to always answer ‘no comment’ in police interviews, and 
this partly explain their disproportionate escalation through the 
criminal justice system. Do you agree with this? 
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 Yes 
 No 
 Don’t know 
3. Should a young person who initially denied an offence or answered 
‘no comment’ and is informed they are to be charged, be permitted a 
second opportunity to make an admission and be considered again for 
diversion? 
 They should always be given a second opportunity to make an 
admission if it will secure an out of court disposal for them 
 They should only be permitted a second opportunity if I am satisfied 
there is a good reason why they did not make an admission in their 
first interview. 
 Never – the young person had an opportunity in their first interview or 
interviews to make an admission and I gave them every opportunity 
to do so. They purpose of the Final Warning Scheme is to encourage 
early frankness, and to allow another interview post-charge is a 
waste of resources and allowing them to ‘play the system. 
4. Prior to a young person’s interview, how willing are you to engage 
in a discussion about diversion from prosecution if admissions are 
made in interview and the young person is potentially suitable? 
 Always 
 Usually 
 Sometimes 
 Never 
5. Have you ever felt unable to adequately explain the process of 
diversion to a young person or their Appropriate Adult because you do 
not want to be accused of inducing an admission? 
 Always 
 Usually 
 Sometimes 
 Occasionally 
 Never 
Bryant and Bryant’s Police Student Handbook gives a ‘major warning’ 
against discussing diversion with a suspect prior to an interview as 
this can expose an officer to an allegation that they have induced an 
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admission, yet paragraph 4.14 of the 2006 Final Warning Scheme 
Guidance states that young people and their Appropriate Adults 
should have access to information prior to an interview so that they 
can make an informed decision as to whether to make an admission. 
Are you able to satisfy these two guidelines? 
 Yes – they are not in conflict and I do not have any difficulty 
 Yes – but with great difficulty – it is difficult to discuss diversion 
because it means I have to explain that an admission is necessary if 
a young person is to receive an out of court disposal, and this is 
contrary to other guidance we have on pre-interview discussions and 
does expose me to unfounded allegations that I am trying to induce 
an admission 
 No – it is impossible to comply with paragraph 4.14 and the separate 
police guidelines on pre-interview discussions about out of court 
disposals only being considered if admissions are made 
 Don’t know. 
 Please explain further should you wish to do 
so……………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
… 
7. In your experience can the pressures of detention in custody and a 
PACE interview adversely affect a young person’s ability to make an 
informed decision about whether to make an admission? 
 Always 
 Usually 
 Sometimes 
 Rarely 
 Never 
 Don’t know 
8. In your experience can the pressures of detention in custody 
adversely affect a young person’s ability to articulate a satisfactory 
admission in interview? 
 Always 
 Usually 
 Sometimes 
 Rarely 
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 Never 
9. Would greater use of street bail afford young people and their 
parents the opportunity to make an informed decision prior to an 
interview as to whether to make an admission? 
Yes 
No 
Don’t know 
 
10. Research suggests law firms routinely deploy inexperienced 
solicitors/representatives to represent young people in custody. Do 
you agree with this? 
 Yes 
 No 
 It is too variable to say 
 Don’t know 
11. Research suggests defence representatives on occasion advise 
young people to make admissions when the evidence against them is 
either weak or inadequate, to secure for them the benefits of diversion 
from a formal prosecution. 
Based solely on your own experience do you agree with this? 
 Yes – it happens frequently 
 Yes – it happens occasionally 
 No – I have never seen this happen before 
 I don’t know – the advice given by a defence representative does not 
involve me 
12. Do you consider that access to legal advice positively contributes 
to young people’s outcomes when in custody? 
 Always 
 Usually 
 Occasionally 
 Never 
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13. By what method/s do you provide pre-interview disclosure to a 
young person and their Appropriate Adult when they are 
unrepresented? 
 Written disclosure only 
 Predominantly written disclosure but with some verbal disclosure as 
well 
 Verbal disclosure only 
 Predominantly written disclosure but with some verbal disclosure as 
well. 
 Verbal disclosure only 
 Predominantly verbal disclosure but with some written disclosure as 
well 
 An even mixture of written and verbal disclosure 
 No disclosure provided 
 Too variable to say 
14. By what method/s do you usually provide pre-interview disclosure 
to a legal representative advising a young person in custody? 
 Written disclosure only 
 Predominantly written disclosure but with some verbal disclosure as 
well. 
 Verbal disclosure only 
 Predominantly verbal disclosure but with some written disclosure as 
well 
 An even mixture of written and verbal disclosure 
 No disclosure provided 
 Too variable to say 
15. In your experience, how would you describe the adequacy of pre-
interview disclosure provided by the police? 
 Excellent – the police always provide full disclosure of the evidence 
they have or may be able to obtain from the outset 
 Adequate – the police usually provide adequate disclosure of the 
evidence they have or may be able to obtain 
 Adequate after further request – the police usually provide adequate 
disclosure of the evidence after the defence have pursed additional 
disclosure 
 Poor – the police do not provide adequate disclosure of the evidence 
they have or may be able to obtain 
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 It is too variable to describe accurately 
16. Do you consider that an unrepresented young person received the 
same adequacy of pre-interview disclosure as a young person who is 
legally represented? 
 Yes 
 No 
 Don’t know 
17 By what method/s do you provide pre-interview disclosure to a 
young person and their Appropriate Adult when they are 
unrepresented? 
 Written disclosure only 
 Predominantly written disclosure but with some verbal disclosure as 
well. 
 Verbal disclosure only 
 Predominantly verbal disclosure but with some written disclosure as 
well 
 An even mixture of written and verbal disclosure 
 No disclosure provided 
 Too variable to say 
18. By what method/s do you provide pre-interview disclosure to a 
legal advisor when they are advising a young person in custody? 
 Written disclosure only 
 Predominantly written disclosure but with some verbal disclosure as 
well. 
 Verbal disclosure only 
 Predominantly verbal disclosure but with some written disclosure as 
well 
 An even mixture of written and verbal disclosure 
 No disclosure provided 
 Too variable to say 
19. In your experience, how would you describe the adequacy of pre-
interview disclosure provided by the police? 
 Excellent – the police always provide full disclosure of the evidence 
they have or may be able to obtain from the outset 
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 Adequate – the police usually provide adequate disclosure of the 
evidence they have or may be able to obtain 
 Adequate after further request – the police usually provide adequate 
disclosure of the evidence after the defence have pursed additional 
disclosure 
 Poor – the police do not provide adequate disclosure of the evidence 
they have or may be able to obtain 
 It is too variable to describe accurately 
20. Do you consider that an unrepresented young person received the 
same adequacy of pre-interview disclosure as a young person who is 
legally represented? 
 Yes 
 No 
 Don’t know 
21. In your experience, what is the most suitable method of 
interviewing a young person suspected of committing a low level 
offence, who is probably eligible for diversion if a satisfactory 
admission is made? 
 The young person under arrest, detained in custody and interviewed 
in the custody suite 
 They young person interviewed in the custody suite as a volunteer 
 Outside of the police station but not at the young person’s home 
 At the young person’s home 
 It is too variable to say as every case is different 
 Other…………………………………………. 
22. In your experience are young people aged 10-13 years able to 
adequately understand the legal elements of the offence they are 
alleged to have committed? 
 Always 
 Usually 
 Rarely 
 Never 
 Don’t know 
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23. In your experience are young people aged 14-17 years able to 
adequately understand the legal elements of the offence they are 
alleged to have committed? 
 Always 
 Usually 
 Rarely 
 Never 
 Don’t know 
24. In your experience are young people aged 10-13 years able to 
adequately articulate a satisfactory admission in a police interview? 
 Always 
 Usually 
 Rarely 
 Never 
 Don’t know 
25. In your experience are young people aged 14-17 years able to 
adequately articulate a satisfactory admission in a police interview? 
 Always 
 Usually 
 Rarely 
 Never 
 Don’t know 
26. Have you ever experienced a scenario where a young person did 
not make an admission because they feared parental admonishment 
from their parent who was acting as Appropriate Adult, and this 
resulted in a lost opportunity for diversion? 
 Yes 
 No 
27. Who do you consider the best to perform the role of the 
Appropriate Adult? 
 Parent 
 Other family member 
 YOS/Social Services 
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 Trained Volunteer 
 Other………… 
28. The criteria for a satisfactory admission in the 2006 Final Warning 
Scheme Guidance is ‘A reprimand or warning can be given only if the 
young person makes a clear and reliable admission to all elements of 
the offence. This should include an admission of dishonesty and 
intent, where applicable’.  
In your experience, is this test a necessary gateway to divert young 
people who have committed a low level offence? 
 Yes – this test is reasonable and diversion will only work if a young 
person is willing to admit an offence and engage from the outset with 
the police and YOS. 
 No – young people should make some form of admission to gain 
eligibility for diversion but this test is too onerous for many young 
people and needs simplifying 
 No – it should not be necessary for a young person to make an 
admission this is often difficult for a variety of reasons, and if they 
have not denied an offence and have indicated they will accept an 
out of court disposal, then that should be adequate. 
29. Under the Youth Conditional Caution pilot scheme, a young person 
who answers ‘no comment’ may be eligible for a Youth Conditional 
Caution, as they have not denied the offence or put forward a defence. 
In your opinion, is this a more suitable alternative than the admission 
criteria in the Final Warning Scheme Guidance to secure an out of 
court disposal? 
 Yes 
 No 
 Don’t know 
 
30. Do you have any suggestions to best enable young people aged 
10-17 years (where there is adequate evidence against them and their 
rights can be fully protected) to gain eligibility for diversion form the 
formal criminal justice system? 
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………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………. 
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Appendix 4 Defence Questionnaire 
 
Defence/Legal Representative Questionnaire 
1. How many years have you advised young people aged 10-17 years 
at the police station? 
 Less than 1 year 
 2-5 years 
 6-110 years 
 11 or more 
2. How often to do you attend a police station and advise young 
people aged between 10-17 years? 
 At least once a week 
 At least once a fortnight 
 At least once a month 
 At least once every three months 
 At least once every 6 months 
 Rarely 
 Never 
3. On average, when you are representing a young person in custody 
as Duty Solicitor, how likely is it that you have met this person before? 
 Always met before 
 Usually met before 
 Occasionally met before 
 Never met before 
 It is just too variable to estimate 
4. On average, when you are representing a young person in custody 
acting as ‘Own Client’ how likely is it you have met this person before? 
 Always met before 
 Usually met before 
 Occasionally met before 
 Never met before 
 It is just too variable to estimate 
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5. Compared to advising adult suspects at the police station, how 
confident are you advising young people at the police station? 
 More confident 
 Less confident 
 No difference  
 whatsoever 
6. How often do you represent young people who are interviewed by 
the police on a voluntary basis outside of the police station? 
 At least once a week 
 At least once a fortnight 
 At least once a month 
 At least once every three months 
 Rarely 
 Never 
7. Do you consider that access to legal advice positively contributes to 
a young person’s outcome when in custody? 
 Always 
 Usually 
 Occasionally 
 Never 
8. Research suggests law firms routinely deploy less experienced 
solicitors or police station representatives to advise young people 
arrested for minor offences. Would you agree with this? 
 Yes 
 No  
 Don’t know 
 If don’t know, please explain further should you wish 
to……………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
…... 
9. How do you usually receive pre-interview disclosure from the police 
when advising a young person in custody? 
 Written disclosure only 
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 Predominantly written disclosure but with some verbal disclosure as 
well. 
 Verbal disclosure only 
 Predominantly verbal disclosure but with some written disclosure as 
well 
 An even mixture of written and verbal disclosure 
 No disclosure provided 
 Too variable to say 
10. On average how would you describe the adequacy of pre-interview 
disclosure provided to you by the police when advising a young 
person? 
 Excellent -the police always provide full disclosure 
 Adequate – the police usually provide enough disclosure so that I can 
advise properly 
 Adequate after further request – the police usually provide adequate 
disclosure but only after I have requested further details. 
 Poor – the police provide some disclosure but it is usually not 
adequate for me to advise my client properly 
 It is too variable to describe accurately 
11. If you have experience of not receiving adequate pre-interview 
disclosure from the police when advising a young person, what do you 
believe the reasons for this are? Please rank the following from 1 
(most common) to 10 (least common). Please leave blank any reason 
you do not consider relevant. 
 Poor relationship with the police 
 Deliberate withholding of evidence in order to create an ambush in 
interview 
 Deliberate withholding of evidence in order to frustrate your ability to 
advise your client 
 There are other suspects and the police are concerned disclosure will 
result in collusion 
 The police investigation is still ongoing and disclosure could prejudice 
or jeopardise the gathering of further evidence 
 Nature and seriousness of offence 
 Obstructive attitude of an individual officer rather than any general 
policy 
 Unintentional withholding of disclosure – the police do not necessarily 
know what disclosure I need to advise adequately 
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 Other – please 
explain………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
……………… 
12. How often do you have to request additional disclosure from the 
police so that you can adequately advise your client? 
 Always 
 Usually 
 Occasionally 
 Rarely 
 Never 
13. Have you ever received inaccurate, false or misleading disclosure 
from the police prior to a young person’s interview? 
 Yes 
 No 
14. If you answered ‘yes’ to the above, how often does this happen? 
 Always 
 Usually 
 Occasionally 
 Exceptionally 
15. Is the pre-interview disclosure you receive from the police of any 
better quality for young people than for adults? 
 Yes – it is better 
 No- it is worse 
 Neutral – no real difference 
16. Have you ever advised a young person to exercise their right to 
silence because of inadequate police disclosure, in the knowledge that 
this could jeopardise consideration for a reprimand, final warning or 
other type of diversion? 
 Yes 
 No 
 If yes, please describe how often this occurs and in what 
circumstances………………………………………………………………
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………………………………………………………………………………
…. 
17. Have you ever regretted advising a young person to exercise their 
right to silence in interview when this advice has resulted in a lost 
opportunity for diversion? 
 Yes 
 No 
 If yes, please describe how often this occurs and in what 
circumstances………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
…. 
18. Have you ever advised a young person to make an admission when 
you were not sure there was adequate evidence, but you wanted to 
secure for them the benefits of diversion from a formal prosecution? 
 Yes 
 No 
 If yes, please describe how often this occurs and in what 
circumstances………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
…. 
19. Prior to the interview of a young person, how willing are the police 
to engage in a discussion about diversion from prosecution if 
admissions are made? 
 Always 
 Usually 
 Sometimes 
 Rarely 
 Never 
20. Have you ever been able to secure a guarantee from a police 
officer prior to an interview that if an admission is made the young 
person you are advising will be diverted by way of a reprimand, final 
warning or caution? 
 Always 
 Usually 
 Sometimes 
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 Rarely 
 Never 
21. If you were able to secure a guarantee of diversion by way of a 
reprimand, final warning, youth caution or conditional caution, would 
this increase the likelihood of you advising a young person to make an 
admission? 
 Yes 
 No 
 Don’t know 
22. In your experience do the police comply with paragraph 4.14 of the 
Final Warning Scheme Guidance (‘Young people and their 
parents/carers should have access to information about the options 
available including the final warning scheme so that they can make an 
informed decision before the question as to whether they admit the 
offence is put to them’). 
 Always 
 Usually 
 Occasionally 
 Never 
 Don’t know 
23. Do you consider that police fear of unfounded allegations of 
inducement is a factor in any unwillingness to discuss diversion with 
you prior to an interview? 
 Yes 
 No 
 Don’t know 
24. Bryant and Bryant’s Police Student Handbook give a ‘major 
warning’ to police against discussing the possibility of diversion with 
a suspect prior to an interview, yet paragraph 4.14 of the 2006 Final 
Warning Scheme Guidance states that young people and their 
Appropriate Adults should have access to information so that they can 
make an informed decision as to whether to make an admission. 
Do you consider these separate guidelines cause the police genuine 
difficulties in discussing admissions/diversion prior to an interview? 
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 Yes 
 No 
 Don’t know 
25. In your experience, are decision makers (police and CPS) willing to 
offer second interviews to young people who post-charge want the 
opportunity to make an admission to gain eligibility for diversion? 
 Will always offer a second opportunity if asked 
 Will usually offer a second opportunity if asked 
 Will only offer a second opportunity if a satisfactory reason for failing 
to make an admission in the first interview is provided 
 Will never offer a second opportunity 
 There is never a consistent approach by the police/CPS and it is too 
difficult to generalise 
 Other…………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………... 
 
 
 26. Please select from the following the correct admission 
criteria for a youth admission in the 2006 Final Warning Scheme 
Guidance 
 
 A reprimand or final warning can be given only if the young person 
makes a clear and reliable admission to all elements of the offence. 
This should include an admission of dishonesty and intent, where 
applicable. 
 A reprimand or final warning can be given only if the young person 
makes a clear and reliable admission to all elements of the offence 
 A reprimand or final warning can be issued if a young person makes 
an adequate admission 
 The young person makes a satisfactory admission that he/she 
committed the offence they are alleged to have committed 
 A reprimand or final warning can only be issued if the young person 
demonstrates to a constable a positive recognition of his or her guilt 
 The young person exercises their right to silence in a PACE 
compliant interview but does not put forward a positive defence. This 
is commensurate with not denying the offence and is satisfactory for 
the purposes of the Final Warning Scheme Guidance 
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27. In your experience are young people in custody aged 10-13 years 
able to adequately understand the legal elements of the offence they 
are alleged to have committed? 
 Always 
 Usually 
 Rarely 
 Never 
28 In your experience are young people in custody aged 14-17 years 
able to adequately understand the legal elements of the offence they 
are alleged to have committed? 
 Always 
 Usually 
 Rarely 
 Never 
29. In your experience are young people in custody aged 10-13 years 
able to adequately articulate a satisfactory admission in a PACE 
interview? 
 Always 
 Usually 
 Rarely 
 Never 
30. In your experience are young people in custody aged 14-17 years 
able to adequately articulate a satisfactory admission in a PACE 
interview? 
 Always 
 Usually 
 Rarely 
 Never 
31. If a young person you are advising in custody has indicated he/she 
will not make an admission (despite your advice that there is adequate 
evidence and they will most likely be diverted if they make an 
admission), what do you believe the reasons are? Please ran the 
following from 1 (most common) to 9 (least common) and leave blank 
any which are not relevant 
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 Does not want to implicate a co-suspect 
 Fear of parental admonishment if an admission is made 
 Cultural – the young person is of the view that it is always best to ‘go 
no comment’ 
 Evidential – the young person/Appropriate Adult believed there was 
insufficient evidence 
 Influence of the Appropriate Adult 
 Adolescent wilfulness 
 Strategic – wants to hear the evidence disclosed in an interview first 
before deciding whether to make an admission 
 Fear of the police  
 Other – please 
explain………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
……………… 
32. In your experience, when young people have the benefit of legal 
advice, what is the primary influence on a young person’s decision to 
either admit an offence, exercise a right to silence of deny an offence 
in their police interview? 
 The legal representative – the advice I give is the primary influence 
 The Appropriate Adult 
 The young person – the decision is primarily made by them 
irrespective of any advice or influence 
 Other – please 
list……………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………… 
33. Who do you consider to be the primary decision maker as to 
whether a young person aged 10-13 years makes an admission, 
exercises a right to silence or denies an offence in interview? 
 The legal advisor – although our role is technically to advise, our 
influence is such that it is effectively our decision 
 The young person 
 The Appropriate Adult 
 YOS/Social Services 
 Don’t know 
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34. Who do you consider to be the primary decision maker as to 
whether a young person aged 14-17 years makes an admission, 
exercises a right to silence or denies an offence in interview? 
 The legal advisor – although our role is technically to advise, our 
influence is such that it is effectively our decision 
 The young person 
 The Appropriate Adult 
 YOS/Social Services 
 Don’t know 
35. When a young person does not have the benefit of legal advice and 
denies an offence or exercises their right to silence in a police 
interview, who do you consider is the primary decision make? 
 The legal advisor – although our role is technically to advise, our 
influence is such that it is effectively our decision 
 The young person 
 The Appropriate Adult 
 YOS/Social Services 
 Don’t know 
36. In your experience is the ethnicity of the young person a 
determining factor in any decision to exercise a right to silence in 
interview when there appears adequate evidence exists and diversion 
is a possibility 
 Yes 
 No 
 Don’t know 
37. Research suggests black youths are subjected to cultural 
pressures to always answer ‘no comment’ in police interviews, and 
this may partly explain their disproportionate escalation through the 
criminal justice system. Do you agree with this? 
 Yes 
 No  
 Don’t know 
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38. In your experience, is the gender of a young person a determining 
factor in any decision to exercise a right to silence in interview when 
there appears adequate evidence exists and diversion is a possibility 
 Yes 
 No 
 Don’t know 
39. In your experience are parents who act as Appropriate Adults for 
their child capable of performing this role? 
 Always 
 Usually 
 Occasionally 
 Never 
40. Have you ever experienced a scenario where a young person did 
not make an admission because they feared parental admonishment 
from their parent who was acting as Appropriate Adult, and this 
resulted in a lost opportunity for diversion? 
 Yes 
 No 
41. Research suggests parents acting as Appropriate Adults 
sometimes exert influence on their child to give an account in 
interview which reflects their own interests, rather than their child’s. 
Do you agree with this? 
 Yes 
 No 
 Don’t know 
42. Who do you consider best to person to perform the role of the 
Appropriate Adult? 
 Parent 
 Other family member 
 YOS/Social Service 
 Trained volunteer 
 Other 
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43. The criteria for a satisfactory admission in the 2006 Final Warning 
Scheme Guidance is ‘A reprimand or wanting can be given only if the 
young person makes a clear reliable admission to all elements of the 
offence. This should include an admission of dishonesty and intent, 
where applicable. 
In your experience, is this test necessary to divert young offenders? 
 Yes - this test is reasonable and diversion will only work if a young 
person is willing to admit an offence and engage from the outset with 
the police and YOS 
 No – young people should make some form of admission to gain 
eligibility for diversion but this test is too onerous for many young 
people. 
 No – it should not be necessary for a young person to make an 
admission – this is often difficult for them and if they have not denied 
an offence and have indicated they will accept a reprimand, youth 
caution, conditional caution or youth restorative disposal, then that 
should be adequate. 
 Please explain further should you wish to do 
so……………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………… 
44. Under the Youth Conditional Caution Pilot Scheme, a youth 
offender who answers ‘no comment’ is eligible for a Youth Conditional 
Caution (where there is adequate evidence) as they have not denied 
the offence they are alleged to have committed or put forward a 
defence. 
In your opinion, would this test be a more suitable alternative to the 
current requirement that an admission is made? 
 Yes 
 No 
 Don’t know 
 Please explain further should you wish to do 
so……………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………. 
45. Do you consider that the pressures of detention in custody and a 
PACE interview adversely affects a young person’s ability to decide 
what account, if any, to give in a police interview? 
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 Always 
 Usually 
 Sometimes 
 Rarely 
 Never 
46. Do you consider that the pressures of detention and a PACE 
interview adversely affects a young person’s ability to articulate a 
satisfactory admission in their police interview? 
 Always 
 Usually 
 Sometimes 
 Rarely 
 Never 
 Please explain further should you wish to do 
so……………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………. 
47. Do you consider that the negative experiences of arrest, detention 
in custody and a PACE interview can sometimes dissuade young 
people from further offending? 
 Yes 
 No 
 Don’t know 
48. Do you consider that greater use of street bail would afford young 
people and their parents the opportunity to make an informed decision 
prior to an interview as to whether to make an admission? 
 Yes 
 No 
 Don’t know 
49. An increasing number of young people are now being interviewed 
by the police outside of the police station. Do you support this? 
 Yes – too many young people are being held in custody 
unnecessarily and we should have more interviews outside of a 
police station 
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 Maybe – I would support this but only if I could be satisfied that 
young people’s PACE rights were protected 
 Maybe – I would support this but only if I could be satisfied that 
young people’s PACE rights were protected but I am not confident 
this would happen without substantial changes to police practices 
 No – too many young people are not having their PACE rights 
protected when interviewed outside of custody, and although I prefer 
it if young people were not detained at a police station, at present this 
is the only way a young person can have their PACE rights protected 
 Don’t know 
 Please explain further should you wish to do 
so……………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………... 
50. Do you have any suggestions to best enable young people aged 
10-17 years (where there is adequate evidence against them and their 
rights can be fully protected) to gain eligibility for diversion from the 
formal criminal justice 
system?..........................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................
............................ 
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Appendix 5 Police Interview Schedule  
 
Police Interview Schedule 
 
Thank you for agreeing to meet with me today. I am currently researching 
as part of my professional doctorate at the University of Bedfordshire the 
role of the admission criterion within diversionary youth justice practices. 
The purpose of this interview is to try and assist me in obtaining more 
descriptive data and information from the views of stakeholders involved in 
diversionary processes, and how the admission criterion operates within it.  
I will also be interviewing legal representatives as part of this research.  
I anticipate the interview will last no more than 30 minutes.  
 
1. Do you have any questions before I begin? 
 
2. Have you completed and returned the questionnaire? 
 
3. Are you a police officer or civilian interviewer? 
 
4. What is your rank? 
 
5. How many years have you been a serving police officer or civilian 
interviewer? 
 
 
6. Are you currently based in the city or the rural police station?  
 
7. Can you recall how many times you have interviewed a young person 
who has committed a low level offence and was eligible for an out of 
court disposal? 
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8. Do you know what the current statutory admission criterion is? 
 
9. Can you explain it to me? 
 
10. Do you have a view on the standard of admission currently required of 
young people [read out the statutory criterion]? For example, is it a 
good standard, too tough, too easy? 
 
11. Do you think young people should have to make an admission in 
order to gain eligibility for an out of court disposal? 
 
12. Can you elaborate on your reasons? 
 
13. The statutory admission criterion is the same for 10 year olds and 17 
year olds. What are your views on whether age should make a 
difference as to whether young people should have to make an 
admission? 
 
14. Does age make a difference in your experience as to whether young 
people are able to make a satisfactory admission? 
 
15. Do you think the pressures of arrest and interview makes any 
difference to whether a young person makes an admission or not? 
 
16. Have you ever witnessed instances when a young person has 
unnecessarily lost the opportunity to receive an out of court disposal 
because they did not make an admission? If so can you suggest why 
this happened in those cases? 
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17. If you completed the questionnaire did you identify any other reasons 
not included in the questions? If yes can you elaborate for me on your 
reasons.  
 
 
18. If you did not complete the questionnaire can you look at question 1 of 
the questionnaire now, and tell me if there are any other reasons 
which have not been included? 
 
 
19. I am researching whether the police are given conflicting duties 
concerning what discussions they can have with young people, their 
Appropriate Adults and legal advisors before an interview about the 
possibility of a diversionary outcome. How easy or difficult is it to have 
those discussions? 
 
 
20. I am researching whether some young people are advised by their 
legal representatives to answer ‘no comment’ because they have not 
received adequate pre-interview disclosure from the police. What are 
your views on this? 
 
21. How would you describe the relationship between the police and legal 
representatives concerning constructive discussion about the 
possibility of diversion for a young person? 
 
22. Do you think legal advisors positively contribute to securing a 
diversionary outcome and/or the best interests of young people? 
 
23. I am researching what the role of the Appropriate Adult is when young 
people do not make admissions when it is in their best interests to 
have made one. What are your views about Appropriate Adults in this 
context? 
 
24. Who do you think is best placed to act as an Appropriate Adult to help 
young people make admissions in suitable cases to secure an out of 
court disposal?  
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25. When a young person does not initially make an admission, the police 
are not obliged to offer another interview. What are your thoughts 
about this? 
 
26. How willing would you be to offer a young person a second interview 
so that they can make an admission and secure an out of court 
disposal? 
 
27. I am researching whether there is a culture in some communities that 
encourages young people to avoid engagement with the police and 
answer ‘no comment’ in a police interview, even if this loses them an 
out of court disposal. What are your views on whether this may be 
applicable in this area? 
 
28. When you are interviewing a young person who has committed a low 
level offence and may be eligible for an out of court disposal, how 
often are they under arrest and interviewed in the custody suite?  
 
 
29. There is some research which suggests that BME youths are less 
likely to make admissions than white youths. Do you have any 
experience of this? 
 
30. Do you have any views on any changes to current practices that may 
improve opportunities for young people to make admissions and 
secure an out of court disposal?
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Appendix 6 Defence Interview Schedule  
 
Interview Schedule – Legal Representatives/Defence Solicitors 
 
Thank you for agreeing to meet with me today. I am currently researching 
as part of my professional doctorate at the University of Bedfordshire the 
role of the admission criterion within diversionary youth justice practices. 
The purpose of this interview is to try and assist me in obtaining more 
descriptive data and information from the views of stakeholders involved in 
diversionary processes, and how the admission criterion operates within it.  
I will also be interviewing police officers and civilian interviewers as part of 
this research.  
I anticipate the interview will last no more than 30 minutes.  
 
1. Do you have any questions before I begin? 
 
2. Have you completed and returned the questionnaire? 
 
3. Are you a solicitor or police station representative? 
 
4. Are you a Duty Solicitor? 
 
5. How many years have you been qualified? 
 
6. Can you recall how many times you have represented at the police 
station a young person who has committed a low level offence and 
was eligible for an out of court disposal if they made an admission? 
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7. Do you represent young people at the city and the rural police 
station?  
 
8. Do you know what the current statutory admission criterion is? 
 
9. Can you explain it to me? 
 
10. Do you have a view on the standard of admission currently required 
of young people [read out the statutory criterion]? For example, is it a 
good standard, too tough, too easy? 
 
11. Do you think young people should have to make an admission in 
order to gain eligibility for an out of court disposal? 
 
12. Can you elaborate on your reasons? 
 
13. The statutory admission criterion is the same for 10 year olds and 17 
year olds. What are your views on whether age should make a 
difference as to whether young people should have to make an 
admission? 
 
14. Does age make a difference in your experience as to whether young 
people are able to make a satisfactory admission? 
 
15. Do you think the consequences of arrest and interview influences 
whether a young person makes an admission or not? 
 
16. Have you ever witnessed instances when a young person has 
unnecessarily lost the opportunity to receive an out of court disposal 
because they did not make an admission? If so, can you explain why 
you believed this happened? 
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17. If you completed the questionnaire did you identify any other reasons 
not included in the possible reasons? If yes can you elaborate for me 
on your reasons.  
 
18. If you did not complete the questionnaire can you look at question 11 
of the questionnaire now, and tell me if there are any other reasons 
which are not included in that list? 
 
19. I am researching whether the police are given conflicting duties 
concerning what discussions they can have with young people, their 
Appropriate Adults and legal advisors before an interview about the 
possibility of a diversionary outcome. What are your views on this? 
 
 
20. I am researching whether some young people are advised by their 
legal representatives to answer ‘no comment’ because they have not 
received adequate pre-interview disclosure from the police. What are 
your views on this? 
 
21. How would you describe the relationship between the police and 
legal representatives concerning constructive discussion about the 
possibility of diversion for a young person? 
 
22. Do you think legal advisors positively contribute to securing a 
diversionary outcome and/or the best interests of young people? 
 
23. I am researching the role of the Appropriate Adult when young 
people do not make admissions when it is seemingly in their best 
interests to have made one. What are your views about Appropriate 
Adults in this context? 
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24. Who do you think is best placed to act as an Appropriate Adult to 
help young people make admissions in suitable cases to secure an 
out of court disposal?  
 
25. When a young person does not initially make an admission, the 
police are not obliged to offer another interview so that they can 
make one. What are your views about this? 
 
26. In your experience how willing are the police/CPS to offer a young 
person a second or multiple interviews so that they can make an 
admission and secure an out of court disposal? 
 
27. I am researching whether there is a culture in some communities that 
encourages young people to avoid engagement with the police and 
answer ‘no comment’ in a police interview, even if this loses them an 
out of court disposal. What are your views on whether this may be 
applicable in this area? 
 
28. How do you think young people perceive the police in this area, and 
how willing are they to engage with them? 
 
29. There is some research which suggests that BME youths are less 
likely to make admissions than white youths. Do you have any 
experience of this? 
 
30. Do you have any views on any changes to current practices that may 
improve opportunities for young people to make admissions and 
secure an out of court disposal?
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Appendix 7 Categories of Practitioner Questionnaire and Interview 
Respondents 
 
Completed Questionnaire Responses 
Respondents 5 years’  
experience 
5 years’ 
experience 
Total 
    
Civilian Interviewer 4 0 4 
Police officer  17 8 25 
Accredited Representative   3 3 
Qualified Solicitor 
 
3 15 18 
 
Total   50 
 
 
Interview Reponses 
Respondents 5 years’ 
   experience 
5 years’  
   experience 
    Total 
    
Civilian Interviewer 6 0 6 
Police officer  12 15 27 
Accredited Representative 0 0 0 
Qualified Solicitor  0 14 14 
 
Total   47 
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